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CHAPTBR I 
The aim of this survey is twofold. First, it attempts 
to describ~ &nd analyse .. the more import&.nt aspects of the 
Labour Government's economic policy, and second .. it attEJmpts 
to demonstrate how the achievement of tbis policy is conditioned 
by the oharacter1stics of the New Zealand econumy. 
The economic policy of the Labour Gove:rnrrltmt is important 
for several reasons.. First, both the 11reoover;y rneasuresn of 
the pravioua GoYernment during the depression, and Labour's 
policy after the depression ttJnd to show that New Ze<::<lhlncl, 1n 
common with other countries, is experiencing a definite t:rend 
towards an extension of State control, of economic life. 
Secondly, since the 1890's the Dominion bas indulged in economic 
and social experiments which have e.tt~·acted the b.ttention of 
economists not only in New Zealand but also abroad. The econ-
omic and soc1a.l policy of the Labour Government thus appears 
to be an acceleration o! this long td'!D trend. In addition 
it is generally recognised thr.t conditions in Hew Zealand ure 
more favourable to economic experimentation than those existing 
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in moat otber countries. In examining this policy 1t 1s of 
fUndamental importa.nea to realise that the Ottawa Agre.r:ruenta 
of 1932, mark the end ot an era when New Zealand could con. 
t1dently rely on a large and expanding overseas market for her 
Moreover the rise of econc,m1c ra. tio:nalism, the pro ... 
gre;;; s of egr:;:.rian protectioni~F<l, t.he development~ in the 
alternative sources of supply anc:t the declining rate of' growth 
of population. in the ConsUt"ning countries, all have forcibly 
demonstrated the inherent weakness of the New Zealand economy. 
Consequently the post de)Jression yeux·s ba.ve witnessed a con-
scious e.x:pans1on of New Zealand's secondary ind·us tries. Al-
though the soci&l and econom.io pol1c;r oi' the Labour Government 
is in many :respects similar to that of the Liberal Administration 
of' Ballance and Seddon in the early 'nineties' o!' last century, 
1 t ha.rii certainly been carriod out under far less favourable 
eiroums tancc')s. 
It is mainly !or these reasons that this subJect provides 
a fruitful field £or economie research. 
To cove:r the whol~ of the policy in detail would t~e 
beyond tba limits of a brief' survey of this natura. It would be 
possible to write a detailed. survey or1 any one~ aspect of the 
poliey. Neverth$les~, it is felt that £i b:roa .. ,.~. treat>nent or 
policy l.:':. tH.1t ~ntirely unfruitful. On the contl'ary a wide 
survey has much to corr..mend 1t, fer li detailed &;•al;y:>la oi' one 
aspect only tends to lose $ight o.f the nature of tile policy 
as a whole. 
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Thus the f'1rst two chapters a.re devoted to an arw.lysis 
of the Labour Government's Pr•og1•a.mrue and the ElCOnomi~J factors 
limiting the achievement of this programme. 
chapters are concerned w1 ttl thB development of }30li.cy. 
Separate chapters deal in turn with J~;onetary Policy, Marketing,, 
Tz·ansport 1 Rationalisation of' Industry 1 Import uud .lrbtchang~ 
Contr•ol, and Labour and Social Legislation. In a concluding 
chapter, the threads are drawn together and an evo.luation of 
the policy uttemtped. 
It should be noted that the period unde;r.' review extends 
;t.'rom 1936 to 19.39 inclusive. It does not deal with the :policy 
after th$ outbreak of war 1n September 1939, beoaus~ this has 
crtaated now problems &nd has thus taodif1ed to &. certain extent 
the direction of Govermn~nt policy., 
At the outset, originality is disclaimed, Much has 
already been written on pu.:ct:\.cular Hspects of policy, but 11 ttle 
if any, on the policy as a whole. 'l'he mat~:r1al hus been 
oollecte<i from. all uvaill>-ble relev8nt lite:r:ature, consisting 
of' numerous pan1phle·ts, periodicals; articles lind offici~oJls 
publications.. A detailed account of x·eferetl-.:es is givo:;:;n in 
th$ bibliography. 
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~ It i.e not proposed to reveal anything w.h:ich is not al. ... 
ready known to competent economists. This survey merely 
aims to amke a comprehensive ana critical analysis of the 
economic policy .followed by the Labour Gove;rrunent in the 
year$ 19)6 ~ 39, 
CHAPTER II. 
THE P.HOG.RAM .. ~. 
!. Labour's Programme. 
II. Methods of Achievement .. 
l.II. Limitations. 
I ,. LS&£?.2lit t I fro&;tiU!m@ • 
The fOWldations or the present Laboar Goverfu~entf$ policy 
were laid dow-n at a party conference in April 193:3, at & time 
when New Zealand. was facing a critical stage of' the worst economic 
depression in its history~ Undex· such condi tiona it is not at 
all surprising that the policy should :prove more applicable to the 
conditions then prevailing, than to those which we:r·e actually in 
existence when LabotU' came into office at the end of 19.35. 
It is worthy of note that the New Zealand Labour Party 
has always had as an iwporttJ.!lt plank in it$ political programme 
the complete state ownership &.l.d control of the r:uachinery of 
currency and credit. This plank has been amphusised over the 
years.. l11lloreover during the graa t depression when de!'la. tion 
succeeded und.e!" consumption the interest of the comn::u.n.ity in 
11tuonetary re.fo;rm 11 became all absorbing. Throughout the entire 
country, organisatlons and societies, lecturers and writers, whc• 
sever·ely c.riticised orthodox f'in&nce and advocated "unox·thodo~ 
monetary reform 11 recruited willing supporters f:r•om the ranks 
of all sections of the comrourdty suffering eco:noudc hardship 
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and distress. Chief amongst the;;e m.oneta.ry reformers wus the 
Douglas Social Credit Pa1·ty. By laying greet t emphasis on the 
abuses a.nd short--comings of the existing .financial sys te~.;_, it 
swept Nev1 Zealand like a religious revival.. 'I'he very <.iif'ficulty 
ot: understanding Douglt1s with his algebraic sy.tnbols and theorems 
rendered the publ1o. mo1·e willing to listen to the Douglas idove-
ment t s critical analysis of (~a pi tli<lis t .finance. But although 
thi.s movement withered f:i.wr...y, 6;.lrnost ~s :r·apicily as it had blossomed 
1 t succeeded in Etrou.sing public .opimbon to tha belief in the 
• necess1 ty for ch&nge. It is the.:,.~ not surprising tw:. t ti-le Labour 
Party's pt·ograriJJlle, with omph<'d:Hs pl&~.ced on monet4l'Y x·efoLm, and 
which hE~d the twofold aci.vf.1ntage of being apparently practical and 
positive, should ha.ve captured th8 imagination of the voters. 
!n &adition, although Lat1our pr·ofessed a socialistic aim, yet in 
practice it sought to bri.rtg about social and economic reform 
within the framework of' capits.lism .. To secure power, the Party 
b.a.d to expand into the rural electorates from its deeply entrenched 
position in tbe cities. It had to cope vnth two major prublems: 
first unemployment and secondly the financial difficulties of the 
small farmers. The policy hud t() be one of ccnnp!'olli1S~ on issues 
of conviction and e.l\,pedieney. To secure 1ts wideSt aypeal then, 
Labour must be neither inconsistent with ca.pi te.l1sm no;r with the 
possibility of eventual progress tow~rds socia.l1sm. At best 
Labour must o!'fer better wages, shorter .hou;r.•s end soc1ul services 
for all, and so operate a progr&rrwe of social controls and 
readjustments. 
The Labour Party placed their financial policy in the fore-
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front of tha1:r progra.ullile and prefaced this policy with u ttp:reamble", 
in {wnnectm.on with \"lhich all the mach1nel'Y p1'opo.sal3 were to be 
read. 'rhe preamble and progran~me were as follovls:-
1 
freamblet.! 
"~ PutJ20§e a£ prod1:\g~io;u The r)u:r·pofH>l of all produc .... 
t1on, primary and secondary, is to supply the social and economic 
requirements of the people, and thll1 duty of the State is to 
organise p:r.·oductive and distributive agencies in order to utilise 
the natural resources !Ol' this purpose. 
11 0nly a uourageous and vigorous policy can save our country. 
The policy of deflation has been pursu~d to such an extent that if 
there were an equitable distribution of e.-\..isting income, .L t would 
not be sufficient to allow thousands of househoibdere, fa.:t·mers, 
and business men to become solvent. A policy must start either 
from a found a Lion of' wholesale repudia.tion and bankruptcy or else 
we must organise tl'H,;, devalop<:ient o!' indust;ry and extend the social 
services to inoreuse the income of the people so a~ to pr·ovide a.n 
adequate stat1dared of' living and enable them to rr;.oot their pz·ese.nt 
co;;.rnitrnents. The cb.aotic state of the world has all'eady 
reduced prices of exports to ruinous levels, and our present 
econo;:nic condition is, to a large extent, due to the fact that 
New Zealand currency and creqit is determined by overseas prices. 
!'Qredii;. B~Si§, . OverS!e~SI .Qricgs. p.nt! cgnsiitivns Q51.1J.Ppt EW:( lOQge;r 
:tat al;}.owe ].,g. d:f:c tate New !fealeAd' s li vipg llSt:nctard. Mx proper· 
J?kiAP.kQg oi' PtQd:uctiou. Yt.Uh. guntrol g£ rr.§tl'!-&gtJ,ng !ill!! .f;j,.p.ance,. 
Nelf ~ep.lapd Cf!D estil?listl her own ~t pn a ·d. The be. sis or all 
credit and currency must be production goods and services). 
"This basis curi only be established and maintained by 
expanding the incomes of the mass of.' the people in f~\.:COl'(l with 
production and theil' social and economic requirements. 
11 Equ1 ties in land and homes w11icb have bean endangered 
by the deflationary policy or the Gl>Vernment (Coates and .Forbes), 
should be :re-established on the basis of an average of wholesale 
prices ruling during the past seven years. Present occupiers 
of. land and homes must be safeguarded against foreclosure pending 
the stabilisation of internal pl'ices on a basis which will allow 
then1 to meet their conu1Ji t:wents. 
"Un@ropJ.Q:ymentr The workers today unemployed are our fellow 
citizens who are out oi' work through no fe.ul t of their own. 'l'hoy 
Lee.John A. 
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are entitled to employJ)tent at a living wage. Failing such employ_ 
went they should be paid a su:Jterlance wage sufi'ic1ent to pr·ovide 
the necessaries ot' life for tl1.em and their dependants.. The 
co.n.di tions of pCt.y for men on relief works are tt standing U.i sgr·ace 
to the Dominion. The existing degrading systelll should be 
abolished at the earliest possible moment. frhe Party will organise 
productive devaloprnent for a.ll who are able to do it, including 
present ;relief workers, unemployed worne:n and youths who are 
leaving our schools. Penaing organisation of employment, the 
Party will inunediately increase the present rates of pay !'or 
relief wo.t·lcers. 
!9Ym:rwt~ed.Pr1gef, Guaranteed prices~ organised employment 
in primary and S$conda.ry industries, with a vigorous pub.lio woz·lts 
policy, local and n.r-ttional, at wages and salaries bas(:;!d on 
national production will ensure to tile .farmel' on the .1.a.nd 1 the 
worker in industry and all others an income, that will maintain 
a. standard of living to which the people of the Dominion are 
entitled. The ruinous policy of deflation and bankruptcy has 
been co:ns1stently opposed by Labou:r·, and we ai'firm a complete 
reversal of the Government's policy and the economic manageraent 
of th6 country generally has become a necessity of first magni-
tude". 
The Ten Points elaborated in the Manifesto were:-
(1) State control of Banking and Credit. 
(2) Removal o! restrictions on·deposlts in the Post Office 
Saving Bank. 
(:3) lif.wrganisation of the Mortgage Corporation into a State 
Advances institution. 
(4) Guaranteed prices for the farmers and negotiations of 
reciprocal trading agreements with G:rea t Br·i tain and other 
countries. 
(5) Statutory minimum wages and salaries. 
(6) A National Health Service. 
(7) National Supez·annua.tion. 
(8) Extension of Education facilities, 
(9) Organisation o! employment, with immediate increase of 
rates of rel1e.f :pay and expansion of public wol:'ks. 11 0ne of 
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the fir·st steps of the Labou.r Governwent wll.L be to ensure a full 
sha.re of the nationtJl production to those 'Nho o.re vvillir.L.g to 
work. 11 
(10) 'l'he fostering of such secondary itlCitJ.stries nas can produce 
couj,;JlOdi ties economically'' for the nmaintenance and impx·ovement 
of' our standard o.f living if 1alports do :not expand in proportion 
to the population. 11 
The appeal of this prog.rwill:r;~.e to self interest and social 
sympathies of different sections of the community rasultad in a 
sweeping vic tory !'ol' Labou:r at the 1935 elections, enabling the 
new GoVE!l.>nment to assm<Je office full of confidence. E~ven if 
Labour were correct in assuming th&.t a more libe:ral policy of 
borrowing and spending especially on lli{d.Jor public woJ.'.ks would 
prove a l!Ol'l'ective !'or u.w:omployment awj would increase conswnp-
tion, they most ce.x·tainly lost Bight of the fact tt1at export 
income of the Domini()H sets definite liuii. tu tions on tbe s tandia,rd 
of living of its people. 
l.t Me:ti:+QQ.~ 2£. Aghiev~ment. 
(1) Increasing production and employment through tile ust~ of 
ttPublic Cred1t 11 • 
The inuuediate aim or the Government was to decrea5e 
unemploy::.u.m. t . The reorganisatlou uf the Reserve Bank under the 
legislatioq enacted early in 1936 provided facilities for 
stimulating em.ploymen.t through various chanaels. T.he heserve 
Bank was empowered for inst.tu1ce to make advancee~ for such state 
undert~ki.ngs as Publ.ic Works,housing &nd esta:blishment o! 
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industries.· 
(2) Incroasing etnploymE!!nt through Government spending, 
involving redistribution o1' income .. 
It was considered possible to incz·ease employment and 
wage rates by i!lcrensing the nu.mbe:t'$ in the vr.:.ricus Government 
services, including PUblic Works. Consequently there was a 
considerable expansion of employm6nt in public services, to~ 
gather with a transfer of workers from relief work to fuLL time 
employ!jlent at sta.ndard rates of pay. 
(.3) Increasing employment, raising the standard of living 
through statutory hours and wages. 
Here the main aim was to increase money wnges. Mea.sures 
were immediately taken to shorten working hours and to fix a. 
basic wage_. both in industry and agriculture. In this policy 
there was the danger o!' the emergence of a vicious spir<"l of 
higher wages, costs and prices but this important point was over .... 
looked by the Govarnment in its first term of office. 
(4) {ted*str;Pmt}.on .thJ:ougn S,.qc~~l ~erv~ges. 
It was by making considerable expansion of the Social 
Setvices, rather than by ch<..mglng the incidence of taxation 
that the Government endeavoured to make redistribution e:ff'ectivJ. 
The increases 1n education_. health services and pensions was 
aimed at raising the real 1nooiaes of the lower income groups, 
The principal Act dealing with this aspect of Govarmnent policy 
was the Social Security Act of 19)8 which although a 1nea2ure 
11 
oL conside:co ole redlt:> trl buti ve v:"l1.w, oreu Led ~l st!Vere financial 
problem f0r the Government. 
(5) .li;c:,pansion of S§COtW~rt:ry: Industries, 
It wos the alni. of tht> Government to incre<~.se both pro-
due tion t<Ild eff'icieucy iu .l-'r imary and sec,;ndhry 1ndu~..;try. 
+J.'he Government proposwd an extension oi' the activities of the 
Department of Agriculture, the New lealand Dairy Boa.rd and 
kindred public organisations w1 th a view to inCI'fHJ.s1ng the 
ef:ficiency of farming. It C:lso brought forv.tru·u b.n Ina. us trial 
.Efficient Act designod to p·mr:.ott'.t ntlw rnost ·eco..:wmic foru' td:l.d 
organisaticn of industryn. 
(6) Stabilisation. 
It W<:.tS desired thut the measures as & whol8 \'ifOUld pro-
vide <1 weans of s tabllising the incuHJGS ana employment w1 thin 
the DLtCliniun. .t.:iuc}l pruu11nuuce vn~s given to & policy of 11 in-
su&a tionr, au(i ul thoug.b oxch&nge i.d1d ·L11port cvntrol wul'e not 
fJUt into opero. tion until Lf;buur' s sucor1c1 tena uf office, U1ese 
,f,Bbsures were llinted ut in the \.lric;iiwl pl'ogl'<lmrne oi' the P<:.Lrty. 
ll.I: J..;iu,.i t<:J U.ons g.£. the Pro.rp.>ElD1lJe. 
From tho r,.)utset tlH.:'lX'C V11Ul'e n ... alq f<.:CtOI"S ;<hieh tended to 
lind t Uw .::>uec:ess of tht:.~ t::b~1ve policy. 
Chhrf f:.tn;ong tlwse vv;;;;, tiu:; ndepoHde.clcun ui' the New L.ealDnd 
tl'<:J.de r·el<:~. t-iuns set vr.n·y. dei'ini tr.' l.Ld t•~ tions on tile staud.;,,rd 
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of living and degree of internal econ0mic activity of the 
])oruinion. New Zealand has attained a high deg:J."ee of' special-
1sation in her e.grioul tural and pasto:s:-al industries; she is 
desperately lacking in heavy indust:r;J..es; she must depend upon 
overseas markets for supplies of raw mnteri~ls, sawi~finished 
goods and capital equipment, and she bas a large balance o! 
financial obligations dulfl. overseas each year. And secondly 
th1$ programme suffered !'rom a Conjiderable adrnixtu:t'e of tuUddled 
thinking on the p~u·t of those responsibl$ :for .earrying it out. 
In this connection a comment of J.M.Keynes is most interesting. 
"lt sounds to me as tb<~Ugh the aims of your new Govern-
"nent are partly admirable but in. serious dange1· of proving a 
fiasco f.rol1t the adr1ixture of nrudd.Led thinking which lies behind 
1 
the.m." 
It was nowhere suggested ttls•.t New Zeal&nd should adopt 
a policy of self sufficienc;r and withdraw tram ltorld trade • 
i 
She was still to benefit .from. int~;rnat1onal trade and at the 
f' 
same time secure herse.l!' against .fluctuations in export prices. 
Ona eff'eot of this policy was to ctluse $ome serious di:t'f:tcul tj.es 
for the Government in. relation to costs, profits and tho export 
of capital .. 
Actually the Govei'nw.ent t s policy c&lled not for stab1 ... 
lisation but for steady and continuous ex.pa.nsi.on of both mo:ney 
·i Quote· irom tee,j .A". op.cit.p) 
1.3 
incomes and production. But increased spending within New 
Zealand woulcl. merely raise the volume and value of imports, 
while a.n:y expansiofl of' domestic industry must necessarily in-
volve inc1'easad inlpoz·ts of raw rn.atez·ials and producers• good. 
Thus the more I'apid the a ttemptea rate of expansion, the more 
ii.aports increase and these in turn depend upon e.Aport prict:ts. 
The central problem then woulcl be one of conserving sterling 
exchange and regulating the rate of progress in co:nfoz·m! ty with 
the amount of sterling availablf;t., Tne pi'ognuru:ue Wf.!s limited 
also by the fact that soma expansion had already taken place, 
the relative shortage of sltillt:d. labour available 1r,t New 
Zealand and that an inevitable lag wust arise befoz·a extensions 
and new factories could be established. In addition any inM 
creased saving would cause diff1culties on account of' the llm.1ted 
nature of' l~ew Z$aland ' s capital war ke t . There would be a 
tendency for investors to seek the 1uore highly organised capital 
markets beyond the Dominion .. This would cause a contraction 
in sterling exchange and may be one fac.tor in the subsequent 
decline of the funds at e. later date. 
These are some of tH.e n1ore importent limitations on thia 
policy and difficulties with which tbe Government would ultimately 
have to cope. After· having coxlsidered the characteristics of 
the New Zealand economy and the economic and mo.netal•y condition of 
New ~ealand in 1936, then an attempt will be made to describe and 
the l:l'lore important econo1nic experiruen ts of the Labour Government. 
CHAPTER Ill. 
rmw ZEALAND: BCONOMIC Ji'ACTO&S. 
I. Characteristics of the H"ew Zealand Economy. 
11. Economic Conditions 1935 - 36. 
III. Monetary Situation 1935 - )6. 
In order to understand .fully 1 and to place in their true 
perspective the economic experiments underte.ken by tne Labour 
Government, it is of prime importance ttU~tt we htAVe some k:nowledge 1 
however brit:ilf', of the characteristics of' the New Zealand econoL'lY. 
There are still ra:r too 111any who possess tt vague idea only, o!' 
th~ manner in which the characteristics ir:.f'luenca ar1d i1upose 
very defin1 te limi tatim1e upon our prospex·i ty t.~.nd upon any internal/ 
policy of economic planning. We shall deal briefly with some 
of the main features of our economy a.n.d. then draw certain inferences 
wh1cn seem to be important. 
1 .. b;oflYtct,lon •. 
For t.be year 19.37 ... 38 the value of producti.un was 
distributed as follows among the difrerent classes of industry. 
Agricultural 
Pastoral. 
Dairying,Poultry €ftc. 
1ot~f!l. l.ftrma.ms. 
Mining. 
Fisheries. 
F1orea try .. 
Factory. 
Building etc. 
XQ:tAJr Ng;n .... F@.fi/iipg_. S?rang total. 
4g:~ 
JJ.B 
4.6 
0.6 4., 
30.0 
13.2 
15 
t t •. 1 • (£ ,. 
~- J a;.~ . b _, ., 1 
10Q 
This ta.'ble includes only the value of goods produced at 
wholesale pl'ices: it does not include other services except in so 
far as they a:r·e embodieo. in the wholesale prices o!' goods. The 
added value of' proc::essing, Ga~nel;y butt&l' and cheese waking, meat 
freezing etc. is included in the .farm group. 
exolude r(ttail distribution, pass engel' transport, medical services, 
and many public services :such as education. 
The most outstanding feature of thl.s table is the high 
relative importunes o.f farming inaustrie~ in the national econo1ay 1 
61% of the value of total production being the product of these 
industries. During the past twenty fivo years Uw vttlue of 
farrn pr·oductiou bas varied from 60 to 65 per cent ot' the value of 
total production, the variations being due lli&inly,to incraas6s 
in the volume of' farm products" 
This pre-dominant 1mport&uce of fanui:ng production 1s due 
to the fact tht~t New Zealand possesses conditions of soil and 
climate which are ll1ghly favourable to th@se inctuaLries and to 
the large overseas rHtU'Kets in Great Bz·i tain. On the whole 
efficient i'armin& techniques have been developed to exploit the 
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courJ.tryt's natur~l udvan.tages and these in turn nave been supported 
by e!':Ciciont syste.trlS of proces::.;ing, t:t'bi.twpox·t and mnrketing. 
On the other hand i~ew Zeal-a.o.d is not f.a.vourably enaowtlH.'i 
w1th t.m~ condition$ ru:lcess&.ry to develop a, .high degree ol' L;.dustrial 
aoti.vl.ty. 
materials for the heavy industries, $UCh as i1·on cUl.d st.eel, and a 
small domestic ~arket. .ln ~ddi tion even this araall market is 
sub-div:t.ded iHto smallEU' markets by the high cost of tn:msportl;).tion, 
arising from the impediments 1mpos€)d by topography. Labour 
costs, too, are high in New Zeal;j;nci, owing lai'gely to tu~ exist ... 
enee of labour codes ana mili t&nt trade ut.1io.ns. Despite these 
impediments to the establishment of large scale secona~ry 
industries, a considerable dagN9c <.Jf' J.ruanuf'hotu:ring development 
has taken place, especially in coun.$ction with the protected or 
sheltered clothing industries, fur·n.iture l.fJaki.ng,building etc. 
where economical production does not necessitate lar~e scale 
production. Generally howove:r, the size of the indu~tr1a1 
establishment is small.,. The following table will mhke thi& 
point clear. 
2 ... 10 
11 ... 20 
21 - 50 
51 -100 
Over. 1QQ 
.... 212~. 96 ,£i.Q1 
OUr survey so fax· makes it quite clear that New Zealand 
1& exceptionally well adapted for farw production,especially 
sheep and d&iry :farming and much less actapted for t.iianu:.factur1ng 
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production. 
2 • E;;;:t~Jt'Uf!l ; %rage. 
The uniqut~ advu.utages in fanu production, and 
the relt:.tive dis~dvanto.ges in manui'uoture &l'tt re.t.'loOt$d with very 
g:reat irnportunca, in extot'nal trat:de, whi!.!h is hight:r per hec..d of 
popula. tion Ulan i:n any otr1e:r country. Expressed in New Zealand 
cui~ren.cy the value o:.t: e:x.ports was £36 6s 8d per head of population 
tn 193S; imports were valued ut £.34 9s 10d per head and the value 
of total trade was k-~70 16s 6d per head. 'l'he value of exports 
and imports a::ca usually high in rel~tion to the total value of 
production. li'or the sea son 19 3 7 ... 3 8 the totals ware : 
V§.lye.oft .. , _ 
¢ - - . - -
Production .. 
F'arm Production. 
Exports. 
};~:Qo,r1¢§ • .. 
1.35.6 
83.1 
61.9 
27.5 
During recent yau.rs pastol.~ul products, H<(.iinly u:teat,wool, 
dai:ry produce, hides aw:l so on, have provided from 92 to 95 per 
cent of the valu41il of ull exports, the :.·eua1nder t,el,.ng mining, 
agricultural, a:n.d fo.te8tr·y products. Tt1e value ot' exports has 
usually been about 44 per cent of the value of t:~lJ. production 
and .t'arming exports hr.we been frmt. 65 to 70 per osnt of the 
value of farm production. 
Ir.1ports cover a wide var1ety of items, but th~ i'ol,low1ng 
table gives u broad cla~;11fioat1on of the imports :fo:r 1937 .... 3a. 
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..;~;Q.=l ... a,...r;.;.s .... ,  ___ .....,__._~-------._....--------_.£,.._,.I"'"'~ ...... z ...· ·~m,...· • ..___,~-...,. 
:F'ood. .Prink Wld 'I'oba<;co. 
RF.lW Material:;; etc. 
!iw.nufactu:red or semi-manufactured. 
Othe-r. 
6.7 
1.95 
4-7. ';;.:() 
1.65 
Of th*.:.H~ imports about 4-7.9 per cent came from the United 
.Kingdo:n, 25 .. 7 per cent frotri other &npi:re countl'hrs, and about 
26 per ceut from foreign courltrist~, th~ most important or which 
was the United States, 
New Zealand have been developed lH:t'gel;y by mo.r1ey bor:x·owcd from 
ov~r$eas, e$-pecially frob:" Britain, with the :r~:Jsul t that both 
public t:1.nd private indebtedness is exceptionally heavy. 
Government au~ Local Body Debt on )h,t l~rch 1939 
£. N;z.m_. 
,tlpmgq1be· ...... 
United_ Kingdom 
Australia 
. Q.9x::u:mnent . , . 
156.86 
&.ocf;! 12od-¥ ..... • __ _ 
13.e6 
,.88.3 K: .17 
~=·:: :ti!t:: ' : : : : : ~§s: ~a: : : : : : ~0 ~ : : 
From the above tabla it will be noticed that 54 percent 
of Governtuent debt was held in tb& United Kingdom and 4~.6 per-
cent 1n New Zealand; 26 percent of Local Body debt was held 
: 
1n the United Kingdom end 76 percent in Nf.lw Zealand. The annual 
interest payable on Government rutd Local Body debt was £ N.Z.1J.5 
million of which £ N.Z.6.5 millions wa.a payable overseas. 'fo 
this fi.gure must be added the 1ntere:Jt payable on privfJ.te debt, 
insurance premimns, 1 shipping cbuz•gea and othex· i terns, waking 
a total of about £ N.Z.12 milliom. Thus if New Zea1fU1d 1s to 
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pay hef· way, $xpo:rts must exceed imports in v~luo by a.t least 
£ N.Z. 12 million par year. 
It is important to realise that i!fterest and other financial 
charges remain fixed 1n terms of money. They are paid for out 
of export reoeipts. Hance 1! the prices of exports fa.Ll• more 
exports ar~ aequired to pay the intere~t on the bill and fewer 
exports are left over to !inance the purchase or imports" The 
reverse is the case when export prices ristH less imports are 
required to pay the interest. bill and more remain for the 
purchasing Q! imports. This tact is of fundamental importunes 
in the economic wel fa.r.e · of New Zealand. 
The volume or priv£te debt i.s surprisingly large in New 
Zealand. At the end o£ the financial year in 1938 private 
mortgage debt alone amounted to·£ l~. z. 2.)5 million, of which 
£ N-z. 105 m.was on urb(;J.n properties and £ N.Z. 130 m. was 
\ 
on rural properties. 
'!he volume of debt, both public as well as private has 
an important bearing upon smployment within the Dominion, Since 
interest charges are fixed, a fall in p_:t•ical3, here, or overse~te 1 
mEum• simply that those ~H~ople who have box•rowed the money have 
less, after m-eeting thei;r debt .commitments, for othe:r purposes. 
They will be forced to reduee·employment and probably the wage 
:rate as wtJ.l. 
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In conclusion the following 1mport~:mt inf'e:renc~s oe.n be 
made .f':rom the above b;rief survey. 
(1) By virtue of 'its highly f&vourable climatic and soil 
. "'0--....:·~-- -- "" --- -- ~ • 
N(l.tW Zealand, 
because of her scarcity ot suitable raw materials, and small 
domestic market is .relatively unsuited to lC'.J.rge scala manu..: 
ractu.ring, Generally we can buy most manufactured goc1ds 
abroad more econOJ1l1cally than we oan produce them our a ~;ill ves. 
New Zealund*s spec:t.al1sat1on ip, farming production under tbe;se 
conditions haa en&bled her to develop a high •tax:1dard of living. 
(2) Because of t.he special advantages in primary production 
and relative disadvantages in mar1Ufaeturing, NI!Jw Zt:utl!!t~ll.~' s 
Ji'arm production pro ... 
vides the bulk of the expo;rts, while the bulk of importa, 
I 
uaually manufactured of semi ... manu.facturcd goods, ia obtained 
from the Uni teet KirigdomJ whieh at the same ti:rQ.e pl·ovid.Bs the 
p:rit1cipal .m.a.rket. 
(J) 
a considerable portion is domooiled overse&s. About £ N .z. 12 
million 1s required annually to meot the interest charges on 
this debt, and this amount must be paid .fo.r out of export. :receipts. 
'I'h1s volume of d€Jb't;_. can prove _a serious bux•den-when~V.8I's6las 
>....-~---'-----·-- _,_ -
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pric.H:>$_fil..ll, and more ... over 1 t can reuc* unfavou:rably upon 
,---
internal economic activities. 
In considering the Labou1· Government •s economic policy 
the above facts must be constuntly borne in m1.r1d. 
When the new Labour Goverruuent assumed office at the end 
of 19351 ·New Zealand had Just ernerged from the severe economic 
depression of 19.30 .. 34, during which some import&nt economic 
changes had been carried out. 
proved to be teraporary only but it is important to notice that 
others were adopted by the Labour Government, especially thos• 
in oormeH;,tion with the re ... di$tributlon of income. 
important of these oha~ges oan be broadly classified as follows:-
(1) Trade and free-dom ot economic enterp;ri~Ht wez·e restricted 
not only in New Zealand but throughout tha whole world. 
where there was a swing away trom 1nte1·national trade to trade 
restrictions and eco!).gJ1I~ft nationall"sm; everywhere nations sought 
~--:;..._~--
a wa.y out of tbe depre2Ja1on b-y p:rotecting their own industries 
both primary and $econdary1 and N~w Zealand was no exception. 
(2) New Zealand depreciated her currency 1n January 1933 and 
e.ff'ected improvements in her banking system by aBtabl1shing a 
Reserve Bank in August 1934. 
(.3) A measure ot re-distribution was achieVf!ld 'by the con-
version of the internal debt at lowex- rate$ o! interset, the 
:reduction of_r~~t and 1_x;~~_r~e~t on ruottgs:t_s;~~---nnd by a public 
c-----
f1nanoe policy ;involving incre~!E!_~~ t(tXation and inS'!_~-~~~d e.x-
pen~~~~-9IJ.~()Q1a.l_serv1oes. 
The ec::onomio depression was transmitted to New Zealand 
by a heavy tall in export prices which drastically reduced ex-
port income, despite an incroas in the v-olume of production. 
In a desperate effort to maintain their incomes f.a:rme:rs sought 
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to increase their output. The value of exports declined !rom 
£ N_z. 55 m, in 1928 ~ 29 to £ N.z. 35 m. in 1931 • 32; while 
the value oi~ total production declined from £ N.,Z •. 126,6 ln. 
to £ N.Z. 84 m. over the same period. By 1936 conditions 
were again approaching the 1929 level; export reoe1pts and the 
value ot production were rising, in~ernal trade was expanding, 
.fact_g~y production showed a m.arked increase, and bank. dt~posits 
attained a record high level. 
The follow1ng tables indicate clf'#arly the extent of 
recovery in tbe economic conditions of New Zealand at the ad ... 
vant or the Labour Government to office in DEH'!em))er 19.3 .5. 
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Yiat ·' - I , . . . hports Excess' of 
. f4igrts. 
From these fig·ures it will be noticed th<;t t export 1noome 
and to.tal value of production had declined by about one third 
from 1926·29 to 19J2~JJ. The exchange rate was raised from 
£ N.Z. 110• £ stg. 100 to£ N.Z4 125 ~ £ stg. 100 in 1933 in 
order to expand purchasing rower within New Zctaland.T'nus 'by taking 
the value of production, less exports-, plus imports, we can 
calculate the eo.nsumr.uc~ble goods availabl$. It will be soen that 
this policy was more o,r less stlocessful. 
'. 
" i : : : :: I : J :::::: ·• • 
( u 6'" t T t t r ~ J *' . IJ 1 ' 
On the other band tt 18 true thrat some unemployment 
remained, but it was reiD.sonable to a:x.pect that it would soon 
be ab$or'b•d by the wave of expand1ng business. 
p ± 
ltwu= :- ld . 
't1iip1ao8a or 
1nel.1gible. 
= .. 
6n MationuCi on listen ... · 
Relief work. anoe Con-
trFct. Wg;rj, 
---
--
On subsidi'st;{(' Total 
Full emploY- frorn Fund. 
!A~pt.. l. 
In New Zealand unemployment, which follows nlQVernents of 
produntion end trade has a marKed seasonal v~:tr:ie.tion., It 
reache& the amlUal pe~tk about A ugust and is lowest about March. 
The rigures given theretora show about the worst phases of . 
ell.Oh year. The highBst totals were recorded for Septem'ber 19.33. 
and by 1936 the Septe:;iber !igur~ had been substantial11 reduced. 
the numbers unplaceu or ineligible have also been greatly re-
duced and those rationed relief work (No 5 Scheme) which former..-
ly absorbed the majority mve been greatly reduced. 
Just as th$ onset ot unemployment .followed a heavy fall 
1n export prices so arise :S.n export prices was .t'ollowt'd by a 
decrease in unemployment. After 19~9 export price$ fell haavi-
ly and unem}.:loymcrmt becarne very severe. S1noe 19.:33 prices have 
risen and the process has been rev.vraed. From 193;:.33 to 19.36 
exports i,;ncreas!jd by 68 percent, other production by 49 p€:1rcent 
and total production by 62 percent. Botb on the downward and 
upwards trend exports moved about a year in advance of other 
1 Chamber of Comtnerce Bulletin, No 159, April 1938. 
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production. the relation shown between the columns of figures 
in the table on page leave little room tor doubt that 1n 
New Zealand changes in e~port prices were the main caus& both 
ot the depression and its consequent unemployment and of the 
subsequent r~oovery. This recovery was well on the way by 
1936t 
;tnsteas .. IPxml?!tl. gt Wtt&e fue.~ms •• fteJtiJ:.~ . P:tt-9!•. tAU~ . Pw:£0£.f'tl'·· Pgwfr 
· Q' Wa.ge;t, 1 
Year 
1928 
1929 
19.30 
19.31 
1932 
1933 
19.34 
,935 
1936 
·a. 
• '. 
... 
102 
. .. 
10~ 
102 
94 
86 
8.3 
84 
86 
25. 
(1926 ... )0 = 100) 
101 
101 
98 
91 
g~. 
79 
S1 
84 §g 
. 'it. 'J 
l - i P 11UI 
Purchaain& Power Qf Wage§ • 
101 
101 
104 
104 
103 
105 
104 
,03 
_310 . 
'l'hes• f1gu:res indicate how, during the depression period 
wages fell less tapidly than prices and the pw·chaaing power of 
Aa rt~eovery i'ollowed, up to the end of 1935, 
wage rat$S. rone but prices tc,nded to increase more rapidly and 
a om• o1' the ·increased ptll'chasJng po·wer or wag-es was lost* The 
increases both in wage r.&.tes and· in purchasing power wad lh.rgely 
due to the changed condi tiuns undex· the legL':.lEJ. ti\m en~cted. 
early in 19.36. 
1 op oit bto ffi, August 1937. 
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By far the moat important f'cea•~ea ot tbf& monetary 
situation; in the light of subsequent eventst were the position 
of the Reie:rve Bank and the aoou.w;ulation or London Funds. 
The introduction of central banking 1n New Zealand caused 
oonald•rable ohangea in tba structure o! the banking system. 
The gold reserves of _;~e $rll<i111.i _banks we:t•e &rans.ferred. tQ the 
-=----~-~-~-__2~-~ . .,..-.L-, .. -"O-.oo-·~-~·--:·------~-~--~-::--·_r-- · .. -_.,.. ....• _-.,_ •. ~--·- __ c_-· ·-- .,,...-_., ___ ,~----::---_-, '""·:-•---~:·.·' _ .--:· '"'- ,-.-.~--"- •' -~---·---• 
Re3~;:!,fil .. BQ.nk; the iJ:'ading b&nks I!IUI'rendered their right of 
Jrt<:>-~-"~~,.._-·• -. -.- -. -----~- . ---- _- ---- . =-o- .-=.- ''--=--··· 
note $.S$\1EtJ the greater par-t o.f the Government bank deposits 
-.-:: :.:---:------ - ..... ! . . ·- -· .• ' 
formerly held by tbe Bank$ of New Zealc~nd ~ta transferrdd 
to the Reserve Bax1k and 1n addition the trading bar~s had to 
plac• minimum deposits with the Resen:·ve Bank,. Large transfer& 
of exehange funds wt~~re clso carl'ied out. Some £20 stg.m. 
of London .t'unds held by the Governm•nt were transferred. to the 
Reserve Bank &l'ld were used to pa.y ott: a corresponding large amount 
of Treasury billa ht-Jl.d bj' the trading banks. The Reserve 
Bank thua oommencad with cwnsidera'ble holdings of sterlic ..g. 
The position of the t.rading banks was also very heal thy. 
Bank deposits in New Zealand were large, advancea s~ll ~nd the 
r~----· 
holdings of London funds exceptionally large. Hence the 
transfer involved no strain on the money and cz·0dit system and. 
apart from the ohango in note issue, there was no apparent change 
in the working of the system. 
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When the Reserve Bank' opened for business it announced 
that it would buy and sell sterling exchange at £ N.,Z .• 125 
and £ N.Z. 124 per £ stg 100 respectively, and it w~s anticipated 
that these rates would remain unchanged for a considerable 
time. This announcemen.t had the effect of stablising the ex-
change. The Bank announced also that its discount rate would 
,~-- ---~-,,,, 
be at f'ou:r percent, but this was subsequently reduced to two jer ... 
cent. During the first tiiO years of 1 ts operations, trw Bank 
made neither advances nor disco~~ts. It was concerned with 
rnanagin.g the note issue 1 holding Government and trading bank 
deposits together with some other small deposits; 1t maintained 
a gold reserve of £ N.Z. z.a m. and held large fusds in sterling, 
This was a period of abundant money, low interest rates and 
steady expans:l.on. 
1929 
19)0 
19.31 
19.32 
19J3 
1934 
19.35 
'!'he .figures give a goad indication of the brllnking 
situation Up to the 'beg1rming of Labour A dmin1stration, The 
eapansion of deposits was almost £ N.Z. 10 rn since 193~ and the 
oo.ut:ract.ton in advances was almost £ N.Z. 4 m, Depostits stood 
ilt record high l.$V&ls while the excess of deposits over advances 
was also very high. 
Year 
1"928-29 
1932 ... 3.3 
19.3 5-.36 
Other 
. Hece;j..p_;a., 
5.771 
61199 
4.61 
Total Re-
v.~p~§ •. 
23. 0 
22.57 
~:6,17 
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1 including £ N;.z.' 2m from reserves. 
These figures show that, excluding employrnent taxation 
which is not included in the Budget• tax revenue had 1rloreased 
substantially since 1932-.33, thB lowest mark of the depression. 
Total expenditure had also expanded with revenue, &xceedinc 
the pre-depression level. 
The total amount of London funds at the enct of 193' 
was exceptiona.lJ.y lat-ge 1 this figure being appx·oxima tel:r £N. z.40 m. 
During the depression severe measures were undertaken to 
secure budget equilibrium • 
• 
They included the cessation of over .... 
seas borrowing, drastic outs in salaries and wages and an increased 
scale of taxation. But by the time the new Labour Gover·nment 
had assumed office at the end. of 1935, aconornic recovery v~as well 
on th~ way; budget revenue was bouyunt, the taxation yield had 
increased at1d the Govermnent could confidently expect a further 
increase in the taxation yield in the future. Although re-
covery had largely been achieved and the monetary situation 
placed on a sound basis as ::;hown by the accumulation of London 
funds (£ stg.46.6.m. 1n May 1935), there still remained some 
outstanding problems requiring solution. F'or instance, although 
unemployment had been r·educed from 73 .. 6 thousand to 60.3 thousand 
at the end of September 1935, this problem was still serious. 
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In addition large loans were due to mature 1n Gx•ea.t Britain 
in tlle not distant future., The plight of the small farmers, 
and in particular the small dairy farmers was still serious •• 
Much of public policy would therefore be conditioned 
by whatever method would be adopted to c·ope with the problem 
of unemployment, Two course$ were open to the Government~ 
first to allow unemployment to be absorbed by the expanding 
wave of business or second1y to absorb them directly into· State 
undertakings . sUch as ~!?.~!<!.">!~~~s.. The Labour Government 
chose the latter method. 'l'he excess of London funds was to 
prove a .fPCt(~l" of first importance in that it made possible a 
policy ot· internal business expansion. 
CHAPT.li:R !V 
MONE'fAfC! POLIC'Y. 
I The Reserve Bank of N.Z. J~andment Aot 1936, 
II Budget Policy. 
II! Cap1ial Expenditure. 
IV lntern~l Bo~rowing~ 
V Credit Expansion. 
VI General Remarks, 
As stated earlier Labour has always placed its monetary 
and financial. policy in the forefx·ont or its programme. Jitcrom 
time to time statements by Gover,rur.H:~nt members and others, have 
been made concerning the utilisation of ttpublie cred:itf11 "eost-
less credit", and suob delightfully vague phrasea a.s ''money 
power for the& people,. n and the like. Vague a5 tb~se tex·ms maybe, 
yet in actual pr~ctioe they meant nothing more nor less than the 
oornplete state ownership and control of the Reserve Bank, 
Accordingly tb~ first major legislation of the new Government was 
the Reserve Bank of New Zealand Amendment Act of April 19361 wh1<:h 
which placed the Bank at tha disposal of the State. 
ment defined the functions of the Bank as follows: 
This amend ... 
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tt It shli•ll be the general funct1un of the He serve Bank 
within the limits of its powers, to give effect as far as maybe 
to the monetary policy of the Gover:ni:uent, a.s communicated to 1t 
from time to time by the Minister of Finance. F'or this pur .... 
pose and to the end that the economic and soc lal welf'a.r a of New 
zealand may be promoted and mai:ntained, the Bank .shall :regulate 
and control aredit and cur:rency in Hew Zaa;Lan<i, the transfer o! 
moneys to or from. New Zealatld 1 at1<i tllo di$posals of moneys that 
are derived from the sale of any New Zealand products and for 
tbe time being aa are held oversea5 .. n 
Thi$ amending Act brought the Reserve Bt:nk under cmuplete 
State ownership and control. 
! 
The share capital of the 
Bank was paid off 1 shar·e-h.oldex·s rectriving £H .Z.6/S/- for 
each £N.z.s share held. The capital item of £N.z. t million 
disappeared from the balance sheet but the general reserve waa 
supplemented by this amount. The number of Directors remained 
unc11anged but all these now becB.J:ue State appointed, and held 
office a.t the pleasure of' the Minister of F'inanee. The Secretary 
of the Treasury was given power to vote. !n addition the Bank's 
power to lend was grea.tly extended.. The Bank was empowered to 
make advances to the Government or to any authority h~vins 
statutory ppwers 1tl respect to the r:n&rketing of New Zealr,,nd pro ... 
duce, to unde~write loans to the Governnient o£ StHte Advances 
Corporation hnd to issue and rn&nage loans to:r the Government or 
local bodies, Finally the limit o!' one halt ye£i:t' t 8 revenue 
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placed on the total amount of Trea$Ul'Y Bills that oould be 
discounted for the Government was extended to the full revenue 
o! tbe Government for one year,. 
It will be aeon from the above brief analysis of the 
changed ste.tus o:t' the Reserve Bank that the Labour Govern.ment 
wEir$ now in a positton to use the Reserve Bank as an instrument 
or their policy. Ad.vano•s f':rom the Bank could be utilised 
in various waysa for bouaing, through the State Mvanoe$ Cor ... 
poration or otberwiseJ for public works, a.nd in fact it could 
rnalte loans tor the development ot' any industry at present being 
pperated 1n New Zeal.::...r1d 1 or for the establishment of any new 
industries 1n New Zealand, (sucb as the proJeat~d Iron and Steel 
worka.) 
tn tbo words of the late ?rime Minister the purpose 
of the new bunking legislation was:-
"All we want is to uae the public o:-edit to develop New 
Zealand.; :tt does not ntatter whether we borrow money or issue 
money through our own credit insttitutivns, the same thing applies. 
The public ore41t is pledged, and the productive powar of the 
1 
peoplt must be the foundation of :1 t in the long run. '' 
But during the first two and a balf years of tta regime 
the Government wns able to operate on relatively orthodox lines 
1- lt.Hon.""M.Y:savage, "!i .. z. PAr:bl.&mtAtarr I?tiak!U•" Vol 2.44 P 157 
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and was saved from resort to erl'tdit creation through the 
maeh1ner1 of th$ Re$er~e Bank, by the bouyant stute of public 
finance. This was mainly the :result of x-ising export prices 
and e~panding export receipts .. 
During the period under review the GovernmBnt presented 
four budgets. Each year has shown progressive increase in 
expenditure from cur:N3nt revenu~ but only twitHt ciuring this 
period wus 1t found tleoessary to alter the rates of taxation, 
In 1936 income taxes were increased on higher 1ncoma:s~ and a 
gl'aduated land tax was also introduc~d. In 19.39 further im-
oreaJta were made in income taxJ petrol tax, 'beer duty tax and 
death duties. The Go<vernment was favoured with bouyant ex-
port pr1c.H3fi ovei' the es.rly period ot of':fioe and. these were re-
f'locted :t.n the budget results as shown in the following tables. 
19JS ... ;36 
19.36-37 
19.37-J$ 
.l2J§ ... Ji 
' 
. "" . ·-·. li'~ 1!11!:· .... 
26.94 4.21 ~1.15 30.68 .47 
31.66 4.40 J6.o6 l5.25 ,81 
• ~'. JQ '*. 6:1 .. • .11-A4 .. 2 ..... ~-· __ ,_,._,. ..... 77 ............ _,. ............ ;..-.8.,;.,J, --··-
The outstanding !eattU'e of these figurQs is the healthy 
increase of £ N,.Z. 10 m in the yield of taxation between 1935·36 
Marked inereaaes in taxation yiields occurred tn 
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the :returns from Customs 1 Sales 1 Motor Vehicle and Income 1'ax .... 
a.t1on as will be shown in th~ next table~ 
In , ·addition the:se figures show that the proportion of 
1nd1:rect taxation to total taxation was high; it constituted 
54 per:eent of' thtJ total in 1937..-38. The level of taxation is 
high compared with the level or internal economic activity, but 
it is important to note that this ratio is 1noreaa:Lng. In 
19.35 ... .36~' the ratio of taxation tQ the value of production was 
( 
18.8 percent., :1n 1939 was 22.5 per"ent,. It will be noticed too 
that the greater portion of Governn~nt revenue 1s derived !rom 
taxation •. In 19JS ..... J9 total revenue amounted to£ N.Z • .36.5S 
million, of which £ N.Z • .32.30 million came fro:m taxation. 
But thil high level or taxation c~n OQ ma1ntainqd only so long 
a$ there i.s a high national incom~ to support it, and the 
national income is largely dependent upon export prices. It 
these f~ll 1 and ther• is nothing that th$ Government can do to 
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_prevent tbe:Lr fal.ling, then the ·taxatiort yield ,must :fall as well. 
The above table does not include tne taxtltion !rom the 
Unemployment Promotion Fund. This account 1s presented. separatelt. 
The .f1gut'e8 for this Fund are as follows. 
::::::I ~:: ~~:~~~ ·: ··.::.: .: :: 
.3,92 
.4.26 
5.14 
........ ...... ...2.2£?: I .. . .. -
This fund was instituted durib.g the depression as an 
emergency measure. 
to provid• sustenance, unernployed r<al1et.f, and ether emplGyment. 
But in 19.39 the 1ntrodulot1on of tlla Soeilil Secu;ri ty Scheme placed 
a dd1t1onal strain upon this Fund. It was consequently abolished 
and its revenu$ tra.nster.red to the Social security i'und. 
'there are two serious tailings to bs found in the p:rttct1oe 
Though. these a.t$ distinct they are 
~·lrst tbe DJnount o1' taxation raquired 
:ls higher than can be sat' ely co~J..ecti;td by the iu.thods adopted" 
S&eondly the methods of collection together with thenature and 
incidence of the taxes are in rwa.ny ca,ses such t~.5 to defe&t the 
ends which taxation is designed to serve. Tbe prsse~nt Go-vern-
illtlnt did not create this tax system. It is a product of: 
Government policy over a long period of year$ which has been 
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shaped not by ref$rence to tbeor1t1cal principles of taxation, 
bUt by the urgent necessity o£ obtaining revenue i'or the ever 
1nore&~ing '.flmQunt of state expenditure .. This Government has 
merely e.xtendEtd the traditional system of taxation in order to 
prov1~e funds for its oxpnnsionist economic policy. 
An analys1• of the main 1t&ms of Government exp~nditure 
will make this point clear. The main channels of GQvernment 
ex.penuitu.re are the consolidated Fund, Public Works lund, 
Electricity aupply Account, Emplo~~nt Promotion i'Und {Jl.pd now 
the Social Securit1 ~Unct) I~in Highways Account und Hou•ta,a 
Oepartl;llent Account. , Of these Channel$, the most i.J4~ort£~.rlt 
is the Conaol1datcd li'mld." The t'ol.lowing t~;J.ble sives a sunmary 
of pay1nents from the fund. 
Debt Sex-vteea Exohan&• 
Highways 
Other permanent appropriations 
Pensions 
Education 
j'. 
Departllental ate. 
q· 114 !fi.i .. ~~~&Jr.. b .lL II. 
From this analysis it will be noticed that the first 
item showed an increa$e Up to 1938 and then declined, tbe 
funds for financing it are derived from taxation and are there. 
tore not likely to inc~ease ux1less there is a phenomenal rise 
in export prices. 
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The highways item which shows an increase in this table 
is self b~lanc1ng, It is financed from the proceeds of motor 
taxation. As will be shown in the chapter on Transport a con-
siderable portion of the revenue derived from this source has 
been utilised !or purposes other than road..ruaintenance. 
The last three items in the table show a substantial 
increase. This is due to two main causes, First the spec-
tacular expansion of Social Services and secondly the expansion 
of employment in Governn1ent departments and the improved work .... 
ing conditions. These points will be elaborated in subsequent 
chapters, especially those deal1r1g with Social Services and 
Labour Policy. 
It would be of considerable assistance to hav-e acess to 
a clear cut statement of the Government's public works policy, 
the naturtl ot' the works to be tmde:rtakeh and the arilOUnt and 
sources of rnoney to be·spent. But the Government does not 
publish such a atatewent. Estimates or public works are made 
ava1lable each ;year with the publication of the budget but the 
pa~ents and receipts are scattered over the various avenues of 
Government expenditure which were listed in the above section. 
To a certain extent this confusion and lack of definite state. 
ment of policy may be attributed to the fact that the rna1n 
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objective of the Labour Gove;rnment was to create employment for 
the large body o:f unemployed males in existence 1n New Zealand 
1n 19.35 1 and to provide a reasonable standard of living f'or the 
mass of the people. That the existence of this body of un ... 
employed warranted some action by the new Government there can 
be no doubt. But in ende~vouring to cope with this problem 
th@ Government most certainly overlooked the dangers inherent 
in a bold expansionist public works policy Of' unproductive 
undertakings., 
v~n1la a feuture of financial policy during the first 
two years of Labourla administration has boen th~ incre&sed 
use of current re~enue to assist financing public works, the 
major portion of this programme has bEH:m financed by loans 
.from various sources. 
The expenditure on public works fO:t' the y$ars 19.36-.36 to 
19J9~40 is as follows. 
: . : : : : ::: 
F *' 
Tbese amounts were used to finance such undertakings as 
Public Works including railways~ buildings, roads wld highways, 
land development, eleatricul supply IID'l other fac1lit1ef.l. This 
progrrumne necessitated heavy expenditure on m~chinery and equip-
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ment. It will be seen that r.uuoh o:!' this expenditure was un ... 
productive 1n that only the amounts spent on hydro-electricity 
schemes, telephone and telegraph would bo likely to its own 
interest bill. such unpx·oductive expenditure is a serious 
weakness 1n the Public Works Policy of' New Zealand. 'While 
the costs of the railways,1nclud1ng interest, were well in 
excess of the ;ravenue, large sums were being spent annually on 
new railway construction. 
It is interesting to notice that it was not found :heceea .. 
a.ry 'Go appeal directly to the public for loan funds until 19.39 .. 
'I'hil Wt1.ca due to two factors. First the Goverruuent was able 
to finance 1 ts capital expen.di tura from revenue kind frorn loans 
raised from Departmental sources, the chief of which was the 
Post Office Savings Bank. Secondly the Government was able to 
utilise Reserve Bank credit, especially after the middlo or 
19)8, to repay Post Office de1Josits, to f'ir.mnce the new Housing 
scheme and maintain its volume of capita-.1 expenditure. The 
implications of this policy of financing state undertakings will 
be dealt with more fully in the chapter on Impol't and Excb.ange 
Control. 
( IV ) 
1b1s has already been mentioned in the preceeding section 
but it will be necessary to treat internal bort'owing separately 
as it constituted an important part of the Government's monetary 
~.0 
The Government took a serious view of the problem of 
th$ :S.nterest burden in New Zealand, a.ud app~ZHu•ed to overlook 
the :real advantages .which had accx•ued .:t'rom overseas borrowing 
in the past, in relation to the continuing burden of intereGt. 
Consequently, 1t advocated a policy o!' cessation of overseas 
borr·owi.r1g and undertook to z·epay loans as opportunity offered. 
But while the Government made public its denunciation o!' over-
seas borrowing it e.pp~rently sanctivnod a policy of internal 
borrowing. 
Until 19J9 when the Government was obliged to appeal 
directly to the public for loan funds, intert~al borrowing took 
the form of loans f;rom variuus Departclents,. Of these- the 
Post Office Savings Bank was the most important source of loan 
funds. From 19.35 t<;;) 1938 deposits.with tbe Post O!'f.ioe Savings 
Bank r~gisterect a substantial tot&l increase owing to the exoass 
of deposits ovar withdrawals. While one reason for this in .... 
e:rea.sfl may ha:ve been the lack: of sui table openings for· invest-
ments within New Zealand; an important result was the,t this in-
crease of deposits provided the Government w1 th a source of' funds 
from which 1 t could readily bo:r.row. 
The f'ollowing tabla shows movements of deposits e.nd 
withdrawals of the Post Office Savings Bank. 
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~ Q.{.f~pe ~ivings ~U;.) pepos1ts w:.ut W;ithdre.w&ls • 
. m 
Difference. 
193s:.j& 25.62. 2;;.s; +·2.b9 
19,36 ... 3'7 30.67 ;27.04 + .3.6J 
1937-38 3~.04 29.63 + 3.41 
.l9~'~s~~~~'-·--------'~o~·a-l~------·-·--~3~4;u•~~~--------~·~A~·~3~P----
From about the rni<idle of 19.38 an adverse movement set 
in, reeulting in an excess or wit:tldraws.ls over deposits to 
the ~:xtunt of £ N.Z. 4.16 m. Th1s was se1·ious f'ot· the Govern-
ment from two points of view. first it hud to find another 
source of loanable funds in order to finance its exp~nsionist 
policy and secondly it had to secure funds from othe:t' sources 
to repay its loans to the Post Of:tic(;t Saving~ Bank. To cope 
with this situation the Oovet:-nment re:iort-ed to the use o.t' 
Reserve Bartlt oredi t. It is no mere coincident that wht:m the 
source of loanable departmental :funds begun to dry up, the 
Reserve Bank holdings o:f Treasury Bills showed. a substo.ntial 
In February 1939 the total issues of Treasury Bills 
to the Reserve Bank was in excess of £ N.,Z.12 million, and it 
has aince increased, In March 1939, the G-o~errml.a:nt appealed 
to the publiQ tor e. loe.n of £. N.Z. 4 million. 
By March 19.39, the Govern.tll.-ent had reduced ove.rsea.s 
loans by £ N.z. ~:.56 m, while 1t increased the inte:rna.l debt 
by £ N.Z. 23.98 million~ 
'l"hu$ up to the middle of 1938 the Gove:r•nmwnt had been 
able to conduct its monutary policy on relatively orthodox k 
lines. This date marks a x·adical change of monetary policy, 
:F'rom then onwards the GovernmiiJnt began to utilise to an in• 
creasing e.xtt~nt its po;ot;.H'S of obt~ining credit fro111 the Reserve 
Bank. This was made possible by the ch&:nged St£i.tus o.f the 
Reserve Ba..n.k under the I\eserve Bank Amendment Aot of April 19.16. 
From August 19)6, when the Government took over the 
lJtarketing of dairy produce, 1 t had 'been borrowing !rom tho 
Reserve Br1nk against dairy pro<.'l'uce exported. 'l'hese advances 
were repai-d· as the produce was sold and the proceeds became 
availablE!. Such advances were not inflationary; they re .... 
presented merely a transfer o:f bus1nt$Sfi .from the trading banks, 
wnich had f'o:rwerly made :.d .. m11ar advanc_es 1 to the Reserv-e Bank. 
In addition the Government had borrowed moderate amounts 
from time to time from the .Eh.'lse:rve Bank1 but tbes& advances had 
all been repaid and up to May 1938 none ;Nere outstanding. 
From. June to December 1938, 11 othern advanoea to the 
State, for Public Works• Housing, Warketing eind the like regist'llr-
ed a substantial increase. At the end oi' the year the figure 
stood at£ N~Z.11.2 mill1on,. In addition the Reserve Bankts 
investments increased and also the trading banks holdings of 
Government ::securities increased considerably. 'rhis meant a 
credit expansion of £ N.Z. 15,67 million on Government account. 
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one result of this into:rnn.l cradi t t:Lii .. pclnsi~~n consequent upon 
the expansionist policy of the Government was a. depletion o;f 
rv;!t over sE;Jas a$ sets. Thi~> v1ill be treated· more fully in a 
subsequent chapter on Impo.rt and Exchtinge Control. 
An. analysis of the published bank returns reveals the 
extent of credit e.xpansion·in New Zealand during the two years 
1 19.38 and 1939, In the followins tables compa.risons are made 
of the bank returns e.t the end of 1937 and 19.39. 'Xhe first 
table compares the :returns of the lieserve Bank and shows the 
extent to which the Reserve Bank has been utilised fliiJr a.redit 
creation in the years 19.3-B and 19.39 .. 
Not.:te issued. 15.,2.3 1,.2:9 + 4.06 
.J2£tPo§1~~~ · 
State 3.49 z.s6 - .63 
Trading Banks 8,9.3 1.3,.54 + 4.61 
oth•,r .;o .o; ... .47 
Othe:r Liabilities .17 .78 + .61 
Advances to State 7.08 22.66 +15.,8 
Exchange 16"99 a,70 ... a.29· 
Invest1nents 2 ,.66 J .36 + • 70 
Qtat:£ i\SJ.L~..._ _____ _......w:;;:2·.,.~--....,,•_. -·. _......,,J.:ii4...,.J --·-·-· _,_ ...... ;+_.., __ ,..., 1;,-.'.1.__ 
By reduction in State deposit.$. 
tl Reduction 1n ttother deposits n 
n !ncree.se i.n advances to State 
1
' Ina:ree.se in investments 
» Increase in other assets 
.... · :&9l!l b .. 
" !0 
1 The tables 1n this section have been adapted from a 
publication by P:rotessor A.H.Tockur, entitled nlvi2Jl~lii'Y 
~Per•m•nt ~ New P~~1ans-" 2$/2/40 
jbe BttQ)$$ QlU>tgwerif! . umeg tnJ,s ~ru;rea§g. 
To Inorea$e note issue 
f1 Ino:rtUlte 'l'ra.d1ng Bank deposit$ 
at Reserve Bank. 
n Purchaae exchange frorn Reserve Bank 
ff Increase other liabilities ot the Bank 
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& ia#dn 
4.06 
4.61 
8.29 , 
It will be notiaed £rom these figures that the Bank pro-
vided £ N,Z, 17.59 m. of which £ N.Z. 15.58 m represented 1n-.. 
creases 1n advaneG.s to the State, a.nd a further£ N.z~ 1,.3.3 m 
· wae covered by :reductions in State deposits and incra&sea in 
the Bankts investments. The total amount p.rovid,ed £ N.Z.17.59m 
was apent 1n various w&ys. Part ot this amount wHs uaect to 
purohase exchange from the Reserve Bank on Government accoW1t1 
and the ~•main~~f on State enterprises in New Zealand, mainly 
Public vm:rks. tnt& would expand tha ci:reulating mont~y in the 
countrt and would ultimately be disposed of in some way by the 
public into whose hands it fell, Since most of it would ;ass 
through tlle trading banks some changes would be l.tkely in the 
Trading bank figures. 
had been used to purchase ex.t.t'a note issue !rom the R&serve 
BankJ £ N.z. 4.61 m to increase the trading bankaeposits at 
the Reserve Bank; £ N,.Z. $.29 m to purchase exchange from the 
Reserve Bank, and £ N.z •• 61 m to increase other liabilities 
of the Bank. .Thes~ facts leave little doubt that the addition 
credit ereated by advances to the StaiG place a substantial 
increase ot purchasing power in thQ bB.nds of the Government and 
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the conununity. Thie increase watt :retlected in an inorea.se 
in imports .and an. export ot capi tul frcw1 .New Zeal~nd. • the 
combinvd effect of which was. to bring about a serious deple:tiOJl 
of net oYerseas ass0te. 
:aut credit e;g:p&na1on 1rent further than this. · 'The 
faci-lities o,t· t~~e trading baM.a were used. as w~l.l. one re$ult 
of the cred1 t orEH:Ited by the Reserve Bank was an increHse in 
trading banl$: resoures. With the 1ntroduct1~n or imp$rt ana 
exchange control, the trading benkf s a.dv4n.ces to custoual.ii's 
declined, thus anabling tnese benks to take up addit1onul 
saouritiils to the extent·of £ N,.Z. 7,.4-;. m within New Zealand1 
thereby further expanding credit to thW extent+ tn addition 
the trading banks made av~ilable £ N,Z. 2.15 m o! th•ir own 
capital and reserves not forme.r•ly used 1n New Zealand. 'l'!'lis 
further expanded credit witbin N~w Zealand• The figures tor 
the trading b~~ roturns during this period are as follows. 
Capital used 
Total .Pep0$1ts 
At·, heserve Bank 
Notes and C&in 
Discounts and 
Ad. vane e 11 , 
Net seou.r1t1as held 
Securities 
eramiP~ll . , ,. l 
54.00 
6.66 
·~04 1.2~ .... t tt 
Xnese. J..:te•}:s pu.lance a§ i:ol,i'oynJ: 
. & 
Japr§i§eS 1U re§o~rgen. 
Increases in capital used 
Increases in customers deposits 
Adltances :repaid by customers 
iilefe hns.Ee!fi!S were. uaes;.t. 
·oncreaserading bank deposits 
at Reserve Bank 
" Increas$ holdings of notes e.nd coin 
1r Increase holding of securities. 
n Inereas&holdinga of Exchange 
" Increased premises 
::;iz 'r. r · t·. 
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'rhese figures reveal an incrEHUH~ of £ N.·z. 12.55 in 
trading bank resources durirlj the years 1938 and 19.39. · Of 
this total the biggest increase was in custornurs deposits.., 
This was largely t!u~ rauult of' tha credit 
created by tbe Reser-re Bank and spent by the Government in New 
Zealand. It colnbide$ almost exactly with the trading banks 
inc~reased investment in Gov-ernment sec~x·i ties which amounted to 
£N.Z.,7.42m. Other 1 tams contributing to tr1e incr(jased resources 
of the t'rad1ng bank:s were £r~.Z.2.,15m. of bank capit&l and reserves 
made available in New Zealand, £i~.z.~:-86m. increase of deposits 
repaid by custo~ers. The trading banks used their increased 
resources to increase theiz· aaposi ts at the Reserve Bank by 
£N.Z.4.6;.w., to increase their holdings of notes and coin by 
£.i~.z ... 0.3m., to increase investments by £l1.,Z.7.42m., to incruase 
overseas exch~nge by £N.Z •• 45m~and thelr premises by £N.Z •• 05ma 
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The combination oi' the abovt:~ two tables will show the 
effects of the credit expansion on the banking system as a whole, 
T:rai:iing bank capital used. 
Total Deposits. 
Notes in circulation. 
Exchange funds. 
Advances (Trading Bank) 
Advances to Government 
(Reserve Bank) 
Investments and Securities. 
12J7 ' 
17.98 
69 .. 16 
11 .68 
2:3.65 
5,4,.00 
7.,08 
10.70 
2.0.1.) +2.15 
76.,07 +6.91 
15.6.3 +J.95 
., 5 • e 1 .... 7 • s 5 
51.14 -~.86 
~2.66 
18 .. 82 
+15.5S 
+8,.12 
Ibese ~temte bal;,aoce .at ,fgJ,low,§; 
Agg*t*on§~ Qred~t maue ava*liRle~ 
By Ad"V'ance:s toovernmant from Re5erve Bank. 
By Increase Bank investments and securities. 
Total ·ror Government. 
Less deeraase in trading bank advances. 
Net addition. 20.8.4 
-------------------------------------------------------------
.tlQ.!. ~ ad,g1jj.o~l !!f!EL 1!§£lQ.: 
For Increa$ed · traditlg bank ca.pi tal. 
For Increase in note circulation,. 
For Increased deposits at bank. 
For Purchase of exchange. 
Total. 
2.15 
3.95 
6.91 
7.84 
An exrun:Lnution of this table shows that the tot~J additional 
credit rr:ade available on Govenunent account was £.~'J.Z.23.7vrn., 
including £N.Z.15.5Srn.increasas in advances to the Government 
froru the Reserve Bu~,and £.N .. Z.8.12.m. repres~nting increases in 
the investments and securities held by the Re~:erve :Bank and 
trading banks oo;u.bined. 
bank advances to customers reuuces this total to £N.Z-20.84J,a., 
This amount was spent by the Government hUU. the public of New 
Zealand. This total was utilised in various ways;£N.Z.2.15m. 
had to be paid for the u~u of the L1creasod tradL~g bank capitnl 
made available; £ .,N. Z • .:S. 951.•1• was used :tor inc reF;. sed note 
d 
37 
. '38 
V.39 
of 
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circulation;£N.Z.6.91m. represented increased customers deposits 
at the banks and finally £.N.Z.7 .84m. was spe.1:1t on purchasing 
exchange from. the banks 1 thus reducing their ove;rsilHtS fu.m.ta. 
Thus, of the total credit creatod only £7.84m~ plus 
£N .. Z. 2,.1;m. of trading bank capital waa used during 1938 and 19.39 
to purchase overseas funds, while approximately £Ii. Z,11ru. was 
add&d to the amount of money available within New Zealand. This 
.means that tllere iD substc.nt.ialiy more money available in New 
Zealand ·and less a.vailable for purchase of ove~·st~as :funds as a 
r(."jsult of the expansion of' credit. 'l'he progress of CI'tidi t 
expansion during the period under :review i~ wox-thy o:f consideratior.JI. 
The following table shows t.he totals oi' advat~ces and st~curi ties 
hel.d by the Reserve :Sank and the trading banks,both separately 
and combined. 
Re.s!lVe .. Bank~ I,re,u1ng.B£:nk., Dif.;fer-enc e 
Advances to5tate. Investments Govt.Securities~ Totul.:Crom end 
of 1ill._ 
Dec • 7.08 2~66- 7 ~76 11.50 
Ma:rch. 5.31 2.97 7 .. 63 15.91 -1.59 
June .. 4.76 2.73 6.72 14.:21 ... .).29 
Sept, 7 .. 66 2.,7'J 8,.26 18.65 +1.15 
Dec. 16.46 3.60 8.76 28.S2 +11 .. .32 
March. 19.4.3 3.66 1~.06 J.3 .15 +15.65 
June. 16.9.3 3.77 10~61 31.31 +1.3.81 
Sept .. 20.84 J.a~ 10!049 )5 .15 +17.65 
Dec. 22.,66 .3.36 15.20 41.~2 '·J 7__, +..: .• ~
This table shows all the advances macte to the Btu te, includ-
ing those for m&.rk:at1ng und tlairy produce ,and the t.t·ading bank 
Jeourities are Government securities alone. In the last column 
a decrease is registered in credit expansion, but this is due to 
sea$onal vax·iations and is a feature cow.mon to New t:.ealand t s 
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economic history. Allowing for further seasonal variations in 
June 1939, the trend of ex· edit expansion has been prog.r-cssi Vfltly 
upwards since June 19)8. This table gtves the gross expansion 
oi' credit, and in ordex• to obtain the 1.1ot expansion of c:redi t 
the advances to customer a and tile Reserve Bank's discounts must 
subtracted from it. The nat expansion of credit, aa shown 
abov& waa about £N.Z.20.S4m.of' which apyrox.tmately £N,.Z .. 11m. 
was added to the amount of monQ;y available within New Zealand. 
Subsequent events have showa that the !ir·st direct effect 
of' the Government's polLoy of uslng 1\eserve Bank credit in New 
Zealand was to promote an ex.ptm.sion oi' c.t·edit Wl&Ccompanied by a 
slmila:r expansion 1n the goods £tnd sa:rvicfois on which that rwn.ey 
was spent. While exchange rEHn&ined u.nre;;;tt' ictod the effects of 
the additional purchasing power so created, w~re reflected in the 
purchase of overseas fu.nds a:nd ultimately 1.n the depletic'n of net 
overseas assets. With the introduction of exchange control 
however, this additional credit was no longer free to leave the 
country a.nd. consequently tha creation of this excess credit 
unbacked by saleable goods was likely to pi·oduce rising prices and 
depreciation of the purchasing power of money w1th1n New Zealand. 
(VI) Gj£N liliAl:! li£tMARK,S,, 
'£h~ brief survey in the preceeding ~ectil.'ns of this 
chapter of the monet~ry policy of the Labour Govetnx::.ent during 
ita first four years of office shows tllat this policy fli.lls 
conveniently· into two distinct staii)es 1 tl€t<Mtly ~i period of' l'®latlve 
orthodox mo(teta.:ry policy and secondly a period. of cx•edi t craa tion 
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through the machinery of the hesel'·ve Bank. Apn1·t from the 
fact that the Government hud super irnposed an extensive programrne 
of public ·worlcs,mcdnly of an unproductive nature, em <.'!. boom 
period in the trade cyule; their policy during the first period 
calls for little further comment. The motive behind this policy 
was of.' course the reduction of unemployment. The effect of the 
policy was however most important, as it increased ilit~rnal 
purchasing power to such an extent that the demand for imports 
increased rapidly .. Increased imports meant a corresponding 
decrease in f..Wersea.s funcls .. It was the excess credit created . , 
unbacked by saleable goods, tha~ placed in tbe hands of the 
community the means to purch<o;.se .t'rom the banks the over· seas 
funds required to pay for imports. In this way the Government's 
poliey is directly responsible for many of the Dominion's 
present di!:f'1culties. 
:tt was the continuance of thi~ expansionist policy,taspecially 
the extan:;;iv~ public works progra:mrne, w11ich forced upon the 
Government the alternative of a radical change of policy, or 
of re sor·t to credit era a tiat:t through the In<->.ch1ne:ry of the 
Reserve Bank. The Government natur&lly chose to continue with 
its for~er policy and proceeded to finance it directly with 
advances frorn the Reserve Ba.nk. This action hastened th$-
depletion of London funds ana forced the Govermr;<:mt to take 
action, towl.:.lrds the and oi' 19.3S. Cradi t creation ctn.tinued, even 
after the imposition· of' import and exchange control. Consequently 
the addi.tionul money remained in New Zealand and caused prices 
to rise and tha purchasi:r.Lg power 91' money to deJ.;reciate. In 
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other words the effects of credit creation began to work out 
within New Zealand and not on the rore1gn exchange, It would 
accentuate the diff1culties of the Government's policy of internal 
stabilisation .. 
Bro~::.dly conceived the Government's monetary poliey, 
especially that of' credit creation, S.s an $X:periroent ot first 
importance, and thet"e are certain lessons to be learned from it. 
A comment by Professor A.H.Tockar 1n an articl~ "Monetary 
Experiment in New Zealand n best SUlnS Up the posi t:lon in rega:rd 
to monetary policy 1n New Zealand. 
"It ahould now 'be obvious that in the long run we can 
consume only to the ext.e.mt that we produce J that whatever the 
Go-.e)'nment spends the people lUUSt ptl.y fO:t'Jand that the 
purchasing power of the people is limited by the goods &nd 
services produced and market~dt and is not i11Creased by an 
1ncree.He of mcmey. All this means that no monet&ry Inttn1p-
u.lation can eua!Jle us to escape the fundament•l !hct that we 
must live within our incOiile, nn<i limit oui" consumption to 
the value of our production. I! these lessons are learned, 
then the experiment may not have been wholly 1n vain, and the 
knowledge gained may yet prove reasonably cheap at the price." 
CHAPTER V 
I Guaranteed Prices. 
II Internal Marketing. 
II! Wheat Control. 
Because of the vital importance o!' farming in the 
eeonorr.ic life ot New Zealand, a great deal of o.ftort on the 
pa.rt of this Government (as well as :previous Governments) 
bas bean directed to improving th~B position of farming industries. 
Accordingly one of the major proposals of' the Labour Ov·;ernment 
was to guarantee to the farmer the price of bis products. Writing 
1n hi$ pamphlet,ttGuara.nteed Prioes,Why and How? 11 Mr.Walter Nash 
stated: ttThe Labour Party undertakes to institute the guaranteed 
procedure and to pay the agreed upon price for all butter,oheese, 
wool and meat, during the t'irst ye~r at'ter it becomes the Govex·n .... 
ment." In May '1936 the Primary Pr·oduots Marketing Act was 
enacted, and the guaranteed price procedure was applied to all 
dairy produce. Meat and wool h&Jtd evidently to Sttind aside in 
the rueantime"' 
The preamble to the Act declar·ed that its purpose is to 
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make '''bettor provision for the ralirketing of dairy p1·oduce anci other 
primary products, so a.s to ensure for producers an adequate 
remuneration .for the services ;rende:ted by them to the community." 
The preamble also emphasises the necessity for prbtecting primary 
producers !rom the effects of .fluctuations in market price$ and 
that such protection <.::~n most .effectively be afforded by empowering 
the Government to assura.e ownership of products tor e.xpo:rt &.t prices 
to be fi:X.~d from time to time, and by acquiring ownership at 
fixed prices of products intended. for local consu.mpt1on 11 Fur-thor 
tho Act was designed to -onsure to the efficient n.l.rmer, operating 
under nusual ti conditions and in 11normal 11 circumstances, an irlcome 
which shall ba stable~:fuir and in :relation to the S~Jl'vices rendered., 
It aimed also to provide the fi::.rmer with .a nl'lf.H:rsonablen st&ndard 
of living, compar·able with that of the rest of the community. 
The new legislation e~r1powered the Government to oraate 
a Primary Products MarJceting D~pa.1•tm~nt., u.rhH:U' the cont;rol of the 
Minister of Market~~. The :runctio:us of the Dep<.:i.rtment were 
to acquire priwary products on behalf of the Gover•nr.aent and to 
market those products overseas whether these have lleen acquired 
by the GovernnH::~nt ol· not. It was also the !'unction ot:· the 
Depart};:.(Emt to arrange for ti'ansport of the produce to the market. 
The activities of the DepartE>ent were iu the first 1r1stance 
confined to dairy produce, which became the pl"operty o1· the 
Government when placed on board ship, at a pz·ice uett,rmi:ned in 
advance by order~in.Counuil. 
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The Departwent took over th~ existing system o.r m&.d<:et1tlg 
and effected certain important changes in tba direction of a 
ful·ther extensio:n o.f control. It proposed to replace tbe former 
Export Produce Cont:r;·o1 Boards 1 but up to the out-bx·eak of the 
present war with Ger~nany it he.d tat-:.:en. over the functions of the 
Dairy Export Cont:r·ol Doard. only. Bingle state ownership was 
substituted for the previous .system of utult1ple owne'l:'ship by 
different producing factories. It improved the ex1st1ng uystem 
of distribution and supe:rvision., The 1Jepartrut:mt selected twenty ... 
two importing ~ouses to act as tlleir .selling agents in the United 
Kingdom for the purpose of : ... 
( 1) Gocttl'ing the services of :::.ales orgHniSEttions which 
would provide the maximum ;regular t.J.istribution of 
New Zealand deiry produce to the va1·1ous wholesa-le, 
retail and manufacturing interests. 
(2~ Retaining those importing hou.st~s which would be most 
likely to co-operate 'Ni th the Depa:rtrrient for the 
purpose of eliminating unregulated selling competition, 
(.3) Creating e. icidnimum distu:rl.lance of' the existing 
disti·ibutive methods. 
'l'ha Department has gi'eatly iruproved the external marketing 
of o.airy produce;it has @liminated to a large extant specUlation 
and irregular! ty of supplies to the ;narket, and it ei'feotad a 
reduction in sall1n~ costs of approximately £stg.100,000 1 dur1ng 
the first year of operation. 
The procedure !'or fixing yrioes for dairy produce has 
proved difficult and w1populur vd t.t1 the fcu·miug ct)lllfftuni ty.. The 
prices for the 1936 ... ,37 season were vased on. the estius.ated &verage 
prices for the previous 8 -10 years, anct from then onwards were 
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to ba determined by orders-in-Council in ~;;coQrdance with the 
following five principles of the Act. 
(1) 0 The necessity in the public interest of maintaining the 
stability and e1'f1cie.ncy of tbe dairy induo try. 
(2) The costs involved in tha efficient production o! daii'Y 
prod~ce. 
(3) The general standard of living of persons engaged in the 
dairy industry in com11&.I'1Soll with the generul standa.rd of 
living throughout New Zealand. 
(4) The estim~ted cost to the Depa:rtment of Marketing or the 
dairy prodl,uce concerned, and also tha cost of the genersl, 
administration of the Act. 
(5) Any other matters dC~emed to be r(ltlGvant. tt. 
To assist it work the task vi' determining p1·ices for dairy 
produce the Gov-ernment set up an expert Actv1sory Committee, No 
inform,ation ox· the repox·t of the Commit teo I!UlS made public. The 
following average prices VlEn.·e us$d as a bas:ts .. 
. ~· 
9 
10 
Average Period 
of xgars, 
Crec&me:ry Dutter. Cheese. 
10974 ~ I 56/6 
112/2 57/1 
114/- 58/6 
Creama:ry Butter. 
12.11 
12 • .37 
12 .. 73 
Cheese. 
1 ;;; .66 
12.83 
, .) . ~J 
Vihey But tex·. 
99/4 
101 /2' 
,04/-
CheeSe- includin.g 
. ~utttel . Wney. 
The Government decided to fix a price ·~·hich would equ~l 
the pay-out of' the: best average p1Jriod, It was decided to 
fix the pr1c$ of butt6r.t'at at 1.29/16d per pound e.nd 6.13/16d per 
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pound for cheese, with variations for quality. It was (:Cetituated 
that the pay .... out for but ter .... fa t would be 1.3. 52.9ci per pound and 
14 .. 440d per pound of butterfat for cheese·-
with these prices. They Yianted more" They compluined that the 
Heport we.s not made pub11c; they urged the creation of till 1nd.epencl-
ent tr1bWH.t;.l, s·ometh1ng a.long tha line ~a of the Arb1 tration 
Court; they were cl.ii1Hippojnted t~1at there was no right vf appeal 
against the decision of· the Government's det~rmined prices. The 
Primary Products Marlwting· Dl:;lpartme.nt later mbde its report 
public~ 
In det8rminiug t.he pr:lces .for the 1937-38 season f.fu& 
Governwent set up a Guaranteed Price Advisory Committee., 'rhi.s 
Committee analysed 19 1 000 co1upleted returns which h0.d been 
preparad by the Statistics Daparttnen.t.t):n tne basis of thl$ 
investigation the prices determined by the Goverrw~ent shQO.ved an 
increase on thosa of the previous season. 
was to be 13~d par pound and 7. 5Ad per pound for chtle"H:. This 
we..s estimated tv yield 13 .B8d per pound of butterfat for butter 
and 1S.8Sd per pound of butterfat for cheese .. 
Jut again the farming CQJjlmuni ty protested,. TJ1ey :rightly 
claimed that the increased prices did not compensate them for 
tile increased co~its ,, which were due largely to the Goverr:~..r-.:tent t s 
own e.x.pl:msive eoononlic polio~, ~·;hich was 1attnifast inriii.si.ng money 
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wages, improv~d. working conditions of labour, rising public 
expenditure and the resort to Reserve Bank Credit for State 
undertakings, 
had statedt 
The Report of the Depnrtment published in 1937 
"The history of the dairy industry shows clearly that 
high prices do not necessarily promote stability of the in-
dustry, bacnuse of tbe tendency to capitalise the benefits 1n 
inflated land and stock v~lue$. The guar~1teed price should 
not be such as will induce persons to capitalise 1ts 'benefits, 
especially as the trend of lund C:ind stock prices in 1936 ... 37 
was of a hardening. nature.lf 
It would seem that in revising the 1936-37 prices, the 
Government had been obliged to make $ome allowance for the in-
crease in the costs o:t" production, but on the other hand had 
attempttd to keep the price down in order to avoid too large 
a deficit in the dairy industry a.cl!uU!lt. It was clear to the 
Government and oth.0r$ concerned that a. series of heavy deficits 
would inevitably wreek the entire guaranteed price scheme. 
Strong recornMtndations f:rom the fv.rming conmrun1 ty to 
alt.{' the method of' price determination resulted in the Govern ... 
ment setting up yet ano~her adviaory corwu1ttee to f1x the prices 
tor the 19.38 ..... 39 season. ~he committ~e r$comm:anded an 1ncreo.$e 
in prices over the pr$V1ous season, !:rom 1),66d per pound to 
15.605d perpound for butter and from 7.75d per pound to 8,775d 
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per pound of cheese. After considering those recormuendationa 
the Oovetnment fixed prices at a lower rate for both cheeee 
and butter. The Corm:rlittee and the Government evidently 
differed in their interpretations of the terms 11e.t'f1c1ent pro. 
duoer, n nusual eond1t1ons .. " '1norm~:-¥l oircumstances,_ n and "a.ve:z:age 
cow." 
The !'allowing table will 1llust:rttte how the different 
interpretations of these terms resulted 1n dit'i'eJ:Ience of opinion 
of tbe Committee and the Government as to what the prices tor 
butter and cheese ought to be. 
(t j" "' 
't - ~ • -' at . 1 Butter fat par acre 
·· ·· oommi.ttee •s 
.PgQ!i,9lll 1 0-1·5 bs 
per year. 
Butter fat per full time male 
labourer employed. 
Butter fat per oow 
Oe.pitali~ation (ra.te per .cow) 
Cap!tal Charges (inter~st pwr lb 
of butterfat) 
Working & tuaintenanee costs, 
per lb bUtter fat. 
Standard. of Pig returns. 
Da1ry Factory costs per lb of 
'butter!at. 
Labour rew$rd par lb ot butterfat. 
Allowance for Housing etc. per week. 
Labour Rewa.:rd 1 t'n:rmer per weak 
Labour Reward: hired labour per wk. 
5750 lbs 
per year 
~;~0 ... 250 lbs 
per yea1• 
£75 
3.37Sd 
5.695d 
1.S4d 
.3.50d 
9.2:20d 
tt-10....0 
£4..,;.10-0 
£4- o ... o 
.· • . - .~ . * Government's 
P!Gi.0 U· , 
5.34d 
1.54d 
J.50d 
8.84d 
£1-10 ... 0 
£,4-10-0 
£4- 0-0 
It will be ~iced that in respect to the butter tat 
p$r full t1llle :mala labourer employed, and the butter !'at per 
cow, the estimate$ of the Government ware higher than those of 
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the Committee, while ', the. working hnd maintenance 9•timates 
were lower. The Government claimed that the Comraittee did 
not give full oonsid.eration to the central fe&tUX'e o:f the 
scheme, namely the aim ot' achieving stab1lise.tion of the 
dairying industry. 
state that 
The Report of the Department in 19)a 
"the ;;llowance !or working and mainten<.tnce costs a:re 
on such a scale that if tney are expended !or the purposes 
speci.fi.ed1 only an ine!rioient f11trraer forking under unusual 
conditions or in [,bnormal circtm1Stu.nOe$, oou.ld fu1l to atta.in 
the uve:t''"i~ of the per cow1 per acre 1 per man standards mentioned" 
Moreover the Gove:rnruent maintained thc:<t lt had set up 
the Comraittea in au bdVisory oapaoit:t o!llYJ 1t wat free to modify 
the Com:tl:li ttee ~. s reoorrJIA&nda tions if' 1 t considered 1 t in the 1n-
terests of the community to do so. Ther~ e~n be little reason 
for doubt, however, th~t the Government decided to fix prices 
lower than those recommended by the ConH11i ttee in" ~m endeavour to 
avoid an unduly large def1c1 t in the ctail"ying account. Any 
I 
increase in the prices paid would merely e>ccentuuta the mlreadp 
ascending apiretl of costs and prices. Unless the Governrnent 
wa$ deter[tJined to avoid lo.rge de!io1 ts in this account and so 
preserve the guuranteed px·ocedut!e, it is dif'f'icul t to see 
, 
that it had any alternative but to fix the prices as low as possi'blet, 
Although it may be eQonomioa-Lly desirable to stabilise 
the jmoome of the da:t:ry !a1·rners, it is politically impracticable 
I •t~t 1 Pt1marry Products Marketing Report 1938 p 6 
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to do so, Eithe:r· the Government ha.d to submit to pressure and 
rU..'1. the risk of def'ici ts in the uccount, which i.t' continued long 
enough would wreck the g:uar.<.nte~;;d BCheme, or it had tu x·esist 
pressure and rw1 the risk of antagonising the farming electorates. 
It is significant that just prior to the 1938 elections the 
Govermnent deemed 1 t expedient to pay the d&i:ry producers a. 
bonust 
'l'o f'i.ruu1ce the guaranteed pricei for dairy produce the 
Dairy Industry Account was established o.t the .Reserve Bank. 
All export receipts of dairy produce are paid either directly 
or indirectly into this account and all payments in respect to 
the Dairy Industry 1 the guaranteed prices, costs of rllarketing 
and costs of adrr~inistration are paid out of this bccou:ut. Any 
deficits. whether seasonal or totnerwise are to be met by 
overdraft from thu Heser·ve Bank, without limit or without con ... 
ditions as to repayrr~ent,. This ac<.:oun.t was later incurpol'ated 
in tb.e Primary Products Uarketing. Accou.rJ.t a.nd covers trans ... 
actions other thun those· arisi,ng frora the e4por_t of daix•y pro-
duce. But transactions r~la t:lng tv the expoJ:t of dairy pr• .... 
duce comprise by far the most important items in the account. 
Th$ deficits of this account Up to July 19.39 were as 
:l'olloWSJ 
19.:37 
19JS 
~ . 1 r £ ll,e z. f w. .. 
',, 4 
6.569 
,,2:57 
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'. 
l229 . (J&Uloa ... \ly.ly) . 
3.766 
3.159 
!l.&kOS ill. ·•r I tia Jli d 1 • 7 .§·02 - l . *· L ·; t .. I 
The use of Reserve Bank credit in this way is, to say 
the lea.sti quite inflationary, quite &part !rom a substHntial 
deficit in the account at the end of the season. The effects 
of this policy provad to be i'or rea.ching and caused serious 
problems for the GoveJ."n:W~ent, especially 1n connection with the 
depletion of London funds. These will be discusBed :Ln the 
chapter on Import and Exchange Control 
One of the main ~Hisumptions of th~ Guaranteed prioe 
sys-tem hati been that 1t would be used as a lita'bili.sinc in-
fluence, smoothing out the farmers t retux·ns and shel terir..g 
New Zealand from the ei'fecta of fluctu~t1on$ in oV&l'I'Htes prices • 
.Apparently the procedure would bo to fix a priee which would 
be maintained over a period ot' yea:t·::;, o:.r at laast a price 
which would val'Y much less thaa mtirket pricus. This price 
would be lower than Itlttrket prices when the latter was high and 
higher when it wus low .. Any de1'1ci t in the Rese1.··ve Bank in 
bad titnes would be liquidated when conditions i;Lprvved, If 
this system could be udhered to it would pos::>ess se'VfUal ad .. 
vantages of' a st~bilising natura. But there are very grave 
4oubts as to whether such a policy 1s poll tic ally pz·acticabl$. 
The history of the guaranteed price scheme so far indicates 
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thbt it is not politically pos~ible. Up to the outbreak of 
this present war the Labour Government had not u.x;t~nded tbe 
system to mf:lat and wool, despite its pre ... el~ction pledges to 
do so. Pressure hae bfHm conS)istently applied t{) the Govern-
memt to raise tbe price& i.'or dr:dry produce on the grounds that 
production costs and tbe cost of living have risen, despite 
the abvious fact that the deficit in the Account ih&S increased.· 
armually. F'a.1ling an upward trend in world prices the Govern .... 
ment will have to reduce the prices paid for dairy produt..:e~ or 
continue with d~f1cits in its account. As huz; been mentioned 
abo"lle it is practically imposaible to :resist tb~ increased 
pressure for 1n¢r~C:ased pricos. an tbe other he.nd it seems 
equally clear that tbe guaro.nteed price prooecture can~ lot be 
maintained indef'1n1tely in conjunction with increa.::.;ing £'.rmu~l 
deficits in the Primary Products Marketing Account. 
It is impossiole to toraoast the future of this scheme. 
'" 
It 1s admitted that some beneficial changes have benn e:f:fectad 
especially in Qonneotion with the marketing of dHiry produce 
1n the United Kingdom. Tak~n separately it would appear that 
tbe guaranteed price $yJtem has been conducive to greater 
stability of 1't:.rm income and that 1t h!iS been conducive to 
higher real income amongst farmers. But when considered in 
relation to the Government's policy as a wbole there arise some 
serious qualifications. It reflacts again tbe confus.ion 
between real and money income which is deep ... rooted. in the 
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pp1losophy of the Labour Government, and the confused thinking 
wh1ch surround:J problems of the sencsitive dependence of New 
Import and exchange 
control ht1s groutly aocentu<c~ted the dangers &rising !'rom dafic.d ts 
in the dairy industry account, high public expenditure and monet-
.. 
a:ry expansion. Inflationary influences cnn no longer be 
dim.inish~ci by increu:H~d imports ana capital oxportJ · they f'all 
with full force upon the movement of prices w1th1n New Zealand. 
Rising cQst.s due to tho2e causes will thus :Lnarease the pressure 
on the Government for still higher gu~ranteed prie~s. The 
Government will find 1t oven mo;re dift:i.cult to reduc$ the prices 
pa1d to producers, under-these circumstances.,· Tbe outlook 
!or the gur,.ranteed price scheme :is far trom encouraging. Un-
less the situation is relieved by a substantial z·ise in export 
. . 
price a (a most unlikely assumption in fl:!.ce of wox·ld oondi tions 
to-day) New Zealand will be fac~d with p:rogre'ssive deficits in 
its Prim~ry Products Marketing Account. 
The Primary Products Marketing Amendment Act 1937 em ... 
powered the Governm~nt to establish an Xnternal Marketing 
Dlvision Qt the Primary Products M.arketing Departmflnt together 
with such other divisions as might be requirGd. Powers of 
pr1o$ fixation were def'inod to oover dairy pt'oduee" truit, honey, 
•ggs and such other foodstuffs as might be brought under the 
provisions of the Act by Order .... in.:.Council. In addition to 
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fixing wholesr.le and retail p:ric~H~ of such !oodstuf'i'e the 
--=-=--=---~~~:-~c >u;•_-,·"·--=·=•..-,_, •o._,.,-::-..:;;.~--·-,_•,,--J,_- ' 
Unda:r 
ntaw legislation en~cted in 19.391 the Depc.rtment·was empowered 
to bUf Ol.' sell any speei.fled goods and sell or otherwise dis .. 
pose o.f' them for consumption within New _Zealand, such prices 
to be fixed by Order-in.oouneil. 
Internal marketing operation$ were commenced in 1937. 
Opeaations co-rruzlepced w;S.th butter and cheese, but were later 
ex:it:lndE:td to cover fruit,. honey, e3gs, m&ise, bobby calves, 
Kauri gum and· baz·ley .. The obJectives of the Department of 
Internal liari<Oit:l.ng are ( 1) to equate returns for export and J 
local sal•, (2) to rat1onHl1se distribution by lineens1ng J 
wholesaler$, (J) to avotd overlapping by defining marketing f 
areas (4). to el1:m1nat8 disturbing competition through trade 
discounts and otha~ oonces3!ons, and (5) to smooth out 
seasonal fluctuations in prices. 
Import und Exchange Control having be<1n irnposed_. the 
Departm~nt became the agent .fer the direct ;importation· of 
I 
f 
sucb .t'I·uit. as c1trius· fruits apd bana.na1, maise, barl$y and 
onions, c.nd ±'or tt1e eiporJ, of the seasonal surplus_ ot' •1gs t!ind 
•.c, __ ;--_...--··" .,.__-o:_._,,_..., __ -___ --_~ ·--- .-,_~ ------ ~- --~--,_-_, .. ~ 
potatoes. In ada1t1on the Department assumed control ot the 
importation or sueh food stuffs as dried fruits and vegetables,\ 
c&~.nned :t'rui ts and vegetables, .fruit ju1c~s, !'rui t J.1ulp and hops t 
J In regard to collllllOdi tics 1 ~ucn as. ddry produce, w!Uoll 
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are exported bu't not subj~cted. to the compatit1on o:i.' imported 
chenges and hua prc.wed Co!Mlucive to greater eeononly hHL1 efficiency 
of mer lte ting • I~1 t!_;r n~±~J!~~E:is~~tf:ll4.~J.~~Lt11J.4~L .O~JJ.Il}llament.ti.l'}r ___ to the 
/ 
guu:t·alltoed ,t:~r·~q~LJ;,t:qG.(;ldUre ~ ~n regu.r·d to couunoU.i ties which ax·e 
~~~~~-.. _ .. -_~,--.--:"--
subjJ::::ct to import cowpet1t1Qn_, the 1ntel'na.l marketing schen;e 
conv$niently fits into plac~ with the Ooverrw.w:nt t s policy of 
ninsulution. 11 It is thus incorporated J.n the Impo:rt and 
b.x:change Control Scheme., The~I~:rt;_gJ;;o.al-~rk-e-ting·- Deparlme!')t- -Eleal s 
;.---~~ 
with oont1·olling supplies c.:n.u prices 11s W(:!J.J: tt~ w).~x~. tl?~. c:iis __ i!.;tt bu ... 
'...:---~· ,_- __ -· -- -- - •-. '·•--'---""' e • -
...____. ___ ......,_,..._,.......--=---.-.....~~~=--·-'-=-----~-- -.,_.---~.--·-~ -~-- -- -- -- ---·----~- ._.,.,"-· -_ .. _ ~-·=·-·-
t1on of the products (!O,t:li;;!'.QJ.led,. 
,____......--:;-"""='-='"~~_..;-,..>-·~"· ~-:•·~·;_-~,--~-·" _,._, ___ ' r,_+ ••• - • -• 
Th~ motive o!' p:rotecting local 
industries will cons1cteJ.,~bly i:n.t'luance the Department in its 
decisions. 
tr·.atie between products by varying the prices of ~oO!'Je of the products 
to compensate its6lf age.in::>t losses on other~. 
and is still 1n a stnte ot' trarwition. 
the Dep&rtment appears to be directed to org~nising the local 
ma:rk(lft by zonl.ng and controlline distr:Lbution agencies in order 
to a:l(,_gJ_fLQ..Y.e.r.l.aJ.UJillg, p_:~~~:-"~ut_~_i,ng, C2~~gg§:J~ci J'~bates and so on. 
!n otht!!r casf:1S the p1Jliey 1J!' the Depa:rtn1en.t is to eont:t'ol :llnports 
,__,.. _____ ~J~i-· •• --."~---= 
guaranteed prices. In this way it hopes to ~void aea~on&l 
.f'luctustions. 
distribution to certain tttrade.s". 
together this policy of internal rjmrketing over-emphasises the 
im.pOI't£i.nce of th~ __ Jl_r.O!iucer at the GLK.pe:ns.e ot' the c<msumer. 
·--~~-..... _ ~-/·--- "'-· . . -
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(II!) WHEA':c. CQNTIWL. 
One of' the most .interesting attenrpts to stubil.iBe ptoduc .... 
tiun and returns to farmers 1s that oi' wheat control. Tb.e 
history of' whe~ t control in New £:e.aland does n(,'t begin with tne 
Labour Gover.n.luent:lt began dut·i.ng the 1914-18 World Vh.n• when a 
Board of 'iirade was set up under the Cost of Living Act 1915. 
Since then movement tow<::tl"ds wheat control l1t;:S ::~tearlil;y increased 
until 1n 1933 a Wheat Purcbase Board v;as established, Gl.>n5ist1ng 
of' four representatives of each growers and millers, whose 
responsibility wa!:i to ur·range for the purchase un.d sale of wheat 
at :rtxe-d prices. 
UndEU' Labour t s legislation this Board became known as the 
Wneat Committee and its functions were extended under a scheme 
designed 1 ..or ttthe St(l.bilisation and. rationali~>at1on of the wheat 
growing 1 floux- mill:l:ng and bread bakir1g inaustries 91 • 
It was the expre:.c;~ed intention of t.t.u.il Govt;l;t·nment to make 
New Zealand sel:f ... aupporting iu the pn:.Hluction of wh~&t. lt was 
in line with tho Government's policy of guaranteed pr1<.:es for 
farm products. The new scheme effected several important 
changes in respect tc- this industry. In the four malri. centres 
the prices of wheat, fJ.OUl" &:Od bread were fixed at the same 
lev.el 1 while the pt•1ce vi' br-trad in other ct.mtres was Q.lso 
controlled. Consequently ttH;~ prices of flour and bread were 
raised in the Sout:n Island c.wntres wt1ere whe~at is produced and 
whe-re a price war hud be~n x·aging, and: lowered in the Northt:~l'n 
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cent1•es. This change was especially welccwe in the Nv.r the:cn 
centres, which up to thls time 1 had rightly cowplain·;od thC1t the 
llenceforth prices 
aoulcl be V&l·ied only by the consent of' th€.-J tHnister of I.ndustries 
;Jnd Comn.1erce. 
(1) The adr.t'Liui~t:r:·ative uuthority is the Who~~t Co!.tullittee. It 
i$ Ui"lder the control of the Uepa1'tlr1ent of Industries and 
C<.Hllii1€'l'C~ • 
(2) 'l'ht:J slidiug £c.:~le dUtJ~ on wheat and flour continues in 
operation. 
(.3) All pu.:rchases and sales o1' wheat a.re :m&,de by the Ccnurni ttee. 
(4) 'I'he prices 0f wheat, !'lour i!:nd bx·ead, and by .... produc;ts 1.t' 
necessary, are fixed. 
(5) Prices a:re !iqU&lised. in the four p:rinci:pa.l cent.t·es" 
(6) The out-put uf flour mills is <,:o:ntrolled; supplies 4U'$ 
allotted to ~xiating mills, and expansion ami entry into 
the industry are controlled. 
(7) Imports of Yiheut and flour ar·e for·bidden except ur1del" 
special official licence. 
li'rom the e.l;<')Ve brittf Bux·vey of the c:on 'tl'ul of ,t;,taf;; whee t 
,1 \ 
industry it 1s clear that the px·ice of wbec:.t has 'be(ln\,~tabilised 
\ />, ,, 
,\ . \ 
to a grettter extent 1 but gerwrall;y wheat prices hnve' 1\,leen higher 
. ' 
i \ 
than those ·;vhich would have r·e~ulted from u fi·e~;; Urket.. One 
result of this bas been tcJ bene:ri t the producer at the "~xpense 
o:f the co.u.sumel'. 
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Consumers, especially those in tho non-wheat producing 
areas, who enjoy no coru.pemsating advantage as a l'&sult of higher 
prices, have rea~ist:~d .fully the bui·den of control. Its effect 
1s seen in the fact that during the h:~.st twenty yours the New 
Zealand price o.t' wheat :tu:.ts been on average, substantially 
higher than that of Austra.l1a. 
The control of the wheat industry so far, has achieved 
the :regult:1tion of milling and baking, the ordet•ly disposal of 
surpluses,. the elimination of cut-throat competition amongst 
bakers and a considerable degree ot' price stabilisation. On 
the other hand it has not succeeded in making New Zealand self-
sufficient 1n whef!l.t production and it bas benefited the producer 
- ~<.-.:..........--->-'--'---..,__ _____ ., __ :__~::.--...o."- _ _,,,---_,_~··-· '·~---· -~-
Whil.o 1 t has made £tdvanc.es 
in the directions of price control, it has not yet determined 
costs. It suffers from the same disadvantages of the other 
Gove:t·nment schemes of control of faru~ing :prod.uat:l!the trend of 
____ ,.,_,~ 
prices l!~~l!P.!L~J'JL~ng.~_-tg -~-t~~gtp~--~~- lower prices woulct be an act 
. --- ----"L-·i.---,.'-- .. ,~ 
of poli!.iq_M-.J~!~-~~~± ty. N_o_ Goverrunent which has to face an 
election every three yea'rs can afford to tak0 this risk. 
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(I) %H§,GjNEBhL PROB~EM~ 
There exists an extensive system of State owned railways 
in New Zealand which has bean costly to construct owing to the 
rugged relief and the scattered centres of population., The 
cost to the country has been some £ N.Z. 65 million~. Until 
about 1928 th1$ system wa.s usually able to pay its own way both 
as regards running costs and interest on oapital., Profits were 
utilisect_to etfeot improvera~nts in th~ servic'il.. But conditd.on$ 
have radically changed during the last ,ten years and this se:r ... 
vice oan no longer pay its interest rates in full, the deficit 
being made up out of the Consolidated Fund. This has been 
due mainly to the incruasing competition of road trunsport and 
partly to defective accountancy methods in the past which did 
mot malta adequate provision !'or depreciation. 
had bean showing false profits over a ~number of years and these 
profits had been utilised to improve the service. Large sums 
of public money have be1;:1n sunk in unproductive branch lines which 
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even without road competition; cuuld not hope to pay more than 
a sma.ll proportion of their interest on capital,; 11' they paid 
operating co~ts~ Many of' those lines too, have been con-
structed for political rather thi\n economic ;t•easons. 
their serious h1:: .. ndicap it is rossible that the railways; under 
non ..... pol1 tical rrwnagement raight have paid their way 1 but the 
emergence ot road competition prevented. this. Road transport 
in New Zealand as competitor to rail trun.sport became important 
as far back as 1920, when the annual consumption of petrol was 
54 million gallons. Ju@t prior to the imposition of petrol 
re$tr1ctions in 19J9. the annual consumption had risen to 92 
million gallons; despite the vast improvements 1n motor engines 
and the consequent increased mileage par.gullon. In the number 
of veh1ol~s per head a!' population New Zealand is exceeded only 
by the United State$. 
E$timated Capital !n1testment in Tra.nepox·t in N. Z., as 
Railways .. Annual Statement o! 
Accounts. 
Road Tra.n$port Vehicles. Valueti estimated. 
Tramways. 
Shipping 
Local Authorities 
Hand 'book. 
.N.Z,O.fficial Yei!i.I' Book 
55.99 
147 ~ 60 
5.55 
19.00 
Tbi1 table provides an estimate of the amount of capital 
invested 1n transport fac1litl•• within l'(,:~w Zealand. It is 
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interesting to ooupare the relative operating expenses of 
road and rail transport. In 19.38-39 it is estln:a-1 tad thf.l.t 
£N. Z.. 11 • 5 m. was spent on petz• ol ~1.nd if' petrol be taken as 
one third of the total cost of operating road vehicles, tho 
tot~l expenditure on road transport \Vould be £ N.z • .35.5 m, 
This figure in ciliates the general magnitude o:f the t'jmount 
the community chooses to spend on road tr~naport, In the 
same year the gr(.')es earnings or the commun1tyta expenditure on 
railways, excluding the subsidy ft"om taxation, aruounted to 
£ N.Z. 9.35 m., o:r less than on~ third of the expenditure on 
road tx-a.ffic. It thus appears th¢;.t l.~ew Zealand normally u.aes 
road transport about three times as wuoh as t-a:t.l. 
On the other hand it is di!fioult to isolate particular 
causes for changes in railway revenue. It -csnnot be concluded 
that the amount of tx·ansport htindled by motor vehiclas is so 
much loss to the ra.ilwc::.ys, becuuse road tr&n$port was largely 
created by the motor 1tsel1'• lioreover roE<.d transport in many 
instances functions as feedE!rS to the x·a1l. Suob factors as 
the general condition of' trade, both intt3l'nal anci external, 
and by the changing distribution of population al'e of importance. 
The following tables .give some indication of the changes 
in :railway revenue 1n recent yearli>. 
72 
Year ended 
2Jsi,ttaroh 
192 
1929 
19.30 
. otal Passenger Journeys 
Joyrneva. (lJltlJ,i{.pn) Cs+ttitat 
per Passenger 
. :ra:~~n m~J..e§. 
Revenue 
g ~.z.m 
1931 
19.3~ 
1933 
1934 
19.35 
1936 
1937 
.l2lfl ...... '' ,._ .. 
From these :figures it is apparent that there has been 
(_, 
a hea"Vy decrease in passenger :tra1'f1o 1 and a large :pe.r·t of 
this must be due to motor tra.nsport. Th$ number of' pass~:mge3f 
journeys bas decreased but on the othe.r haL';d number of their 
miles run has shown a substantie:<.l increa:;e. The revenue from 
passenger traffic has fallen considerably. The railw<,ys have 
made large reductions in passenge.r t s fares in an endeavour to 
maintain this bra:nch of traffic_, Subst&nti;.:,l improvements in 
the second class aeoot.aodation have beon uccompanied by a de-
crease of nearly 50 percent in first class pass~nger revenue. 
These improvements has also iflCl'GtJ t~ed the cost of haulage, 
It would seem however that the railways is getting a larger 
p:roportion of long distence passanger· traf'f1o 1 whilo it ia 
loosing short: distance tra!'fio to road transport. 
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,.__ __ _.,._._.;;.;R~ev~!IOI:ln~\l:.:::;..e,...;~t;=-=·~:ioo;l:·9m. Gogdp 'I:rgtJ,c. J928~J8. , . 
Year eneled' 'Goods & Live Ton Ui.leage Total Goods etc~ Revenue' 
,31st March Stock £ (tons )m, of goocts etc. Revenue £ N, Z,m per Ton 
. !!~!' (pen1 .. 7 ,jg I I \, - ~ I . 1"11 469 4.72 i928 2,40 
7.61 488 4.90 1929 2.41 
7,79 512 4.96 1930 2.32 
6.96 467 4~54 1931 2.33 
;.a;;.: 40; 4.08 1932 2.41 
5.49 .36.3 J ,$.3 1933 2,52 
5.64 384 4.00 ' 1934 2.50 
6.0k 420 4,.2) 19)5 2.42 
19)6 2.)9 6.19 444 4.43 
6,81 496 4.91 1937 2.37 
z.~6. . ~61 . II.-• ~.SQ . -32~3~§--------~~------~~------~~~----~'··~ 
These figures indicate that the railways have been better 
able to maintain their volume of traf'.fic and revenue in this 
branch of transport. Revenue plilr ton....mile na.s been fairly well 
me.intttined ciespi te many cut rates and concessions. The decline 
in the volume of goods handled since 19.30 is s{j;riQus. Much 
or this decrease !rom 1931-34 was obviously due to slump con-
ditions, although o!' course the volUJ.ae ot' agricultural produce 
did not fall off during this period. It has been noted else ... 
where that New Zealand was well on the road to :recovery by 1936 
( 
but 1 t 1 s s1gn1fic~ar1t tlHi t the tonn&ge of goods handled by the 
railways did not incr.ease in proportion to tht:l. general business 
turnover. in other spheres of econoJt~ic activity. F'x•om thasa 
,figures it seems quite clear that the l'ailways have not secured 
1.ts proportion of increal:H~d busines$. 
A M1n1stxy·of Transport has axisted since 1929 und has 
since expanded so as to employ H~5 persons at an annual cost 
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of £ 83 1000. It is responsible for the adminiatra tion ~md 
legislation dealing with motor t:ra..ffic~ and for liconcing of 
road vehicles under the Trauspo:rt Licencing Act 19J1. This 
Aot ainv .. ;;d 11 to regulat~ motor t:t"affic with a view to securing 
co .... ord1nation between it &nd other forms o!' tl"affic, and to 
secure organisation .from the stnnd point of maximum ut1lity.n 
The country was divided up into ten tra.r1sport districts, this 
number lnter being reduced to four. Both goods and passenger 
service$ were required to take out licences, to be reviewed 
at three yearly intervalso~r A Tr&nsport Appeal Board was.1n. 
stituted, later being replaced by a eo ... ordin~tion Board. 
The Act or 1936 abolished the Co-ordination Board and its powers 
ab.d duties were vested in the 'Minister or ttransport. The 
object of thtls legislation was nto provide proper machinery 
,-' 
for the co ... ordination o:f' private enterprise with the f'~ilway 
Department.u It was indicated. too that the revenue o.t' the 
railways should be protected by the elimination o.f services 
in direct competition wftb it. 
It cannot b$ claimed that the system o!' licanoing of 
raotor transport has 'been u success 1n the wider f'i$lfd of 
transport. It may be true that some e11m111ation of wasteful 
cplJlpetition within the road transport industry, but the pro ... 
blem of road versus rail transport is ono that h&s yet to ~e 
competently approached. The new Labour Government, by vesting 
the powers and. duties -of the Co-ordination Board in the Minister 
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of Transport• made no effective :radical obange in the optu·ation 
of the systetn. lt may be true on the other h~nd thet the 
Ministers of 1'ran$port and Hailways tiJ'e not able to work in 
closer collaboration under the new leg1.$l8tiCJn. 
!n 19.37 however, the Government t:ff'ected substantial 
changes, when it proposed to buy out ~). number of paaser.tge:r 
and goods services which Wt:li'B op€U'a ti.ng in direct competition 
with the railwoys, In addition it U$ed pres~u:re to bring 
about the anmlgttmatlon of certain fleets of' goods and paar;eriger 
scrvtees. But if the aim is the complete oo~ordination of 
road an'i ·rail it see-ms. that something more thtm this is rGqu1:redJ 
The :railways must be able to adJust far~!:l and time tables to 
get the best re~ults from th~ combined SGrVioes. 
absence or any positive policy or co-ordination of road and 
rail earvi.oes. serious pr-oblems have ul'isen 1n both b:ranches 
of the industry, 
Firat, with regard to road tr~n:sport. 
probt:lbly without .full eonside:r•ation o!' Hll o1rewnstances, that 
the control exercised by the Gov~rnment discriminates heavily 
This is to 
a certain extent 1nev1 tuble wh~n some of the tl·a.nsport :facili ttes 
are owned by the State. Since the railways ure State owned 
there is a te.nptation for the State to control competitive 
service$ in order to preserve the capital value of its own 
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services. In New Zealand road tl~iimsport has bc~d to bear 
increasingly heavy t~:xation, while the railways have been 
heavily subsidised in recent years f:rom taxatic.m. It is adr.~t 
~itted that road transport should pay its share of road costs 
by taxation, such taxes liLt'S raerely a part of road running 
costs. But taxes imposed on road transport for othex· pur-
poses al:'e indirect taxes which are pl'iissed on to increase 
production costs, and tend to retard consumption and production, 
Professor A. H. Tocker1 considers that it would be just as log1oe.l 
to tax tll.e coal used on the :railways &t.td to :im};ose import taxes 
·on railwuy mate:rials 1 as to tax motor fuel and road vehicles 
for purposes other than road expenses. 
In 1938-.39 taxation on motor vehicles was £ N.z. 6.29 rn 
ot wn~oh £ N.Z. 3.44 million. was devoted to roads and £ N.Z.2.82 
million to general Government re':'~nue. '!'he tax on petrol 
was raised to 14 .. 7d per gallon of' which 6d was devoted to 
road purp0$6$ and s.7d to other purposes. Consequently motor 
transport bears a heavy burden of general taxation, aa well 
as contributing to road maintena.:1ce. 
The ra.ilw&.ys on the other hand are heavily subsidised 
trom taxation~ a portion of whieh comes f'rmu the taxation paid 
by motor transport. The following table shows the d~fieit of 
railway expenses which has to be made good from t4:!xation. 
Year ended 
].¥larch. 
1935 
1936 
19.37 
19.38 
19)9 
Revenue Expenditure Net Revenue Interest 
. Cbet:S§S 
' . 
6.63 5.54 1.09 2 • .33 
7.00 S.95 1.05 2.30 
7.79 6.89 .09 2 • .31 
8.6J s.oo .63 2,34 
9 • .35 8.64 .70 2.42 
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Deficit ·tO< 
1.22 
1.25 
1 .41 
1.71 
1. 7Z 
The figures show an increase in railway revenue due to 
the general expansion of tr~de from 1935•38 but expenditure in~ 
creased more rapidly and net revenue continued to fall until 
the new earnings of the railways were lower th&n in tbe worst 
years o:f the depression. In 1938-.39 some improvement was 
effected as a result of a 10 pe:t'cent increase in rates., but 
thit!l improvement wa.s slight owing to an increase in expandi tur$. 
Tbe deficit bas increased steadily $1nce 19.35 •. 
An unsatisfactory situation has ·thu=s· dav@loped in the 
transport system of New Zealand where uneconoi:,ic taxation is 
imposed upon payable ;read transport and used to subsidise un ... 
payable railway transport. Oespite this very obvious state 
of affairs, the Government is persisting with 1ts expansionist 
policy of spending large sums of public money on railway trans-
port a~d constructing new lines where they have little, if any 
prospect of paying, At the same time the Government continues 
to further restrict road transport which not only pays its own 
1 op cit· No 191. 
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way but which also contributes revenue to o!i'set the deficit 
of tne railway returns. The continuance o.t' tr11s policy will 
merely accentuate the present embarrassing position of the 
railways in the !utu_re , while its affects must operC~te to the 
detr1m~nt of int~rnal business. 
The difficulties of' the l'ailwaya may be attributed to 
a variety of :factors. The Government has shown its willingness 
to s1ve consideration to the current 'belief that road transport 
is the main cause of x·ailwey di:f'ficu.ltie~. Since the State 
owns and operates the railways this attitude is understandable, 
But there are other serious ~ weaknesses not due to competition. 
In recent years 1 and in par·ticular since the depression, railway 
di.ft'iculties have been created largely by the Goverrunent itself. 
The improved working conditions, tlte torty hour~week, the in-
cre&$ed wages paid to ·~unployeos and the increase :in :the numbers 
or employee~J have greatly .increased the running costs at the 
railways. In addition tbe Oovex·naui!nt has undtu·tuken a con ... 
oiderabl& amount of new railway eonstruttion, at a time when tije 
cos.t of construction is at its highest. These new lines have 
less chance of paying than those already operating. 
The following table o! re.ilway returns will make these 
points clearer. 
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ear ended 
March. 
OUtput per 
Employee. 
19Jf 
1937 
.:lili '' ._ 
L . - - t ·y M ·a· 
100 
105 
jlO 
100 
118 i&. 
14J 
100 
94 
'!'b 
The most stri.king feature shoV#n by this table is p:ro ... 
gresaive and substantial fall in the output per person em-
ployed on the railways. If the 1935 output per pez•son had 
4. ifl 
been maintained and the present expenditure l'educed proportion-
ately it is probable tbat the railways would not have required 
the subsidies from taxation which have been paid since then to 
meet the steady falling productivit)ll. of.' lebour. 
; -.., I 
that the Government bas created em.ployment on the railways as 
one means of easing the uner.aployment probl~m. 
In 19:30 a Railway Commission investigated problems 
associated with this bt•anoh of the trtmaport system.. It 
concluded that many o.t' the di:ft'iculties were the result of 
long yaa.rs o:f'·po11tical mismanagijment of railway affairs, of 
tmwise construction of new lines unlikely to pay, fiome of which 
parallelled existing roactB or sea routes; of political control 
ot freight rates involving concealed subsidies to other in ... 
dustries il and or 1nterf'el·ence in staff control to the detriment 
of eff1cioncy and orguu1sat1on. As a result of this Com .... 
mission the :railways were administered by a Railways Board re .... 
1 op cit. 
80 
latively tree from political cont:rul. But in 1936 the Labour 
Gov~u.'.nruent l'~$tored full political control of' railway f.:.ffiiirs 
and embaz·k.au upon a. policy cf the kind that the 1 930 Commis sian 
had f'ound responsible for many o.f the di.fficultles or railway 
trcmaport. Consequently the dif,ficulties of the railways will 
tend to increase rather thun decrease in the future, 
Despite the Governmentt:i professed policy of the 
rationalisation of industi·y, and the introduction of the 
Indust:r1e.l Efficiency Aot in November 19.36, ite achievements 
so far in coa~ection with tran$port in New Zealand, leave much 
to be d~sired. Xn :road transport the methods followed t1ave 
taken the form oi' heavy taxativn .. the control o! 1niports ~nd 
increased State regule.tion. ~his policy claims to be directed 
towa.:r·ds rationalisation and co .... ordinati.on, but, if that is. so, 
it has not succeeded. It has acbievod the el1m1n~~tion of some 
road servich:1s oom.petion with tha railways, the amalgamation of 
exi$ting competitive services, the sale of road sarvt~ea to the 
Railway Department,. thus giving the railways increased monopoly 
on the roads, Road transport has been further handicapped by 
State superviAJion of rates, time tables and scheduls~. 
Government. polioy d1~c.r1minatea ht~avily against :road transpa.rt 
in favour of rail transpo.r.t which is State owned and operated. 
On the other hand, while road transport is being reduced, 
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the Government continues to increase future ;traneport problems 
by expanding railway construction. .Road construction has also 
been increased considerably, annual expenditure r1tUlg from about 
£ N.Z. S million in 19)5 .... J6 to £ N .. Z .. 13 million in 1938 ... 39 .. 
lt appears that th~ Government has been far more concerned with 
solving the unemployment problem than the problem er rationalis ... 
ing transport. Admittedly a case can be made !or tbe utilisation 
of rail transport on the grounds that a tremenc~:ous amount of 
public manGy hu.s already been e~~peoded in railw£.y construction 
Eind some return on this money 1s bett~r than nox1e at all. 
Consequently some control is eHHHmtial., 
tn New Zealand there is a41ple ciCOpe fo~ Government 
control or tll~ transpOl't system. The methods adoptf.ld :to meet 
this need $hould be designed to cov~r the whole field. they 
should not hamper efficiency and desirable economic progressJ 
they should embrace :rail as well as road tra.nspox·t, new con-
struction as well as current operation and import control or 
transport requirements. In particular they should consider 
seriously the possible fu.ture development of air transport, 
eapeaiully i.n the J post war per·iod. 
Tl'ansport is perhaps the most vital of all economic 
services a$ production, tl·a.de and employmont are all depfJndent 
upon it. It is oi' fundamental in1portanue tbht transport 
policy should give the consumer the maximum practicable freedom 
of choice and should enoblo any form o! trtd15port to expand 
freely 1n responso to deu:iRnd.. The consumer is by far the 
bast judge of' what is best f'l.)r the production ~md trade in 
which he is engaged. Control, to be beneficial, shoUld( 
therefore aim at providing the most efficient services in 
the most acono1;1ical way. 
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From the above analysis o! the tr-ansport problaui 4t.:nd the 
extent and trend of State regulf.i·tio•l; it will be seen that 
much more 1s required to establish a sound economic and efficient 
transport syatem in New Zeal~nd. A complete reorientation of 
policy is imperative. It i$ difficult to bel1e'Y'e that the 
control o! transport Up to tiie pres.e:nt has been the result of 
deliberate and considered policy .. On the contrary there is 
an abundance of evidence to show that no definite transport 
policy has yet been formulated, and th~t the Government has 
decided to pursue a policy which has proved harmful in the past 
and likely to prove even more harmful in the future. Far from 
ef!'eoting the rationnli.sation of the transport system. with a 
View to '.!providing more efficient and economical services, the 
Go'i'ernment ha$ merely discriminated hea:vil..y ·against road trans ... 
port in :favour of its own railw<:~ys. In other words it has 
tailed to f1:1-ee the issue of co .... o:rdination between road and 
tail altogether. 
CHAPTER VII. 
I The General Problem. 
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A section of a previous chapter dealt ,,;ith the character ... 
tstics of tll.e New Zealand economy, and emphasiseli the high rela.t1.ve 
importance of the f'ar,.~ing industries in the national economy. 
On the other hand it was pointed out thut con.d1t1()nS in New 
Zealancl were not favourable to u. high degree of industrial 
development. Mention was made also of the fact tlla t the Dominion . 
was largely dependent upon overseas ma:rkets, especially in GI·eat 
Bri te.in, for the disposal of her. primHry produce. Hf,tVing rega:t•d 
to these fundamental facts. it is not at all surprising tbat in 
the pest, the objectives of Nt::w Zealand's econmH1c policy have 
been wainly concerned with CJVer!;;aas trade and w.ore ptirticulu.rly 
the share of the United Kingdom and other Duwinions in that 
trade. Domest.ic manufacturing industry was not fostered as a 
matter of policy although suc11 industries as were in existc:.n.ce 
constituted a political 11 pl'e::>suz·e 11 group of s~!m€ importance, and 
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had obtained the protection of tarrifs - usually about twenty 
per cent. Moreover such shelter us dor1~estio industries had 
managed to obtatn was not tal-ten from the1n., 'rtH~ existing position 
in regard to New Zealand t s developm\mt of manufacturing industries 
is described in the Official Year Boo.k for 1940. It cltiS.Sifies 
New Zealand's industries as follows: 
Qt,QUP 1 comprises those industries anguged in the 
preparation of farm products :t:or the market, with tbe 
'resulting by ... products.. 'Xhe o,dded value is relatively 
small in proportion to the val.ua of tiH~ ou.tput. These 
industries comprifH"l meat .freezing and preserving, ham 
and bacon cur~:ng,butter and cheese making, sausage casing 
making,felllllongering and woolscour·inJ, boiling aown and 
manure making. 
GtQYU II_ covers the public utilities w1.th large capital 
assets operating under monopoly ct:md1tiun.s. It comprises 
gas worlts, ~e·lectrical generation and supply. 
,GtQlU! Il~ consists of what are usually tern1ed sGmi-
primary irldu.stries, utilising natur&l resources. t1Added 
value" is high. The group includes saw milling, fish 
curing, lime crushing, brick; tile l:l.nd pottery 1::..a.h:ing, 
flax milling, concrete black and fibrous plaster making. 
,Argy.p IV includes all. those industr1Gs.for which stat1s ... 
tics are &V(;<ilable ancl whioh are not included in tbe 
first three groups. It includes borderline cases such 
as grain milling and also,several "~epair" industries 
such a.s motot repairing. Gtine:r-ally speuk1ng this group 
:represents the 11 truett manufacturing industries of rJew 
Zealand.. -
The fvllowing to,ble represents the pr1ncips.l statisticts 
of the various groups in 1937-~B. 
Group. 
I 
II 
III 
IV 
OutpJ.l:t. 
Number of 
.E.J!IJ.tl Ql;: e ~ S · 
S5 
£ N.Z. 
Wages paid • HActded Value". 
None of the above g1•oups co\fers the extractive industries, 
building construction,or far-ming p:roper, a.lthougb of course, a 
large pf.u·t of farming products enter as the raw matel'i&ls of 
Group I. 
It is clear that the first three groups &l'e almost in.ev1tti.ble 
or indigenous in New Zealand~ They ul'e not subj~ot to any 
appreciable extent to competition from overseas. The 11 true~'~ 
manufacturing industries are individually small, scattered and 
oft$n uneconomicol. Large scale manufacturing industries 
have only recently appea.red. A notable example is the motol' 
assembly industry. 
The defects of New Zealand's J'&ctory industries are to 
be foW1d in efficiency and orga.n!sation 1 including the over ... 
lapping of factori~s on a limited market. On the other hand 
there is no ls.ck of enterprise:the range of' products 1s consider-
able .. It includes cloth and cloth1ng,.boots and shoes, hats, 
corsets, silk stockings, umbl'ellam, refi.iled sugar~ chocolate, 
wi.ne 1 phosphates, electric and gas ovens,_ enamel baths,lawn 
mowers 1 steel of rice i'urni ture, altiun1n1um wa.re, milk:ing machines*-
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concrete mixer· a, in.sul£1 tors 1 bowser pumps, arnmuni tion, brushes, 
tnatchas, pa1nt 1 rad1o sets,ba.ltelite,gol!' clubs and the liKe, 
This variety of products itself, implies a preponderance of 
small individual units since the mar<Ket for many of' th&se products 
is limited. But thel,'le exist, on the other ha.:nd, some industries 
such as the boot and shoe industl'Y, in which an e.xoe~si ve number 
of small factories cater fox· a relatively srnall marKet. The 
following table gives th€} t1umber of opez·ativee employed iu 
thirty two factories~ 
5 
2 
5 
a 
12 
Over 200 
1.50 ... 200 
;o ~~..-60 
20 - 50 
Under 12. 
Although the relatively small size of individual 
establishments is a feature of the :fc~_ctory industries, their 
importance as an &venue or employment is considerable. Admitted.ly 
the futurfit expansion of farm production and employment must in 
the last analysis bte conditioned by overseas markets, since 
over seventy per cent of farm produce is exported. But at the 
.same time there ar~ good indicutiuns ttllit overseas wurk.ets are 
not likely to expand in tne future as they !lave dona in the 
past, and that expansion of ewployu1ent in the fartning industries 
has slackened in recent ye&r·s .. In contr&st, there are 
indications that factory industries offer wide possllbillties 
for increased employment in the substitution of Nt:tw Zaalend. 
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factory products for imports. The employment i.n the flti'uen 
manufacturing industries has shown a mc.x·.ked i.nc.rea::H~ during tbe 
past twenty years. 
New Zealand, by vi1•tue of the dependen.ce of its farming 
industries upon export prices, experienced the ;full impact of 
the economic depression when these prices slumped. This ht:Lrd 
fact dewonstrated also the economic weakness of vi:rtua.lly euti:re 
dependence on the farming industri~s, and the necessity for a 
more diversified or balanced economy. Accordingly, the Labour 
Party formulated certain t11nsulat1on 11 p;roposals., which implied 
a vigorous prqgramme of lndustrial expansion botb~a$ a means 
or creating employment and of protecting 1iew Zealand froru the 
drastic consequences o! overseas fluctuations in export prices. 
The position was summed up by the late Prime Minister, the Right 
Honourable M.J.Savage, as follows: ... 
"If British policy now precludesthe sale of our exportable 
surplus products in the Un1 ted .Kingdom at econord .. c prices, 
in sufficient quanti ties to er'iable this Dominion to continue 
to progress, then obviously New Zealancl. is faced witn tne 
necessity of adopting one of tW'o alternatives. Either we 
must develop our own manut·acturing industr·ies and thus 
provide internal~y the expanding market that is necessary 
for the prosperity o.f our people,or we rnwst attempt to 
find foreign markets for New Zealand's primary pr·oducts. 
hlf the first alternative is adopted it means that New 
Zealand must make :t'or itself a oonsidarable portion of the 
articles, which at present we purchase from the United 
Kingdom,. Naturally we would concentrate only on those 
industries best suited to our economy. We have no desire 
to set up U!leconomic industries behind the shelter of a 
tariff. Hather we would. attempt to organise industry 
on a r,a tionalised plan. 
"- ~ - - ~ ~ - - - - • If however we achieve a more balanced 
econo!lly and produce more of our own manui'uctured goods,we 
should be in a position !lOt only to absorb that considerable 
portion of our own people who a.t pr0sent axe unable to find 
normal avenues of' employmer_1t, but &lso to IM11ntain u mu.ch 
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greater populat1c.mtt" 
The words 11 org<~nise industry on a rationalised plan" 
are important:they indicate a new train ot thought •• Although 
the Labour GoVt;:l'rtm0nt advocated a progr·amme uf tne rutionalisatio~ 
or 1ndustry, even before they were eleotad to office 1 it is 
important to remember that prior to 19J6 the tx·end o.t' much 
legislation was in the direction of more and more detailed 
r$gUla tion of industry a.n(i trade. Much of this was doubtless 
due to the depression, a.lthuugh some critics oo11sider that the 
existence of such regula.tion wa.s one important cuu~e contributing 
to the length and severity of the depre~sion i ts~lf. rt ~vas 
however under the Labour Government that the fir.'t}t thr.Jrough-
going attempt to norgauiae industry on a rationalised plan 11 wa.a 
made. 
(Il) l:fl}!1 lNQL1Sl'!liA.L E\FfiCif:IiCX AQ1 J.2.J..Sa AND :&,'1;§ ADM~Nl§TRA'fl~ • 
With the passing of the Industrial Efi1o1ency Act in 
NovembtH' 19.36 and thf; subsequent establishment of u Bureau of 
Industry, it appeared as if the new Labour Goverment would take 
early and active }i!Etasures in the direction of a planned develop-
ment of mG~.nufactut1ng industries. 'l'he gt:m•n·ul purpose of this 
Act as described in its title is nto promote the economic welfare 
of iiew Zealand b;y providing for the promotion of new indus tries 
in the most economic form, and by so regulating the general 
organisation, development, and operation of: industries that a 
g:reater measure o:f industrial affic1ency will be secured". 
It is importomt to notice lha t tht> term u industry" includes not 
only manufacturing, but &lso any trade, occupation, busines;·~, woz·k5 
or servic·& of any kind whatsoever. 
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Under the Act a Buroau of In.uustry was set up, which was 
corupri~ad of speeial and oro.inary members, all of whom ine 
appointed by the Minister ._,f Industries E.md Coltlmerce. Ordinary 
members are persons employed in tho SElll'vico of' t . .he Government 
who in the opinion CJf the 1A1n1st<:Jr possess special qualif'icationa 
which enable them to render valuable service to ttte Bureau. 
Special members are nominees of m~nufncturing and agricultural 
industries,and power is given to the l\Un1ater, if he thinks fit, 
to appoint further special members to represent other industries, 
or the vmrkerf/3 employed in any industry. The BUl'e&u, which 
illEH~ts at regular intul'vals acts as an advisory body to the Minister 
of Indu;;tries and Cmm;teroe, in rM~tters pertaining to the establish-
ment and development or new industi'i.es; the renderii:.~.g of any 
Government assi::ltance to industries; the raising uf' the qualities 
of products; tbe ad.aption of uniform methods of accounting and 
cost1ntH the preparation of' statistics; tstandardisation of 
materials, }Jl'vCeS:Jes,or pri.JdUcts; the tl'&ining and SUppJ..y Of 
workers; and the ffir;~l'keting and distribution of products. 
The functions of the Bureau a.re thus extren~e.Ly ;'>'ide. 
The Minlstet· can require tllii\t any industry speci.fled by him 
shall be catr1ed on only pursuant to a license issued under th$ 
Industrial :u;rriaiency Act, and tbe Bu.reuu is the licensing 
authoritt in this connection. The hhnister is the appeal 
~ autht:~ri ty a.gains t the deois1on.s or the Dureau in resJH~ct to 
licensing.. A fur·tber duty <)f the Bureau, closely allied to 
licensing, is the prepal'ation of i.Gdustrial plans for indus trias 
with a view to securing greo.tor filffioiency ifl suob in(iustries. 
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The Minister may on the advice uf the Bur'eau, [U·r·ange to hatve 
any such plar1 applib!d to the inu.u.:.>try concerned,although Elny 
such plan must be appruved befo:re o.dopt1on, by the majority of 
those t:lngaged in the i.w:.lustl.--y. 
Hegulations unde:r the Act way be made for a wide rangE~ of 
purposes i.n.clud.ing the fi.tla tiun of' prices 1 royal ties ,discuunta 
and the like, the control of production and murketing, the 
standardisation &nd simpl1flcat1on of materials, processus and 
produets .. 
It will be SL~en then that the powers of the Bureau are 
very wide in that it has thu power to r·ecowaend to tha Minister 
virtually any measure deemed nece s sa.1·y !'or the x·a tionalisa tion 
of existing industries ana t.l:le establishment of new ones. 
The passing oi' the Aqt and the establishment of the 
Bureau met with a lirixed reception. There was a. fairly wide-
spread recognition of tbe need for new definitions of the 
relationship of State au.d industry, and ma.uy rna.nufucturers feel 
tbu t the Act lUiS the very thing for thfim. l t would give them 
the protection tl:1ey x·equired, ~s the l:ndus trial Con<mi ttee. Jstalbl1shed 
for each industry would represt::n.t mainly produce:rs. On the other 
band some prog;cessive i~,anufacturE!lrS fean3d that the f'-Ct1v1ties 
of the Bui·eau w<.>uld retard their development. An~1 again 
consumers felt that the Du1 eau woul(J be utilised to assist 
manufacturers to remain in business ratbex· than make buoiness 
officiant. 
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The :reoo:rd of the Bureau during its first three years 
of operation suggests that some of these earlier misgivings 
were not undfound~d. In tbe first place many of' the Eureauts 
activities bad to be delega~ed to oommitte&s. Thes$ committees 
wore later replaced by an Executive of five members,. Much of 
the Bureau's activity was concerned with licensing. .By the 
end of 19391 twenty-five industries bad been gazetted as 
licensed industries. Apart from licensing, only two industrial 
plan$ have been put into operation, natuely the New Zealand 
flax (Phorium tenax) and the pha:t·macy industries. In regard 
to the former industry the echema .formulated by the :Bureau ot 
Industry provides for the minimum guaranteed prices for fibre 1 
licensing of flax mills, and advisory service for !liil\. millers, 
marketing of fibre by the State, a r~se-aroh orgc:,nis<:Jtion, 
flax e-Xperimental farm and e.xperiment~l mill both owned andoon-
troll.ed by the State. (hmerally it r9presented a thorough .. 
going attempt to rehabilitate a aeol1n1ng industry which for 
some years pt;.st had be0n subject to depressed ma:rket conditions 
and which had also been. supported by finanoit:.l uid from the 
State. The phtU"rru:J.cy plan effected ce.:ctt:.1n improve1aents in 
the industry together with somiii' reduction of chtu'ges. Bu.t it 
has been subJected to seve;r:·e crit1o1s~n on the groUll:)s that the 
plan merely presGrves the uneconomic set up of the industry, 
eliminates competition, and discr1ruirw:bes against the consumer • 
. The following subtle critic is n o:r the Pharmacy plan app0ars 1n 
an issue of a. New Zealand periodical. 
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"ThCil plan gives tbe chemists wbo are to be made eff'1o1ent 
a monopoly over their indust:t'YJ it allows th(;m to with ... 
hold. licenses from Boots Ol' any othe:c concern that see1ns 
e!fic1$nt; it does not fix Sto!\lndard !e(;;;s for dispensing OI' 
an art11'icial drug price list; it forbids the eco.r1omic com-
pet! tion of Wholesal~n· s or manu.fa·e t\l.rers; 1 t g1 v·e s ohemis ts 
the monopoly right to sell cer•ta.in substances; it preserves 
the uneconoru.ic set up of the industry; it gives majority 
control to the chei:Jists tbemsalves;. j,t gives• employees a 
vested interest in preservifli the uneconomic stllitus quo with ... 
out giving them e contl·o111ng voice,; it gives absolutely no 
representation to consumers who u:re the Vel'Y l'eli:i(So.a i'ol' the 
chemists existing; it confers official :r~acogn1tion on a 
closed corporation of p:t•oducevs givi.ug tbem, power to con-
tinue their existence, eliminate cotnpeti tion, ana r;uHte the 
consumer pay. There a:n3 two good things .~bout the scberr;e, 
one tb.a.t the chtnn1~ts will themselves have to pay for its 
adrr~.inistration, and two, that tb6 Minist~n· h~s the controlling 
voice. li$ can turn down recom.mendations and veto plans. 
He1 we gath~r, will represent conswuers, but how cen he get 
nis information, when the ones who supply it will be chemists 
themselves? He will be l'1filld1capped from the beginning witn 
lack of kn~)wledge. '' 1 . 
Another .measure which rnay have an important bearing on 
the future of industry in New Zt:;aland is the Iron and Steel. 
Act of' 19.37, Which a.uthurlsed. the est~. blisk:uneut of a State 
iro.n and steal industry at One.kak.a. For this purpose the 
Gov•rnment was empowered to borrow the sum o:f £ N.z. 5 Million 
from the Reserve Dank. Progress with this project is at the 
moment at a stand~till. 
When judged. by the usefulness of its achievements, the 
Industria.l Efficiency Act so far has not proved an outstand ... 
ing success. Allowance must be made of' coUl'~e for the !'act 
that the Bux·eau up to the present has been feeling its way • 
1 n~gmQrtQ.Wif December 8 th 1937. 
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and that in the early stages it would be too unwieldly a 
body. This was more especially the case when it is re-
membered that th.a Bureau is composed fo/ busy members( de-
partmental heada and business men) who could devote part of 
their time only to Bureau work,. Tha subsequent creation 
of an Executive helped to ease this problem. There are 
certain $phe.res of aot1vity 1n which the Bureau has proved 
beneticial·L to industry J n~mely its explanatory and advisory 
services. While the scope of the Eureauts activities call 
for n..; aoaMtmt, lack of co ..... orclination of tbese activities 
and the manner in whioh they were dispersed have not been 
conducive to uorganising industry on a rat1pnal1sed plan.n 
This parti~lar aspect of the rationalisation of industry 
will be treatBd more tully in ~a subsequent obapter on Market-
1ngj; All that is intended here is s. brief outline of' the 
regulation of agriculture, in order to consider it in relation 
to the ceneral schema of the Government to org4nise industry 
on a rationalised plan. 
Becausa of the predominant importanct~ of farming in the 
eoonor.uic life of .New Zealand; a great dau.l of tbe effort of 
Governments, both present and psst. has been directed to 
improving the position of farming industries, Among the 
va:r.·iou.s measures adopted .umy be mentioned land settlement 
schemes, the State .Ad.V4naes and Rural Cted1t Schemes, various 
publio works schemes covering cleb.ri:ng th$ lond, dru.inuge 
and irrigation, .subsidif~S on t:ne carri~ga of l1we Bnd 
fertilisers, resear·ch and instruction by Government Depart-
ments, scheLUes for the sulasidislng or control of production 
and marketing of various .f'arm products such as wh&~t and 
dairy produce, mortgage reduction, ra..,.organisatio.n of internal 
and external marketing, and Guaranteed Price:f& for fhrm pro .. 
ducts. 
This trend of St&te regulation of agriculture has been 
one of the outstanding developments during the po~t-war 
period. The present Government has merely ucc~ntuated it. 
The pl;1nc1pal changes a.f'fel:ted by the Labour Government were 
the re-o:rg&n1sa.tion or e.xtel·nal marketing o1' dairy pr·oduce 
which was associatad witll the Guaranteed Price scherue, and 
the establishment of an Int~H"h<;.l Marketing Division of the 
Primary Products Mar:tettng Department. Fol:' this purpose 
the Primary Products Marketing Act was passed in 1936. An 
Amendment ot: 19.37 enabled the control to be extended to 
internal marketing ~ot1v1ties. l:mprovements were also 
effected in the control of wheat production and the marketing 
of wheat. In June 19.36 also, the Government re-organised 
tn• rural credit system,. The State Advances Corporation 
replaced the former Mortgage Corpot'f;.tion. The chunge of 
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t1tle is significant and w;.;.s COiilii.i(znted on by the Minister of' 
Finance as followst 
ttThe pyohologicol import£tnce of the old title t State 
Andvunc es f was l' aoogniaed by elim.inc. t:tng the word 'Mortgage' 
and calling the inst1 tution the St£'1. te Ad vane as Corpora t1on. tt 
It must be conceded thi;;t the Govex-·w.nent has s-ubstantially 
improved tha external roarketing of dairy px oduce, and the in .... 
tarnal marketing of a wide va1·1ety of products, including local 
grown ·.f'ru1t and vegetables, and 1mpox·t~d fruits and c~reals. 
Under the guarE:Lnteed price scrJeme for da1ry px·oduca an a tternpt 
h&s bean made to stabilise the incor:w of' the da.iry farmin, 
oomruun1ty although they suf'i'o:r to a cetta1n e.>..tant from rising 
costs whieh are lurgely the result of the Government's expansion-
ist econm,.io policy in otbe;r spheres • 
It caru1ot be over emph:: .. sised however that the rationalis-
ation of ll>.g::ricultu:re, llke thlilt of industry shows a marked 
tendency 'to bene:rit the producers at the expense of the 
QOO$UIT16l'$ • 
'l'he general ide~;.. behind the r"gulution of induetry and 
trac;le appears to be the desire for a more sec\\re, mol'e stable, 
more rational and less wasteful organisation of industry and 
trade. The method followed is generally to investigate the 
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condition of the 1.n.dust:ry concerned• includin~ both. pr·oduct1on 
and marketing, und on the basis of this 1nveut:igc.t1un to license 
p:x·oducers and to tix prices 11 conditions of S£::.le etc. In this 
way it is hoped to stabilise industry .for all those conee.r:ned 
in it, wor•ket•s and employers, dealers and consumers. 
The ideal aimed at seems in many respects a desirable 
on~ but 1ts attainment or even its near approach is beset 
with d.if!icUlties and dangers, which_. wt:a.en investigated suggest 
that the rer~edy applied might be worse than the cure. For 
instance the :re!1l.ovi.ng or r-:>gul4 tivn of competition I;Yill create 
the d1fficul ty o:t' providing t:·m al tez·n~t1vt:.1 to com.peti tion 
which does not consist of monopoly f'or a privileged few at the 
expense of. the many, In addition Stu te f1xa tion· of' p•:l..ces .
1 
OVerlooks the faot that the fundame:ntul .functiQU of prices iS\\ 
'' 
to equate supply and demand, It is notice~ble th~t 1n several 
cases wh·,re regulation bas been applied. and prices fixed, as in 
the oase of wheat, petrol and fertilisers (to quote only a. few) 
the fixed price ha.$ been nigher than that formel.~ly ruling. 
Con:sELiu&ntly the consUl.UBl' 1s penalised. Finally the difficulty 
of elimination waete without int5oduc1ng another and gx•eater 
waste will not be easily overcollle., l:he cost of labour and 
resources required by industry !o conform with the :t•egulations, 
plus the cost of regulaticm1 control und enforcement to the 
Government must be added to the cost of production .. 
It is importv.nt to notice too, thttt although c¢ ... ope1'ation 
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among producers has bt;on an active force i:n. New Zealar1d for 
a genera t1on or mo.l'e, especially in the da1:ry1rlg industry, 
consumer t s cO-OJ>eration on the other hand is not extensive. 
This form of selling organisation, te highly developed 1n 
conservative Britain and retor.mist Sweden, has never made 1"eal 
progress in New Zealand. A 11m1 tea &Jllount of co ... o:pere.t1on 
e.x.is ts, particularly 1n eormHction with the purchase o:.r fert-
ilisvrs, and to some extent hou$ehold requirements also. by · 
dairy farmers through thei;r• :f'c.ctor1es,. This disparity in the 
thst the former ax·o placed at a o.1st1not disudvantage and will 
no doubt continue to be so until tlu;y becH:.nne sul'ficiently 
orgs.rd.sed to .rectify the position"' 
But although the organisation of industry in New Zealand 
is far f"J:>om being organised on a l'atim:laliaed plun, it appear·s 
most unlikely tl:tat ax1st1ng State control will be relaxed in 
the future, on the co11tr<J.ry the reverse appears to be th~ case. 
This being\so, the extension of control pl&cas additional 
\ 
responsibilities on Parliamentary Government as well as add1t1onf.tl 
&dminiatrative burdens. To cope with these increased problems 
the principles a:nd techniques of administratir..>n will have to be 
improved. 
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ThEt most. pronounced clie.racteristie of State action 
in New Z•eland bas not been in bu.siness activities but·in the 
various $Ohemes for :red1str1buti.ng the natioul income. In 
no sphere has the st~:.rt• played a l;;rgar ptil't th-~n in the re-
gulation o!' social and labo'Ul' conditions, particularly in the 
period since 1890. For a ¢orruu\mity with a predominant agri- · 
cultural and. P~!toral economy, this trend n1ay Ge~m a little . 
curious, F.rom the very beginnings o:f colonisation the demands 
of' education and $ocial !iarvices generall)' have been matters 
of' public inter<Hit. lfhe reas<;>n for this may have be6n that 
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through lucl{ of voluntary communi t;y organ1sa tiona able and will .... 
ing to undertake humanitarian works, the provisiun of these 
services developed upon the State. Tha strenith ot this tend-
enoy during the past forty years may be gauged from the fact 
that it ha.s persisted with more or less vigour under all Govern ... 
ments and no one would deny that its strength comes :f'rom tho 
wishes it' not the convictions of the people a.s a whole. Thus 
Dr. J.B.Condliffe could write in 1930: 
"If New Zealand can be said to have any social or economic 
theories, pride and place must undoubtedly be given to the 
general theory that human considerations should take precedence 
of economic progr~~s>f or perha.ps that true economic progress , 
can in the long run be be.sed only on human wel!are~ 
It is only natUral thMt this theory should .find whole 
hearted support in pe:t•cept. and action with the Labour Go"'ern-
ment. ~he late Pr:i.me Minister, the Right Honourable :M.J~Savage 1 
expressed the same idea in the following terrast ... 
»They {the People) r~cognise that social justice must be 
the guiding principle and that oconor~1ic organ1$a.t1on must adapt 
itself to social needs. If out 1nstituti'0ns fail in this re ... 
gard, then they must be chGnged. This is the basis of the 
2 policy of the Labour Gover·nruent in New Zealand. n 
'\., __ _ 
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!t 1& important to notice that a considerable amount of 
labour and social legislation was in exi.stence in New Zealand 
long bef'o:re the Labour Government &ssumud offi.ee ir~ 1935. Tbe 
Factories Aet, the Shop and Shop Aasistants Aot and similar 
measure$ providt"d for thu re.gl_:;,l&tic!llS ot g-eneral wo:rking oondit:Loqs, 
while the l:ndust:ri&l Cono111at1on and Arbitration Act 1894 aimed 
to SJect.u:·e th~ ptilaceful &ettlement ~:.1f industr1tll clisput~s. 
Compulsory Arbitration haa been I\Iew Zt.i'a.land 's beat known con .... 
tribut1on t-o labour legislation,. But the growth of' social 
services bsa been almost cont1m.1.¢U$ sinee th:s 1 S90~ s.. In 
1899·1900, ther• were 11,.285 ptUliion:& in force and the total 
cost was. £ N.Z. 157,000 or 4/2 per bead of population. In 
. 19)S there ware ove:r:• 100,000 pensions o! various kinds (including 
war pensions) at a ·totr'!.l oost of over £ N'.Z- 3 mil..U..on,. The 
total Gov0rnm~nt expenditure 1n the three branch~s of the 
soc1al services, Health; Education ;-md Pensl.ons, !or the year 
193~1. .. .)6, !ilt th~ ~11d rJf the depr13SS1<:m in New Zealand WU$ 
£ N .. Z. 14.,.31' million.,. Although e:xpe.r1diture ou th~se aierviees 
wa• curtailed and drastic aalaxoy cuts were imposed a:J economy 
measures during the depression,. provision wa.:s n•verthelesa 
made for the rel;J.Qf oi' unemploym~nt. In 19)J..,.J4 over £ N.Z.4 m 
bad been colleetud :fQ;r tll1$ purpose. The rise of the Labour 
Government to power at the, ,:.;nd of 1935 brought substantial 
ohangea and e:x.ten5lons of: labour a.nd social legislation ot 
Ntw Zealand. 
1 01 
Practically the f'irst step of the new Goverwnent ·was 
to pa$s the Finance Act 19)61 by which E:.l.l t~rbitr~.t:ton Court 
awards, ~rh.ioh had b~en suspended dtll'ing the depres.s:i<,)n, werfit 
completely restored, and all cuts in sa.ltl.ries and wGg0s imposed 
during the dep:re-$:sion pariod, whether the workar5 concerned 
were wox-king under the Ar'bitration Court award o:r nQt,; were 
restored to their former levels. 
Al'b1 tration Court me.da a pronouncement on. t stflnd.nrd wages' .. 
~e tollow1ng rates were deemed to be the r,d.nimtt'i'l t 
' - - ltl i _, - '1 "' ' 4 .. " ... ~ 7 • 
. .· .J.ed 
Semi ... skilled 
t!it§iiJ;Jte§ ::.. .... - ' ... 
... 
~ ·. 
2/, tp 2/7td 
,......ai!zoili:t:._-·JJJ'i:tl.ta.i TIT-. .. ,._. 
Further, theJt minimum rates were intended for- a forty 
hour week and for oaeual labourJ they were not applicable where 
employment is rf)gUlar throughout the year. 
Th• Industrial /Concil1(;1;ti.on und Arbitration Act 19.36,t 
require• tbe Arbit:t~:ttion Court to ti.x basic rate5 of w~ges for 
to tb.is end ::uey b~ amended at not less tban half .-yearly inte:-vals 
adult m;a.l~ workers must be sufficient, in the o,pinion of the 
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Court, to rneJ.ntain a mun, wife emd three children ftn 11 a. fair 
and raasonabl~ standard of co!.f~fol't. '' 
rate for adult mr .. le nnd l'emf.de workers was fixed at £.3-16-0 
It applies to all workers 
twenty .. ona yea.n: of :.•g~ • or over (except C<'i.!ilual workers and 
fhe basic wage 
had not come up fo:r:· review before the outbreak of the present 
war. It is 1 however, genere.lly consider·ed that this wage is 
1nsuf:f1e1ent1 and very f~w adults actually get paid such a low 
wage,. It is interesting in this corw.eetion to corupetre the 
e1'1'ects of price movements upon wage incomes. 
table summarises the position. 
1934 
1935 
19.36 
1937 
19.38 
19.39 
.. 8J9' 
859 
950 
1036 
1081 
1099 
The following 
ffective Wage 
R!a;teti! · 
i L¥1 . , • 
10.38 
1025 
1100 
1122 
1138 
't121 
The improved nominal wuge o:t' tbe workers .s:i.nee 19J5 is 
apparent, although some of their gain is being lost through 
Tho Labour lover.nmant t s policy in rege.Lrd to trtide unions 
was, expressed in the introduction of the Arb1t;ration Am~nd ... 
ment Act of' 19J6, namely& ... 
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It is the policy of tbe Govel'nment to h~.ve working con .... 
dit:ions !'ix.ed by negotiation between organised workers abd em .... 
;~·· ~ -l 
ployGrs, and it i:s considered recHiOObble to requb•e all workers 
to bEuu· their &hare of the cost and respons:tb1li ty giVing effect 
1 
to this policy." 
Accordingly it bacaine compulsory for work.ers to belong to 
a union where the award or the Court applied. In addition., com ... 
pulsory registration of trado un1ons in New Zealar1d we.s 1ntro .... 
Consequently both the number of members tmd the financial· 
r•sources of the Unions 1noreased tr$menctously. At the beginning 
of 1936 the membership of the industrial trade unions wa• 8,,929; 
lrt the beginning of 1 1939 it wr.:s :241 1 2.31 .r while the numbex· of 
unions had incret:.~.sed from 410 to 46b OV$r the EJame period. It 
is inter$sting to notice too that at the same tin•e the employers 
unions snowetd a de!ini te 1narease both in Irt~mb~rship Hind numbers 
of unions., 'lhe figures wttre 1)1 unions witr1 a membership of 
4,344 in 19.36 and .248 unions with 9 1 131 nuilmbers in 1939, But 
the significant feature 1-o! the tx·ade union dev~lopment is not so 
_muon. 1ta speotaeulur nu.merical increElSf3 1 aso much as 1 ts in ... 
creased b&rgfiining power., 
There had a~1$e.tl in New Zealand numex·ous small and weak 
l 
trade uni~Jns organised on a craft ba.sis and judicial :rather than 
m$-litant aation became the ac::c.~•pted ruHan$ o1' settlir'.ll disputes. 
O'nskilled VfOI'ke.cs Unions on the other hand had formed an 
orgunisatir.)n knov."11. as the .Alliance of Labour. 1'\.S a result 
of a conference in April, 19)71 the$e two org~1isations were 
dissolved and replaced by a New Zeale:md FediU'tition ot Labour. 
To th1s organisation the vast majority ot' Unions are aff'1J.iated. 
This change was designed to encourage the Unions to 'become an 
instrunu:ant tor tbe d•moaratio 1 o:ontrol of industl'Y. The 
summary of dispute# shown in the following table 1s Et good in ... 
d1cat1on that this aim is :far from achienement~ 
'.l'he most spectacular move of the Government to improve 
workil'li. cond:l tions w~s the 1ntroduc t.ion of the 40 .... hou:r weak •. 
For workers under all Awards it was st1pul~ted that the Al-bitratio" 
OElurt should fix; the ms.:ximu:n working hours at forty per week in 
all industries except in such oases where the Court considered 
it unpraeticablEJ for the ind.ustry in ttuestion. Undta.(' the new 
legislation it was stipulated that wagea rr~y not be reduoed nor 
ma.y employees be dismissed merely because of tne /Shorter hours 
w~rked.. Rest:riet.lon was also placed on the runount of over-
In the fir$t year of operation 
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no less than 116 o!' the Hl9 , nwards made by the Arbitration 
Cc)urt conformed to the 40 hour wee.K: schem.e"' 'I'ha court has 
p;rovided fc:>r Saturday to be .free in 48 indU$tries while Saturday 
wo:ek is pex·mitt•:t~<i in 6J industries, where wo:rk 1nvolved is of 
6hc1ps to.nd Off:t.ees work a 44 hour week. 
In a.dd1tion the Gove:rtlllient aftecte.d ohar.1.g0s and improve-
ments in th6 working conditions of' the agrieulture.J. la.bourer, · 
und$f the Agrieultural Workers Act 19J6.. j}hese chqnges improved 
bot.h tha money whges and ti:te housing :t'~1cili t1ee1 o,f ag;ri.oul tural 
labourers. 
In connectio:n with its labour legislation the Labour 
Cov€:rnu~en t h& S r·atif it:J(i nu 1' ewt.:.t' t.hutJ. 2 Z u.f' Ll1t.;t \Jr l g:.l.u<;; l 6;2 
conv(mtions relating to miniruULi stand!'~rds l~~id down 'by the Inter-
national Labour Office since 1919. Tnis is a wo1·thy acllievement 
for any Government·t.n so short u time .. 
(I I I) !£~PLP¥"f@jNI c 
The Government took a ;1oriou.s view of the mH~mployment 
problem in New Ze~::.land. Although conditions in this respect 
had impx•oved considerably as a r·esult oi' in.cr~ttased business 
aotiv1ty, by the end of 1935, the l~·rubl.em NES nevert11-elvss still 
acute.. The ·worst period in t.l:le dep.t'o-szion was iLl March 19.3.3, 
ll:hen the total llili'lbe:J:' on the l.m.employl:nent r-egi~tel' w;;::.s 73 ,6.50,. 
In Dac.:t:tJ:uuar -1935 this m.uuber h~td decrt:HiLSCd to 57, 2f31. '!'hus to 
a large extent the Government moulded its policy to eope ,;ri th 
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the problem or unemployment. Unfortunately no full measure 
of the increase in err,;.ployment 1s _possible beca.us~ of t!le liick 
o:f an index of' employruen t in New Z~al~.:;,.nd toga thnr with the s b ... 
oence ot adequate stot1£>tics o:e employu!$n't in several 1mpottant 
fields. 
Satisfactory statistics of eu~ployulet.Lt in the. &gl·icuJ.tural 
and pastoral industries are not available but there l:s good 
ret'.son tc believe that er;.;:;;loymcnt actually doclincd tb.~le after 
Ii'vr in~Jtance despite the GoVti.L'r:lment' s suc.ro.nteed .P i(~€; .scheme 
tor dairy pl·oduce, furmer s 1n thi$ iru:h:~.stry "~~1'€' l(i.*J.tE; una.blt1 to 
Cl.)mpete wi t.h thlil hlght:r wag\.': r& tes and :l.&l,pt·oveu wor·~:J.ng con ... 
d1 tions of labom• in the vuriuus Gover·:rwa~t~t 0.~1Jiii:t't.hi\;>Hts, especially 
the Public Works. To & csJ;'tf>in e:l{:tmt t th1H is true ul.so of 
other non .. Oovernment 1ndust:r:les. Not only were they unable 
to compete with the irr.p:roved weges anu working cm:tdi tions, but 
pri va.te industry failed to a t'tl't~Ct 1 ta shurf~ o!' investJ:,ents partly 
on a.Qcount or the .fact that. the Gove:z·nment's own policy mad~ the 
field$ l~ss &.tt.ractive 1.'o1• such 1nvestm€:nt. This xeta:rded 
production and ther$.t'ore employrnent" 
Undar these circu;t,sthncf;s 1 t is not sux·prising -that the 
1~1ost; notable increes~s t:l:·e to be found in public ctuploymt.1nt itself ... 
the Public Srn:-vice, Rail·~ays, Post und Tl1llegrc-tph and i.n particular 
the Publit:: Vh'~:rl<:s .. 
107 
T ."bA } 
n 1937 
'' 1938 
" 1939 
Th('tse figures represent workers in the direct employ of 
the .Public Works Department, those employed by pub.Llc works 
cont:re~ctors and thoee employed by loc&.l authorities on (a) wo;r.'kS 
financed wholly or partly by the Public Works Department, and 
(b) highway o:r road construction and mZ:;\intenance. Etuployment 
on th~ public works, however, figured as a temporary measure 
in the m.inds of the Government, since they expected that transfers 
to industry would be progressi.V$ly po:.>Sible. Had such an e:xpans-
1onist public wor·ks policy been undertaken during the dep:.r·ession 
1t is conotJiVabla that internal business conditions could have 
been stimulated. But to : superirnpose tl'lr• t policy on the peak of 
a bo()lli. meant that pr1vute industry wa,s hampered rather ttw.n 
helped witt! the :result tnat it did not attrtJ.ct employment from 
the pubLic work&. 
Industrial and f'acto:r·y Ehi:ployment shuwed a marked increase. 
l,;ikewise the employment of the building and constructional 
indust:rie& was destined to inc:.rease cons1derQ.bly. The follow1nC 
table summa:rises these increases. 
Year. 
.1- _i 
lt"actory 
ff'i29Yt:t1on, 
108 
Building ~nd 
Cprtt> trgs: ti.9n .•. 
It is highly probable tl:lat, owiz1g to the substantial i':.creHse 
in export prices and consequent inc:t·eased business acti vl ty within 
New Zealand, a marked :Lnorea.se in employment w~:ulu have taken plt:: co 
In fact, there are good reasons for believing that 
the Government t s policy actually hindered the L1crease in this 
sphere. The increase in public employment, howefler, 1!.i certatlnly 
gr&ater than it would have Uean under otha.r than a Labour Gover.runent, 
In co.nclusion,mention may be made of' the fact that th.e 
Government has retained cez·tain n~lief' i 1)easru·e.s, of fur·nter Govern-
ments, and also auded new on(J5 or 1 ts own in its endeavour to 
These include the vc..rious 
relief schemes and subsidies to ftl.l'tHers who desire tti un.dertake 
land clearing and improvement drainl!tge projects ann the like. These 
measures however a.re pa.lliati ves only; they do not &t t$lTl.pt to 
remove unemployment by lessening the <LLslocatiiJUS which caused 
it .. 
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"Redistributing the national 1ncome 11 has led the Labour 
Goverrune:n.t to vastly extend social se:r'vices in Nt:w Zealand. The 
year 1936 thus ma.rks a turning polnt in soc::i&l lcgislti. tion.. Not 
only were pension payments xesto:red to their former levels but 
they were increased as well. The qualifying concti tions for a. 
pension are now more liberal 1:;.hau hitherto. Old age pensions 
were raised to £1 and then to £1 2 6d pEU' week, wi tll a property 
allow·ance or £500. The qualifying age for YiOI!len became 60 years' 
and the residential .requirements were reduced from 25 to 20 years. 
Widows t payments we.re inCI'eased !rom 9s foJ.·· the widow, &nd 9s for 
each child, to £1 for the widow and 10s for each child. Deserted 
wives were classed as widows. Restl'ictlons on the t:r·~:mting of 
pensions in respect to illegitii'IlB.te children and to AsiE>.tics were 
removed. 
The Invalidity pension v:t:.s a nev:1 one enti:r~ly, It consists 
of' £1 for single men plus 1 Os f'or wife and 1 Os fur· each child. 
Qualific-ations fo:c thi~} pen:::~ ion an~ incapacity for work us the 
l'fHiUl t of aucident or by reason of illness or congen1 tal defect. 
The F'amily allowance iv.u.s also restored in 19.36 to its 
previous level of irwomes up to £4 a week.. The increases in 
wages and employment will cause the numbers bewefiting fi·om thi:s 
pension to decrease 1 and ~;uwther ecunomic dep:ressiun w.il.l huve the 
r·everse effect. 
11 0 
The highlight or the Government's social legisla ticm was 
of course the Social Security Act of 1938. It represents the 
most comprahensi"e attempt ever made in New Zealand to extend 
th.e scope of 5ocial services. Its principal features ar·e as 
summarised .below. 
Healtb lnsur@nge. 
(a.) A uni veral general pn:<cti tioner service tu nll members of the 
community who require medical attention. 
(b) F':ree hospital and sanitorium t:.rea tment i'or all. 
(c) Free medicine for all~ 
(d) Free mental hospit~:d care and treatment ror the ments.lly 
afflicted .. 
(e) Free mat·"'rnity tre&tment including the c~ost o:f 11:aintenance 
in a maternity home, plus, in certain circ'tlrn.stances, a grant to 
provide outfits for babies. 
(f) Free horne nursing and ciomastic help when the necessary sta.f:f 
has been trained to make the scheme prB.ctioable. 
(g) Extended education for t;llEt p.t·omotion vi' health and prevention 
of disease. 
(h) Other services to be provided when practicablfH- a.naestheticj 
laboratory and radiology, specialist and consultant, massa.ge and 
physio-therapy, transport to and from hospit~l, and dental and 
optical.benef1ts. 
WeftJ.lX ,Pa)?nB-Qt§, 
(a) Payment of uge b~nefit of JOs a week at the age of 60 years, 
with an income ttllowance of £1 a week from other sources. A 
married couple could receive therefore £4 a week. Whw.l we •lS.D. 
is 60 and the v;ife not yet 60, &llows.nce will be made unde:r· 
general benefits. 
1 1 1 
(b) Increase in inval:i.di ty pension from £1 to £1 1 os a week. 
(c) Payment of sickness l.H!nwfi ts at r(i tes to be d&termined .. 
(d) I::1orea.se in o.b.ildren' s allowance to rec11)ients of sus tenanca 
payments when unemplc.•yed. 
(e) .Increased widow'~ pension of ;:5s a week plus 10s u week fo:r 
e&ch child under 16 (formerly 15) o'.:mtinued in special cuses to 
18, while the children :rerJ&in at school .. DesertE~d wiv~s and 
wives of mental hospital p~tients will receive the same rat•s. 
(f) Institution o! orphan's pe.nsion of 15s a week ·up to aged 16. 
(g) Incr-ea.se in f'ar~ily allowance from :rs,. to 4s. a child, with 
extension o! weekly wage qualification. 
(h) Increase of miners' and veterans' pension. 
It will be seen from this brief analysis of th.e Social 
Security legislation that nut only wa.s the former p~nsiot1. scheme 
incorporated in it, but pension payments v.'ere increased and new 
benefits added. Needless to say this schema is nut yet in full 
operation and p;rob<J.bly vdll not be for s<:nr~e tiroa to come. For 
instance the medical profession as a whole are opposed to a 
universal medical scheme for reasons which are apparently not 
very clear. The :finance for the soci¢tl Stk.UI'i ty scheme is 'to 
be partially provided by a uni.versal wage oontr1'but1on of 1 s. in 
the £1 1 while the remuinder will evidently be a charge on gene.tal 
revenue. 
!n a<'h"l:ttion to introducing a Milk 1n Schools Soheme 
in ·19.37 whereby every child attending a school, state or otbeP-
wise • will receive a halr pint of paateuri sed milk daily, the 
Labour Goverruuon·t ho.s greatly inoroaaed the expenditure on 
education 1n. ll'ew z~alnnd. 
has been 1ncrt-eased, the period or tree post prlmary education 
extended, University bu~saries 1ncr$ased and extended and 
finE:.lly, add!t:to®l grants ror adult education aet1v1t1ea have 
been made. 
~~ere can be no doubt that the Government's achieve• 
mente in the sphere of social servtcee in New Zealand have been 
oona1dernble • nor can there b.e any doubt that they are h1ghl;r 
desirable. ':.:he t'aot rernains, howe"1'er, that this polioy however 
.,, 
desirable has gveatly increased unproduotive pUblic expenditure. 
The :following table Ahowa the epeataoula:r 1narease of' publ1o 
expenditure in aooial services in recent years. 
Year ended Pensions Educati()n Health Total 3i at t.iaroh 
-
"' ... """""'~" ~-----
19.36 ).80 3.27 0.88 7.95 
1937 ,5.02 3.98 1.01 10.01' 
19:58 6.4l~ 4.62 1.23 12.29 
1939 6.93 5.10 1.78 13.81 
1940 12.29 5.56 1.82 19.67 
Whon co2.:1p&J.'ed with total state expend1 ture and state 
taxation, the expenditure on eoc:Lal services is sut"pria1ngly 
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Year ended 
21st Me.rab 
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1936 
1937 
1938 
19.39 
1940 
Social 
Ba:rvtees 
l ... , ,, •. 1 
Taut ion 
Yield 
bJ t. 
Total Govt. 
E!Eend1~~~·· 
29.89 
35.02 
39.40 
42-24 
48.49 
1 Includes special taxation for war purposes. 
In 1938 t~k) ~xpenditul'e on eooial se:rvioee alone, 1nolud• 
ing unemployment vol1e:t', exoeeded the total yield o:f' taxation 1n 
the ye~a 1922 to 1928 and 1932 to 1934, and tha reo1p1ents or 
pens1one of vartoue. kinds nearly one-aixth or the total bread.-
winners ot the Dominion. It would bo interesting to epeoulate 
where this trend of' state expend:ttutte will ultimately lead, but 
it would hardly bo relevant to this disaueaion. 
It was largoly the Governrr1ent' s rnotive to l"ediatribute 
the national inco:le which was responsible for the lavish ex-
penditura on social serv1ceo, and also foro the substantial in-
crensea 1n t.be nlc.HlDY incomes o:r the wage earners. It would 
appeel" that this policy has been suecesefnl in connection with 
the extension of social services. It ~emains to investigate 
the amount o'f red:tstrihution effected through inoreased money 
An earlier table illustrated 
the ~act thot although mon~y incomes had increased, retail pr1oea 
11.3 
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had increased also with the result that some of th&.:t gain was 
lost. The :following summary of the aggregate Private Incomes 
will be of value in estim&ting 
t~1but1on has tak$n place. 
the extent to which redis-
4sst~ii1td! Pr*va~e ~ns~m~ 19J6-JJ! 
:: :: : . : :· : :· .' J9Jt!·'·llld ':: : ' 3:pf' : : : 
Wages etc. · 66.2 7 .·• 
Wagea Exempt (a) 7~4 . 9.) 
Pensions. J.) 4.7 
Other Income. 36.0 49-.2 
Other Ii'.xarnpt. 4-4 ; ,.3 
Undist .. Coy. (c) 4,0 5.0 
91.1 
3 .. 9 
6.0 
49.9 
;.5 
5 II. ,.;.~ 
~ab) Includes relief wages, sustenance etc .. ) Variou. categories. c) Und.istr.ibuted Coy,.Income (including Income Ta.x payme:uts). 
Tnese ;figuz·es show that notnex·t1 incom.a subject to the tax 
incr~a..sect proportio.n.ately to ;.;L.ge.s and salaries until 19)8. The 
same result ie; obtained !rom a comparison of (a) wages and 
salaries plus exempt ,.,u.gas and pans ions, and (b) othc;;r income, 
plus •'other" exempt income &nd. undistribut~d company inoorue .. 
These facta indicate that the exte:ut of redistribution achieved 
through higher incotues and increased employ.tm~nt has not been 
appreciable. 
li'rom the a.bove analysis ot labour t:..nd social legislation 
1 Adapted from an article by i:E.r.J .o.ShtH:l.t·e:r in the lf!conom,\.c Hecor¢t .. 
New Z&aUnd SU.Jlplewent 19J9., 
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While the objectives of this policy 
call for no ~dverse OOlmnent, it ,1:ust be udmitted thot the Govern-
ment has confused money 1n.r.H..)mti with real income t,o the detriment 
Some critics would argue that 
as fa:r as labour legislut1un is cor;.cerned .. tn~ action of the 
Government actually hampered tr~.bsorpti:;.u ot' idlo labour L:.tto 
industry, and llfl a tlill ttor of .fr:~.ct thet·e 1& some validity in this 
artrwrt~mt .. 
Treated sepal'fl.tely, the Government's labour and social 
policy, ;oil:.lile it suffers !'rom certain in~1l::lrent d1.fficultiEHB 1 has 
muc!J to c owmend it . Under the present Govornrnent, labour and 
soci<l;ll legislation 11as advanced to sueh <!lil exto:nt tr1a.t it &lrtlost 
eclipsed tlHa.t o.f' any ca.pitalist c~ountry in tHe world., Jm Australian 
visitor summed up the position as follows: 
tt'lhe workers of New. Zeal~:~.n.d CfUl have no grieVHlJ.ce against 
the La'bour Government. Thdy have betit.t.1 served w1 th pr~:nnpti tude 
generosity and eomprahensi veness .for w.ttlCl'l 1 t 'Ni,YilJ.d l'IH difficult 
the world over to find equal. In wc:,.rkin.g rwurs, '1'-isges and 
condi t1ons, J.n step a tc) I'(~mOVfJ l.tnemploymon t » und in t~V<Jl"f kind 
of social aervictJ. tne Labou:r Govermue.tlt h&ct 'iilthin & yftar of 
taki::.-g of'f.ice gone f&l' to ;:>et up a new :LJ.dustri,il [ii.i1.d ;:Jt.Jcial 
Dominion.1 · 
But when viewed in conjunction \d th La. bout•' s oth~::~r economic 
experiments such as the Guurantead Price t>cht~me. St~.;1.te Housing, 
Public Works and Mon~tary Policy, tile outlook for the future loses 
1 Sir.H.Gullett. E.v§ning post, Wellington .. 14th Apr11,1938. 
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some of its brightness. 'l'he labour and social pold.c\ies o:f the 
Government, mar ely plhce. an h.ddi tional burden on tbe alr·~~·v.dy 
overburdened financial 8ystem. There 13 a uef'ini te .l'i!Hi t to 
unproductive Stat$ e.xpendi ture. As .far as N~w Zealand is. concerned 
that li,mi t is deterrnin(~d by our expor·t income.. Consequently a 
substantial fall in export .in.come (which incidantally the Govern-
ment cannot prevent) will not only prove di.sast:rous to New Zealtu'ld' $ 
I'}Conomy » but &.lsu to the social i.ns ti tutions 'Nhtch heve been grafted 
on to it. 
CHAPTEft IX 
I Imposition .. 
II Caus~s. 
III Control and its Object1~es. 
IV Alternat1Yes. 
V Application. 
· VI erreots. 
On December 5th 19381 regulations were i&azatted by 
Order .... i.J'l ... C.ounoil giving tbfit Governm~nt complete control over 
overseas •~change transactions and over imports into New Zealand. 
While the oocnsion fo11 the imposition of eK:ehange control &nd 
import selection was tbe aeut~ shortage of Lonclon Funds which 
developed towuds tbe close of 19.3$,. the 'pbilosopby behind it 
extends back aa far as 1935. Mr. M.J.Savage stated in June1935 
that "!be control of trade -·-- plus allocai1on o£ overseas 
credits would (a) do a.way with the necessity of raising the 
rate.of exchange and {b) remove the nwcessity tor protective 
Tariffs, without leaving Dominion manufo.cturing 1ndustr1e$ open,. 
1 
to competition with the products of overse-as cheap labour .. n 
·1 i.:1~ie.Yage'·· tifiie Case :f'or Labour.n 
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Mr,Nash st~ted in 1935 in connection with marketing and re ... 
ciprocal trr;.de, thf~t "thia polic)l' would first provide for the 
use of' the credit to pay the interE~st on, and as occasion de-
manded to ;redaa:m, the over$eas portion o:t: our national debt, 
Second, for allocation to importers in New Zea.land for the pur ... 
ohase of commodities from overseas ..,.. __ .,.....,._ ... .,.. confined mainlY 
to the importation of classes ot' gooda that cannot eoonomical1y 
1 
be produced in the Dominion .. '' Again import and exehanse con ... 
trol was hinted at in the Labour Government's first maJor act -
the Reserve Bank /unen.drnent Act of 19.36, when they took eontrol 
the :function o.f' the Reserve .Bank nto give etfeot to the monetary 
policy of the Government as communicated to it .from time by 
the M1n1st~r ot 1!'1na:nce.n Finally t.h~ Primary Products 
Marketing Act of 1936 in sectiGn 1J (2) p:t·ovides that where 
a courrt:ry pt•ovide.s t't;t.vourable ma.t•ketin.g conditions for our 
primary proau~e, the Government "will undertake to arrange 
througn the Res(:J;rve Bank: o! N.ew Zealand that thEt wl'10le or a 
substantial part of the financial credits thereby established 
in such country will be utilised for tne p\.U"chase of approved 
goods or olasses of goods being the product or manufscture of 
tlle oount17 .. " 
S1mtlar instances could be multiplied but the above will 
suffice to illustrate the faat that although exchange control 
and impo:rt selection divides the history of the Labour Government 
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into two distinct ph'·~Ses., this 1Jelicy was included in their 
or1g1nt:.l programme. It is beouusa these measures were adopted 
at a time when sterling funds were obviously depleted that 
exchange and import control has been regarded in some quarters 
as a defensive policy and ~s a means of sEi.lvagi.ng the!Hl fund:.s. 
Import and exchange control have always been implied in Labour's 
prograrnme. 
,Between December 19J.4 .and December 19.38 net overseas 
assets declined from £ N.Z. 40.5 m to £ N.Z. 6.e m. The 
movement .rapidly gained momentum in 19.38 and in the absence of 
drastic Goverruuent action these funds would h;:;'.ve been completely 
exhausted in a very short time. V.'hy d1d they fall? To answer 
this question various !actors must 'be considered. 
{1) A5iHUY11Ule:tios SJl. Oyt?J:JH3ff§ .§s§elit 12:23-J~. 
ln January 1933 New Zeeiland depreciateci her curr·eney from 
£ N.Z. 110 to£ N.~. 125 ~ £ stg 100, while at the same time 
the Bank•• lndenmit;v {ltxobange ) Aet of 19:.3.3 ea:f'eguardod the 
trading banks against any loss which might ~esult trom the sale 
of any accumulated funds consequent upon depree1ation. On 
commencing operations the Reserve Bank received £ N_.z,. 20 m. 
of 'theSJ~ overseas funds and at the end o! 1935 the total net 
overseaa assets amount~d to £ N.Z. J6 .. 1 milli,.ms. 
Changes 1n subsequent 1ears we:r·e as follows 1 
At .ast onda.y 
.~ D!9f!ml?et; . , 
14.6 ,,_, 
6,.7 
2.1 
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Tote.l 
I . 
2.1 ,4 
16.·5 
17.0 
4.7 
:tt is difficult to estimate the actual amount of aocumulHtion 
of funds owing to exchange depreciation and the Bankts Indemnity 
Aet but some place it at £ N.Z. 25 mi 
It seams more than probable thttt some ,funds were trans-
rerr~d abroad before depteoiation in anticipation of deriving 
a profit from repa tr1ation. on the other h<-,nd since it was 
widely rumoured that the exchange rate would be lowered with 
improved business conditions, British exporters left payments 
due on deposit in New Zt:aland in anticipation of deriving a 
profit from apprecia.tion of the currency. Importera probably 
a:r.nanged for delayed payments with the st.1me object in view. 
Likewise 1t is reasonable to as.sume that .funds were transferred 
:from overseas to New Zealand. Finally there was a decline 
1n imports following the depreciation of the currency. These 
fa.otora must account i'or some ot' the accumulated ovez•seas 
funds. 
(II) }.1!\Y§E~. 
(a) Decline of Net Overseaa A$Ssts. 
During the three years from 19-'5 - 38 the funds de-
clined by over £ N.Z. 29 m. '!'he following table gives the 
visible trade balance and est1mattd balance of payments tor 
1.21 
the years 19$6 ... 38.-. there are other payments to be considered 
besides payments for impor·ts. Thes$ 1nalude cartuin invisible 
items, ,such as payment of :i,nterest on sovermnent and local 
body overseas debt, interest on private debt, payment or pensions, 
profits on investment_s and the like. It he.s been estimated 
t·a ta) ~· (b · (e)· '* · ' '':Baianoe of 
Visible Visible Balance of 1-'ayments, 
. ~ir~~. i •• w~tts. a:r{+gg. . . , c s .. ig a) . ' 
From these figures it will be noticed that the unfavourable 
balance of payments would have been about £ N.z. 12 m over the 
whole period oovered. 
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By adding the decline in sterling funds to tha balance 
of normal payments we can arrive at a rough estimate of the 
ext$nt of cap1tti-l exports, 
At end ot 
pecembyr 
These figux·es immediately suggest heavy "over 1rnportat1o:n" 
but nevertheless certain other factors must be tak<tm into con-
s1de:ration. 
~:ring 19.36 there wex·e two substantial and abnormal 
d•ductions from Landon Fimds. The fix·et was the repatriation 
of moneys either left in New Zealand or transferred to New 
Zealand in anticipation of the appreciation of the currency. 
These fun.ds were returned when 1 t was obvious that New Zealand t s 
currency would not appreciate; if any changes were to be mt.de it 
would probably be further depreciation. Secondly there was 
the repayment of nearly £sta 2 m~ government stock 1n August 
1937 and£ stg 1.5 m. Southland Power Board bonds in September 
of the same year. Moreover in 1937 tourist expenditure, 
especially in oom1ection with the Coronation was exceptionally 
heavy. The lac• of investment opportunitie2 in New Zealand 
probably accounted for the unusual investments in .Australia 
about tho same time. on the other hand, there are certain 
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off-setting factors such as tourist expenditure in New Zealand 
but this is not of f'irst importance. 
By "over 1mportation"'.is meant importation to such an 
extent that the exoes~ of exports over imports is not sufficient 
to pay the "nnual debt services due abroad. We must now oon ... 
sider the ex-pent of over importation and its effect upon the 
po~\1 tion of' net overseas aSSllitS • 
1935 
1936 
1937 
123.8 .. ; "' 
Balance 
4 .• 54 
56.75 
66.,71 
~s .;z .. 
£ 
of Trade., 
N,& • .g;, 
. l 
10 • .22 
12.64 
10.55 
'-\ 9~ 
One cause of over importation w~$ cyclical and a familiar 
feature of New Zealand's economic history, During the trough 
of the depression the fall in export income was accompanied by 
a corresponding decline in imports and continut:d so for a short 
period even after export 1:nco1ae began to ~bow signs of recovery. 
Wi.th improv~)d econo:.;:-;:ic conditions, imports 1ncrtHlbt!d but again 
when a decline in export 1noome set in during 1937 ... .)8, the de ... 
cline in imports showed a distinct lag. 'l'hare is a lag in the 
movement of imports and exports of about one year in New Zealand, 
This lag must account for some of the d~cline in the margin of 
exports over .imports in 19.38. 
But from May 19.3S the new factor of expanding Government 
advances :t'rom the Reserve Bank came into operation. Thus 
during the second half of this year the countryts income was 
oona1de:rably increased as a rosult of these advances to the 
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Government .from the Reserve Bank. Moreover the credit expan-
sion that occurred was not confined to the Reserve Bank alone, 
The facilities of the Trading Banks were used as well, 
resources were increased as a result of' the Reserve Bank ad .... 
vances to the Government which were spent in New Zealand. Since 
the aonsurrrption of imports :represents approximately on~-thirc:l 
of the Dominion's total consumption in normal times it is clear 
that this 1noreaoed credit expansion would >.Ultimately in .. 
fluence the volume of imports. In the abse.nct:t of any special 
i'actors any inc:c·ease in the money incomes of the people in 
New'Zealand would e.4pres.::; itself it) a corresponding increase 
in the volume of imports. The expana1onist policy of the 
Government included an' expanding prograrrJine of public works 
expenditure which attl.'b.Cted labour !rom pz·iva.te em}.lloyment, 
reductions in world.ng hours and 1ncreuses in money wages all 
contributed towards increased puroh;;,,,sing power F,,nd higher 
costs. Advances of the Reserve Bank to the Government increased 
from £ N.Z. 0.6 m. in June 19.38 to £ N~Z. 11m. in Deceraber of 
the same year. The Advances in the Marketing Account averaged 
£N,Z~ 5 m. in 1937 and £N.Z. 4.5 m. in 19.38. The combined 
eff'ect o;t• these measures 1s the main cause of ovex· importEt tion 
during 19.38 6 especially the late:r hi.lf. 
STERLING EXCHANGE AND RESERVE BANK ADVANCZS. 
£N. Z 
m ~----~------------~------------~------------~-----------,----_, 
30 
" 20 
10 
0 
., 34 ' 1935 1936 1937 1938 1939 
Sterlin ~ ~x~ anpe. Ad "ranees. 
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!h$ spending of Government loans from the banking system 
affected the demand for imports in two ways. F'irst, the Govern ... 
ment itself spent much of them directly by heavy importations 
of machinery for public works undertakings.. . Such machinery consisteq 
of railway and tramway plant and equiprnant, iron and stt'tel goods j 
and heavy machinery such as bull-dozers, dredgl.tig and electrical 
equipment etc, Secondly the policy of redistribution placed 
in the hands ot' the lower income groups increased purchasing 
power through increases in wage$, pensions and money incomes. 
As has alr~ady been noted the result of this expansion ot pur. 
chasing power was an ultimate increase in the volume of' 1rrrports. 
And the combined·effect ol' direct Government importation and the 
importation due to an 1ncre1;1sed dem&nd for· imports on the part 
of the recipients or increased money incomes was the ultimute 
depletion of net overseas assets. 
In addition to over-importation, the export o!' oap1ta.l 
plays an 1mportant part·in the decline of sterling funds. 
'!!nit export o!' capital was due to a variety of causas. The 
transfer of funds began about May 193S and continued to the end 
of the tear. It was particularly heavy from August to October 
during the election campaign .. 
The extent of this outward flow of capital is difficult 
to estimate. Estimates range frorn £ N.Z. 8.6 m,. from March 
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1936 to March 193S, Other investig~tors have made different 
estimates. Mr Leicester Webb, {Christchurch Press August 8th 
19)8) suggested £ N.Z. 20.4 millions as an upper limit from 
March 1936 to March 1939J Professor B., :Belshaw (Eaonom1c 
Record, Pecem'ber 1939) suggested £N .. Z. ,7.4 millions from 
Peoember 1934 to December 1938 while Dr. W,B.Suteh ( N.Z. Financial 
fimes, May 19.39) states that "the total amount of the 19JS 
abnormal transfer of .fundJ abroad has been estinlated at between 
£ N.Z. 10r million and£ N.Z. 15 million." Although these 
••timates vary eons1derably they indieata that a substt.ntial 
outward movement o! private capital took place between March 
and December o£ 19.38 J 'before exchange :restrictL.>ns were: impelled. 
An analyais of the long te:rrn in!lue.nces a..t'Lecting capital move .... 
ments in New Zealand will serve to throw soma light on the ¢auses 
or tnis expor~ of capital. 
According to the estimates of the N.Z.Offioial Year Book 
the total debt for the ;yeare 1919 .... .38, excludin& pu.bl1c and 
local body debt movements was t •ta 57.6 million~" By inelud1ng 
these d•b'b movemlitnts a ored1t o! e·stg 14.5 million is obtained. 
New Zealand nas apparently been equating her balance of payments 
by ov•n·seas borrowins. lay 1938 such borrowing h~d amounted 
to the sum ot £ stg 72.1 million and. it bas been :further suggested 
that these public borrowings were offset on the debit side of 
the balance of payments by an outward flow of capital. More-
ove;f since 1918 New Zealand bas not proved a good field , .for 
private 1nvestmept. The post-war era has w1tne5sed an incre~sing 
amount of State interference with the :t\lghts of' mortgages and 
a corresponding decrease in tho volume o.t: British capital 
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inV•3Sted in th:t.s cou.utry,. In addition as the:t'e 1s little scope 
tor investment in indu:i:trial and commercial securities, profits 
made with in New Zealu.nd hhave shown a distinct tenaency to be 
invested overseas 1 especially in Britain and ..~-~ustrnlia .. 
Previous :Sr1t1sh investments too may h~;ve bef.n withdrawn in 
:favour ot better .f1elus o.r investment elsewhere. Thus from the 
point o:r v1ew of the ,,long term expor·t ot' capital it would 
appear that the drain on London Funds which caused grave concern 
towards the close of 19.:38 can be partially e..x;plained as an 
it 
acceleration of this long term process. But; ie important to 
analyse the r~ctors which caused this acceleration of capital 
export. 
One factor of oonsideruble importance was the low interest 
rate policy which was introduc@d into New Zealand during the 
deprasa1on and was designed to provide cheap money and stim.ulate 
internal business activity. There can be little doubt that the 
depress•a condition of business activity wa.r:rv.rrted this :measure 
a.nd most economists -rtould fnvour a policy of low interest rates 
but the £act rer11ains thut some of the benefioi~l effects of 
tbis pol1oy were lost because of' tbe lack of suitable investment 
opportunities within New Zealand. Consequently so.rr;e trhding 
bank depos1 ts were transfor1·ed to the lost Office Savings Bank 
wher$ they were ultim~tely utilised to finance public works 
1~8 
projects. Although the public works policy greatly relieved 
the problem of unemployment, ye~ : at the saune tirua 1 t had a 
retarding influence upon private ir~ustry. 
by baing fo;o•4 to compete with the higher money wages. ana 
improved wo:rls:1ng conditions offored by tbe public works, had 
necessarily to reduc• its margin of pro:t'it. !rhus private in .... 
dustry did not attr·act th~ &alOUllt of investment that it would 
otherwise have done~ Under these conditions it is conceivable 
that investors preferred to exploit fielcts of investment outside 
New Zealand. 
Allowance must be made too, for the nervous investor who; 
oons1dered bia sacul·1t)' underm~ned by the Labour Government, EUJ 
distinct. :f'rom ~be investor who was influenced merbtly by tb{t 
:ret'"rn for h1s 1nV$stment, 
"Sinee 19)Si a·farily steady export of capital ft"om 
New Ze~land ha$ tuken pl.i'we and money has be~n invested over .... 
seas, m.atnly in .Australia,. wher$ conditions have been more . 
e.tt1•active to investors. It is o!'ten said that eapital is the 
most timid and the most l1tu1d of al.l the &tgents of product1on. 
It 1s readily frightened away when conditions appea:r insecure 
and its . movements in any particular dir•otion i• d~Sf1eult 
to detect and etop An investor necessarily looks first 
for sjaurity and second to:r return on his capital, In New 
Zealand d~!ng x·ecent y•are the conditions t'or investment 
have appeared insecure and 'W'lattractive tor several reasona,. 
'!he compulsory adjustment of' cont:rG.cts between debtors and 
eJ<editors, during,. ancl since,. the depression has not been 
forgotten and there bas been some .fear or u further unknown 
and unpredictabl~ changes in the security ot tnve•tar• 1n Ntw 
Zealand. In addition, b1gb and inoreasing taxation and 
rapidly :r1$1ng costs have roads the ma:rgJ.n .from whieb capital 
sets ita return less than it would otherwlae 'be., and h®Ve im-
paired the net earning capaoi ty o.f business on which tl'le 
seou.ri ty of oap1 tal ultimately rests.. 1'beae': condi tiona 
have been more tn evidence in New Zealand than elsewhere. 
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lt .t'ollows that .since cap1tal is liquid and. moves readily, 
some overseas investors huve rt:~alised tbeir inVe5tru~nts ·in 
New Zealand and transferred their co. pi tal elsewhe:ne, while 
eome New Zealand inv~stors have .found ov0rsei;U'I invtJ:;;tments 
mora attracti.V@ and have sent capital outside the country where1 relatively gr·ea. ter secur1 ty or higher returns a.ppeurs to offer. 
F'inally the effect of political propaganda playing upon the 
ignorance and politiCM.l prejudice o~· some mv:ners o.f ca.pi tal canr1ot 
be ignored. It is (iirficult to estl.i.uate thG extent to which these 
various factm;'.s were imi:ividt...J.ally· responsible for tho export of 
capital frmn New Zealand but the:r~ a.:tn he no doubt that t.tle 
CUUJU.lS.tiVIV effect Of ti.ifJ S.bvVt'l f&CtOI'S WS.S instrWllental in redUcing 
the Do:minion•s net ovursea.s assets to dangerously low levels. 
tiThe decline in over~Se&s runds 'Nhich corrunenced during 
1936-.37 .... ,. ...... continued s~eadilr ~ u.:~t1l at 28t~ NovaJ.Ube~, 
19.38, the net overseas funds of the ht:H.ie'!rVe Bank 6l.nd the traaing 
baokS were u.:.lder £N. z.s, 000,000 .. 
"With a. view to conserving overseas tunds~ so aa to 
ensure that over&el1S debt services would be met and that 
aui'i'icient funds would be available for· essentifa1 irapol'ts, 
regulations .... effective from ..,tb .Dece<:lber, 19.38., and known 
respeeti vely as th!." ln1port Control Regulations 1938, and 
the Export Licences .Hegul.e.tions 1938 .. y;ere rii.ade by orders .... 
in ... Comtcil of 5th D(i.lcemb.t.:r 1938. 
tt'l'he !m.p()l't Cop.tJ:'ol Regulc. ti·.:U:lS pr0hihi t the i.u.tporta tion 
of goods except in pursu~nce ot' a license under tht: regulations 
·or of an e:r .. em.pti(}n grnn.ted by th. e ;c£1nister. Under tno Export 
Licences RegulationsJ govds (with eertain minor exceptions) 
may not be expor•ted except .under licen,l:ie ~ .. . . .• A co:nd1 tioil of 
tbe issue of an export licmwe is Uu:~ t the overseas c.fEHii ts 
arielng fro>4 t.be st1.le of the gouds ( or used to finance t.he1r 
purchase) must ba .sold to a New Zealand ban.k in exchange ror 
;}lew ~ealand cU:t'l'ency .. 
....,.,.... ...... _· . . - . - - . 
1 Chamber of Commerce Bulletin Nov.19.38 No. 
"1.30 
t'f\rom 7th Dece~ber,19.38, also, tae M.inister of :Fin.CJ..nce has 
susp(::nded the obligation of the Reserve Bt1.nk to giv~ ste;r·l1ng 
in exchange for its bank nutes.n 1 
ln introducing this new legislation the Guvei'r)J:Jemt intended 
tc maintain the exchange rata at its ;pl'esent levsl fJ:Hd to prevent 
the rree buying ana $elling of sterling e.Jtcb.ange by subjecting 
each transaction to ofriclal approval. The B.eserve Bank was to 
be utilised a a a central pool t'or recei vi:ng the whole o:f the 
receipts fl•om export sales and a~ ~ med1WtJ of mtlking such payments 
which were officially approved. In this· wi:)._y it vvould be able to 
control oapi tal move1nents !rom the Domin.ion,. 
The new leg1slat1on placed no restrictions on exports t·rom 
the Dominlon;its purpos~ was the conoentration ot' export receipts 
in a oent~al pool. 
and rationed. One aim of import con.trol was to give a prerere.nc• 
to imports from the United Kingctoo1 and others units of the Empire. 
Tho G<;>Varnment indicated also that the ox.Ch{!nge funds twailable 
would be used_. firstly to moi;.lt our overs;eas debt com:tn! twants, both 
public and private, and secondly to purchase imports f':rom the 
United Kingdottt and t'inally provision would be made for the import-
ation of materials and equipment, necessary to devalc.•p our secondary 
industries. 
It 1s necessa:r·y to undin~ta.nd cle~u·ly the objectives of 
1 New ZtiHiland Official Year Bo(.11r 1941 p 198. 
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this control. It has already been pointed out earlier in this 
chapter that import ~nd exchange control hav& >..tlways been 1m .... 
plied in Labour's programme. But 1t is equally clear that the 
imposition of import Qnd exchange control was forced upon the 
Government by the serious Jepletion of London funds in the second 
half o! 19.3S. Professor H. Belshaw writing in the EconomiQ 
Reco~d, December 1939 regards the control as 11 pr1rnarily a salvage 
operation." 'fh(t reluctance of tlle majority of Labour to realise 
the prime importunoe of London funds and the peculiar sen$1t1ve 
dependence of New Zealand's economy, togetber with the confused 
thinking surrounding this aspect of policy prob~bly accounts for 
much of the delay in the initial applications ot control. 
Having imposed control, the Government exploited this 
opportunity of furthering :tts policy of expansive econo.mic plan .... 
ning of which up to this time much had been heard but little 
aoh1eved. The leaders of the Government lost no time 1n point-
ing out the advantages of the new le~1sla.t1on: that it would 
quickly relieve the serious plight of' sterling fundsJ that it 
off'<:ared d1st1nct possibilities of expanding the Dominion's 
le¢onda.ry industria$ and that it would provide the macn1nery for 
avoiding future crisea with our net overseas assets. On the 
other hand opponents of the Oovex·nment were eq,ually quick to 
point out the O-bvious disadvantages of the scheme: that there 
would be chaos in the inttial stages of the application of the 
J.:l.cenoing schemeJ that the roadjustment of trade to & certain 
1.3 2 
extent would be necessary; that the burden of administration 
would be heavy and thut bureaucracy would increase at the ex-
panse of demorcratic liberty in this sphere; that the quality 
o:r New Zealand manufactured. goods would prove inferior to 
imported goods; that the prices would rise before control could 
become effective and that in the internt>.tionul sph0re inves-tors 
would be further t•rightened away and that retaliB..to:ry measures 
would proba<bly follow .. 
The objectives of Import and Exohemge Control stated by 
the late Prime Minister, the Right Honourable M.J.Savage, &md 
Minister of lfina.nce; the Honourable Walter Na.sl'l1 W'ere as follows, 
(1) flTo safeguard exchange funds so that debt services might 
be met, and the po$1tion improved for pending conversion operations. 
(;_) t1';ro provide the means for "essential irnports tt; which might 
be expected to include raw l1lfuterials 1 requisites for primal'Y in-
dustries and goods which coulil not be economically produced in 
N:ew Zealand. Starling exchange was to be rationed in the 
following order of preference. 
1. Government debt services. 
2., Local body debt services. 
3. Pri~ate debt services. 
4. Mach1ne:ry for public work:s and ciafence .. 
5. Machinery for primary and secondary 1ndastr1ea. 
6. Raw materials .for industries., 
7. Other neoessi ties n<>t prod\lCed in New Zealr.nd~ 
a. LWC\U'ie$. 
(:3) To increase the production of consumable goods in New Zealand. 
1).3 
(.4) fo glve p:reteren<:e to th& t1n1ted Ktngdotn while •t1ll 
ab1ding by agreements w1 th other countrit~lh Control there.t'ore 
1nvol'Ved selection according to country ot' or1g1n. 
(S) To promote trad~ agreements based upon ''earmarked" 
exchange, 
(6) To insulate New Zeal~md against unfair competition. 
(7) Generally to imps>ove the standard ot living While avoid-
ing the depleti.on of exchrulge funds .. 
S1nee 19.38 much batt beiin w:ritten c..baut what would 
nave happened had the Oo'Vernment been leS$ lii4bi t1ous w1 th 1 ta 
public works policy; and hMi.they u:rrested the financial drift 
long before December 1938; but tnuoh·of this' is merely idle chatter 
and apart flrom being a guide to future policy, is or academic 
interest only. We are !lot oonc~P.~V'Jti . .;_ t 'bh~ moment w1 th tbe 
various methods whereby the o:rlsis could have been avoided; 
we are concerned $olely with tbe alternative methods which the 
Government could have applied to deal with the crisis after it 
bad ar:Laen, 
The first alternative perhaps, dealing with the depletion 
of London f'unds viOUld have bet~n &. form of exchange ra t1on1ns 
Tb.il!.l method would na.ve bee:n quite 
auftioient had it been the aim of the Government merely to con-
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t:rol ove:rseus .funds, But Government policy as has already 
bee.u noted extended fur beyond this_, l:lUd so by the very nature 
of Government policy this meth<:J<.l was ruled ou·t. 
A second method would helVe been to vary the exchange 
:rate either by pegging it at a higher level than the present 
one ( £ N.Z.12' ~ £ stg 100 ) or by unpegging it and allowing 
it to fix its own level.. This polioy would have the ma-nifold 
advantage of reducing imports, uffording further protection of 
New Zealand's secondary i.ndustr·ies 1 arresting the drain on capital 
and most importaut o1' all 1t would. have assi~ted the faru.;ing 
community by raising their money incomes. Moreov6~ this policy 
had been tried before in 1933, proved successi'ul &nd. waa t'amili&r 
to New Zaal&nd. On the other hand tbe raising of the rate of 
excha.nge in 19JJ had provided the then Labour Op: .. ·osit1on with 
substantial grounds for criticism of the Coalition Government 
and a :repetition at this stage would h:::~v@ the double dis-
advantage of being an open confession of' the failure or Labour 
and of being unpopular with the wage earning sections of the 
oommtm.t.ty. In addition 1$ is probable that the e:f':fects of this 
measure would have been too slow to salvage London funds. 
A third alternative would have bean to rc:J.ise a sub:Jtnntial 
loan overseas as a means of restor·ing London funds to a safe 
level, .At best this would. prove a temporary measure only. It 
suffered from the disadvantage of being opposed to Labour's 
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traditional policy, (that of' being freed from the flde'bt sla.very") 
and of being d:iffioult to implemmlt since the Dominion was in 
the unfortunat,e position of having to ask. &.cconuuod;;_tion from 
London. Unless the Government were prepared to reverse their 
rad.i.(~a.l policy, a loan, if it were possible to obtain, would 
have provided but temporary relief. 
The method of rationing exchange under the Import and. 
Exchange Control Regulations has been se~erely criticised in 
many quarters_ aac_be,ing- irksortre,costly and cuuibersome, As an 
alternative, rationing of exchange by th1;: banks ha:3 been ~tdvoca. ted. 
Professor A.H~Tool{.er supported this policy as follows t 
n..., ... - - - Hat1on1ng of exchange by the banks na.a been 
tried and proved in the pkst as o swift and effective 
method of cont:rol. It is simple <::-trlC! the least inconvenient 
o! all the methods, and the banks possess the knowl~dge, 
experience, and the orgl:illiSatio:a to operatEa it effectively. 
It was used in 1921 and again in 19.31 when overseas fu.n.ds 
were very short, and on both occasions was followed by the 
speedy restoration of normal tn!di.ng con0it1ons .n 1 
This is doubtless very true and mt1y have been th€1 rnethod 
adopted by the Gover.run•nt had their aim been ma:rely to l~e$tore 
London funds. But a.s bas already been noted, Government policy 
ha.d another a.im as well; to .furthe1· its policy of expansive 
economic plar.ming within New Zealand, and for this reason ration ... 
1ng of exchange by the banks was politically inexpedient. 
Other alternative measur0$ would have been to impose 
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higher ta.xoiffs, the raising of' interest rates aimed at internal 
daflhtlo:n or a radical change ot' Government policy. But again 
these measures w~re z·uled out as being politically impracticabl$. 
By the very nature or Government policy there was only ono 
avenue open to it. 
By December 1938 the Governm~nt was faced with a serious 
d1lemnta. '.fhe l•ss •t Lend•n funds had gone beyond the limits 
of safety and it was forced eith~r to abandon its radlcal 
eeonomio po11cy or to adopt stringent :uethods of control. The 
above alternative methods of dealing with this c:r1s1s, if' applied· 
earlier might have proved successful but they were op1Josed to 
Labour's traditional policy and were therefore politically in .. 
expedient. To abandon their radical economic policy would have 
bean an unconditional cont'ession of' !ail.ure,. it would h{cve 
precipitated a crisis within the Party itself. By imposing 
Import and lii.xctv.:tnw;e cont:rol the Government chose the only raal · 
alternative available. 
Xn introducing this new legi4'llat1on it was obviously 
impraoti.Qe.ble to widen the ma:rgin between e.x.ports and impo:rts 
from the side of exports. Cleal·ly too 1 it is fundamental to 
the welfare of New Zealcmd to maintain e~pot·ts s.t the highest 
le\Tel pos:sible. Export price$ ure always beyond the control 
o! New Zealvnd, and in any case the increasing of the volume of 
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exports cannot be achieved overnight by Orders .... 1H ... Ccunc11. 
Importfil therefore must be reducad. To giva efi't:~ct. to this policy 
two things were required; to control the SUPJJlY' of e.x.cnange 
and the.demand for it. 
To cope with the first o! these problems the Export 
L1cancin& Regulations were enacted. Expo:rt ot goocts oould 
only be effected under a Government licence end the proceeds 
must be paid into local or London branch o! a trad1ni bank .. 
whence they would aubse4.uantly be transferred to the laserve 
Bank 1n G$chang• tor New Zealand currency. This amount would 
then be credited to account or the licencee, This had the 
eCfeot of giving the Reserve Bank a monopoly o! exchange acc:ru-
in& £:rom the proe•eda or export receipts. It is not sur ... 
pr1a1ng under these conditions that a ttblack market" •hould 
d&Yelop 1n com"Ieotion with f1n~nce drafts payable on banks 
outside Naw Zsaland. 
the Import Control R•gulatio:ns were designed to re ... 
gulate the main de1uand for sterling exchange. The first pro ... 
blem for the Governmant was to decide to what extent the de .... 
mand for imports should be curtailed and this could be decided 
only by estirnat1ng tile amount of excha.r .. g.e available for imports 
aft!ilr making due allowances for the· amounts l'equired for both 
building up London 1'unds and rox· the payment of interest on 
ov~rseaa debt, public as well as private, 1 t llas been est:ima. ted 
that £N.Z.12 million •is.' :requireu annually to maet the Dominion's 
is 
interest bill and the amount of £N.Z.5 mil.lior,t/allowed for the 
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restoration of London funds to a safer level, giving a total in 
round figures of £N.Z.17 million. 'I'he balance of trade figures 
for the year ended JU.11e 1939 (worJdng on the 19.38 figures) would 
have been a.s followa=-
Export$. 
lmport1... . ... I- I; 
'"'! 6·~
This would. mean in other wo:r·ds thb. t the Dominion 1 1:1 :!.mports 
would have to be reduced by about £N .z .. 15 H'illion .. 
The Import Control hegulations empowered the Customs Depar-t-
ment to issue licences to importers and the Resorve Bank was empower-
ed to issue per·rui ts f'or overseas payments arising fron1 these licenced 
imports. Iillporte were prohibited except under of.f'icial liceDce or 
special permission or the Mi.n.ister of Custorns ~ In this connection 
the Minister was vestsd with extremely wide powers, ,in that he could 
grant, modify> or refuse a lic~nce.. In auui tion p:t·uvi::sion was made 
I 
for appeals against the conditions of any lie (.'.irwe, or the :ref'usal 
of the Depar-tment to grant a licerwe. Since it wo s also the aim 
o1' the Government to expa11d secondary industries within New Zealand 
as well as to :restore London funds, the De.partment of' Industries 
and Corru:n~x·ce was oon:sult.ed in c:wnnect.:l,.on w:i.th the t.P'anting of licences 
or hearing of appeals. 
There ware many obstacles prev~:Jnting th~1 effective operation 
of the new ach~me or import control. First,conf"usion between the 
139 
hanks, Customs Department and the Govtn·mnent aecentuuted the 
adm.inistrativ.s dif'f1cu.lt1os. Importers in pa:rtioular ~'.-ere handi-
capped by ttlo lack. of a clear-cut statement of Govt'!l'nruent policy 
:regax·d.i.ng the list of :rGstr1cted. and prohibited impor·ts and the 
carry .... over of licences after the expiration cf the first half ... 
yearly period of control. In addition it wa,e not altogether 
or use 1t merely as a mear.ts of restoring London funds to sa:fer 
l~vels. Had the Government intended merely to restore Lor1don 
funds the situation coulo have b6'en easily and spaed11y remedied. 
But that was not the case. T'ne Govsrnn1ent haci given avary 
reason to believ·e that control would be ~a permanant institution, 
ar~d that they int~nded t9 use it in addition, as a means of 
exp&t1ding .locul prod.uct1on and of p:rotectlng New Zealand's 
· secondary industries. To eJS.pand local sec~Jndary inthwtr1es 
vrithln i~~w Zeula:n.ct 1-t was fl(.;eaosary to :ua.ke provision for the 
importation of inr..:reased quanti ties of rew mtite:r1als 1 sem1-..t'ln1sh-
ed gooda and capital equipment. This m~ant that 1::erta1n classes 
or goods would have to be fw:·thel· ra~tricted if the Dominion t s 
overseas as~ets were to b6 restored. Importers wore consequently 
placed at u further disadvantage on account ol' tile unc~rt&inty 
of the types of goods wl!lct1 they would be pvrm1 tted to 1m port 
in the future a.nct by t.he failure of control to achieve its object-
iv~s in tho first half of 1939. Accordingly~ a coui'ere.nca of 
importers submitted the following r·ecollmmndatiow.r; to the 
Government. 
"That, having ;r·egard to the following Government obj oc tives. (1) Conservation of sterling. 
(2} Protect,ion.of local manufactured l.ines. 
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(3) Alt~ratio:ns in tho diroction o:r trodc 11 • 
the Govenunen t should: 
11 ( 1) fix the amount of .!Sterling e~wh impo:rter ca11. use for twelve 
111onths, bused on, ~ay, two or three yeul'B' &.verage Imports 
less wbntever peruen.tage the Go·,ra;r:nment con!:>iders necessary 
to conserve sterling funds., 
(2) Protect local articles of manufnctura by listing those 
which ere prohibited o:r· restx•icted by means of' a permit. 
~.3) Vary the direction of trads by listing itsws subjected 
1 
to restr1ot1on from certain countries. 11 
The Government 1 bowtllver, decided to continue with its 
present teo:tm1que of edm1n1st:ration and to impose even heavier 
restrictions upon imports for the second half ot 19.39, 
We oan now eon.~4,der ~ome of the mor& important effects or 
Import and :Ftlx.ch.<lnge Control. 
(VI) lfl'i'&!Q~~ , upont 
(a) .k\R9It~ .. 
During 1ts tirfllt'·hal:f' year of' opez·ution, the polieif 
did not achieve its object of restricting 1mpor·ts, Failure was 
due ~o a variety of eaust;s, chclaf of which were the !'act that 
so• orders ht.d been pla;J.ced prior to the introduction of control,. 
som.e anrewd importers may .have placed ofders 1n exoess of their 
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normal requirements, the 1rnpoi·t.::~t1on of ce1·ta1n r&w mate:ri11ls 
essential for establishing secondary industries within New 
Zealand and possibly the tact that licences granted had to be 
made effective during this period. The following table gives 
a comparison or the imports for 19J8 and 1939 (first half). 
¥ i N,,z,. lS· · , 
Fir's t · ha!r yea:r 
Second half year 
XP:iA··. 
.7 .1, 
2.8,.31 
' 5~ .Jt6 
21.20 
45/ • .J~"' ! 
+ 1.,0 
.... 7., 1 
.... 6, o; . . 
Exports during the same period had declined from £ N.,Z. !$8.,38 m 
1n 1938 to £ N.z. 5S.,01 • in 1939. It will be seen from the 
above tabl$ that, although control had failed to achieve its 
objective in the first hal! of 19391 some improvement was 
nevertb&less affected during the second half of that year. The 
exoesa·of exports over imports was£ N.Z, 8.6 m which .fell eihort 
of the amount ot £ N,Z. 12 m necessary to balance the 11 1nv1s1ble" 
items 1n the balance of payments. Consequently the Minister of 
Finance was despatched to London to raise a loan. 
Although there was a favourable trade balance of 
I £ N.z. 8.6 m , London funds did not accumulate as was anticipated. 
Various factors were responsible for this failure'* chief among 
which was the continued export of capital $hrough various channels~ 
Le$.kages were occuring through the trading banks, the Post Office• 
and to soma extent through the development of a nblack market," 
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After eix months. o;f' operation there wore ample grounds for 
believing that Import and Exchange Control had .fuiled to achieve 
their prime objective. The .following table give$ the position 
of net overseas sassets during the first six months of control. 
19)9 January 7.26 
February 9.06 
Maron 9.27 
April 9.00 
May 7,39 
J1uu~ . . ~·O' 
The effect of control on prices was not felt fully 
during the first ha.lt year of' oper·ation. This may 'me explained 
by the fact that the Govoz·nment '• $X.pans1on1at policy wa.a still 
expressing itself in increased im.pox•ts and some a:xport of capital 
As soon as the control became more effective a.nd im.,IJ()rts were 
drastically reduced in the second half of 19391 the full weight 
of the Government's policy began to !all on economic conditions 
within New Zealand. ConsequentlJ prices showed an upwara 
tendency, The following table will make these points cleal'er., 
- . n 
- ""L. •ndeJ; liYmB!!'f Qf Wbol!sa.le and Re:tf!d:l !:rice!. 
-fiti!~~l ~ii!~lQQ)-19:3~ Firat I . Quarter 1 .. 150 
2nd tt 152 151 
:3:rd tl 151 151 
4th tl 15.3 151 
1939 11Jtt tl 154 154 
2nd tt 155 156 
Jrd 
" 
157 158 
~~h II J6J J6j ~ . 
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Since the volume o:t: import trade in :relation to total 
trude is high in New Zealand and enters into econow1c activity 
of all kinds to such an extent that vary few industries are 
not affected by it, it follows that a heavy reduction o.t' :imports 
as conternpla ted by the Government must produce serious effects 
upon internal business activity. Tltis was more especia~ly the 
ease when it was intended. to expand secondary industries at 
the swne tirJte, fo:r such eJtpansion would n<1tcess1 tate 1ncrea:.3ed 
importations of producera goods and ra.w au.1.terl.als. This 1n 
turn would mean that even further drastic reductions of other 
imports would have to be af!ected. 'the following ta1.ble of 
the Classification of.' imports will sfj~ve to illustrate this point, 
Producers' Equipment 
Fuels and Lubricants 
Transport Equipment 
Consumers goods 
Q\!;U!tt , . , . , . • • 
; b ,. 
. f &I f 
# L _I _ , JOQ,Q. 
This table shows thut over 44 percent of total imports 
consisted of' producez·s materials and equipment. !n orde;c· to 
.,a 
maintain internal production at its existing level, this amount 
~ld have to be retained at le~~st. If secondary industries 
were to be expanded this amount would b:; .. ve to be increased. 
Adrd.ttedly some local manuf'a.cturars would stand to gain from 
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$UOh a pOlicy• b~t this section of the manUfacturing industry 
:Ls not large in New Zealand. .Much of New Zealand manufactur1l)g 
is concerned with the processing of primary products, or re .... 
pair trades; relatively little is concerned with purely second~ 
ary industries • !n addition production both primary and 
secondary would have to bear the add1t1onel burden of rising 
coste and pl'ices consequent upon the policy o:f control. 
In conclusion it mt:1.y be said that m&.nuf'acturars greoted 
the scheme of control with entllusia.sm, although iwp-ortars have 
experienced real d1f:t'1cul ty in obtaining p&.rmi ts ... 1.nd have con .... 
aequently suffered, ~e Govermnent must be given some credit 
for attempting to meet th~ crisis with measures which would 
spretd the burden and not undul;y penalil:ie the wage ea:x·ners and 
for endflavouring t() maintain their programme of social and 
economic reform, even if they failed to realise the more :f.m ... 
portant., implications of such a policy • On the other hand, 
it must be clear that the stu.ndard of living of the Dominion 
must fallJ the consumer must sut'fer through higher p:L"ices,. in ... 
!'erior goods and a narrower range or seleetion; and the pro-
ducer must suffer also through higher prices and costs. The 
crisis was brought about largely ty the Oove:r.·nment t s own ex-
pansive econo.llic policy and the failure to improve the position 
ea:rly 1n 19.39 was due largely to the Govex·nment persisting with 
its same policy, even though there may have be;jn some $cope for 
a certain amount of economic planuing within New Zealand. 
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Fortunately for New Zealand perhaps_. and unfortuna.tely i'or the 
rest of thtl world the outbreak o!' war 1n Septembt;tr 19.39, shi:f'ted 
the Government's economic problems ·to a di.ff"er·ent plane. 
CHAPTER X 
The purpose of this inquiry was to describe and analyse 
the more important aspects of the Labour Governrnentts economic 
policy during its first four years of Office (1936-19.39), and 
to ct·emon~trate how the achievement of this policy is conditioned 
by the charn.cteristics of the New Zealand econumy. Before 
proceeding to attempt an evaluation of this policy it will be 
convenient to restate briefly the origin&l aims of Labour Govern .... 
ment which were formulatt;;:d at a PaBty Conference in 1933. 
The aims were: .... 
(1) The State control of' Banking and Credit .. 
(~:) Hemoval of restrictions on deposits in the Post 
Office t~ading Bank. 
(3) Reorganisation of tho Mortgage Corporation into 
a State AdvLnces institution. 
(4) A guaranteed price prodedure for farmers~ 
(5) Statutory minimum wages and sale1!'ies. 
(6) A National Health Service. 
(7) National superarmua tiun. 
(8) Extension of educatlonk<l facilities. 
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{9) Reo:rg~~nisation of employment wlth 1m.med1~;.;te in-
creases of rate$ of relief pay and expansion of 
public works, 
{10) The expansion of secondary industries, 
It is important to remember however, that the paramount 
objective of the Government was the reduction or unemployraent. 
P'rom the !ore going discus~ion in CC\ruleCtion w1 th the 
economic experiments of' the Labour Government during the puriod 
under review, it is now possible to draw certa.in couclusions 
regarding the achievement of these experiments, and to establish 
some fundamental principles upon which &ny programme of economic 
reform in New Zealand must be based. · 
Thus by 1935 it was shown that economic conditions were 
agp.in approaching their pre ... depression level and New Zealand 
was well advanced on the road to recovery. This me11nt that 
the original program.:n:.e which was laid down in 19JJ, was more 
applicab.Le to the conditions then prevailing, than to those 
which were actually in existe:c1Ce when the Labour Government 
assumed office at the end of 1935. 
In the Preamble to the progr;;umue it was eJi~phasised that 
overseas prices and condi t1ons would no longer be allow<;;d to 
dictate New Zealand's standard of living, (tnd that by proper 
planning of production and the intelligent use of credit New 
Zealand woUld be able to eatablish 1 ts own st;:~ndat•d of living. 
Th1s belief, to say the least, is quite::; fullacious !'or the 
simple r.:mson that, by virtue o1' the '1dependenceH of the New 
Zealmd economy, e.Kport prices impose very definite limitations 
upon the standard of living. When the value of export receipts 
increase, the real inco1ae of i~ew Zealand is raised, but wuen 
this value shrinks, real income falls. No amount of rilonetary 
manipulation can altor this fundamentul t'(l,ct. The failure to 
recognise this fact, together with the confusion of money in-
oonle and real income, which is deep rooted in Labour's philosophy 
were the basic causes of many of the Govel'IL.'llEm t '.s dif'f'icul ties 1 
espcec1al1y those 1n connection w1 th the it• f1nr,nci.ul policy. 
For instance, when the Government •v:as no longer able to !'ine.nce 
its various undertakings from current revenue and lm-~ns fr•ow 
depa.rtn1ental sources, it proceeded to finance thern dix·ectly by 
advances from the Reserve Btmk. This expansion of exceso credit 
unbaaked by salea.ble goods, was the main c.:.use of tho rapid. 
depletion of net overseas assett> in the second half o:f 19.38. 
The Government vws f then faced with the alternative of' {oJbandon-
1ng its radic&l progrr:u:nu~e or of' drasticalJ-Y curtailing imports. 
NatUr£~lly 1 t chose the latter col;lrse, {hich was the only one 
open to it. But this did not enhble the Dominion to escape 
the consequences of u too liberal financial policy. 
With the imposition of !mport &nd Exch.::.nge Cont:rol, the 
effects of further credit creatiun were to fall with rull force 
upon internal economic activity, thus o.xei·ting an urhmJ:'d 
pressure on prices and. costs. This in tui'tl a.dve1·sely affected 
the Government's policy of stabilisation, particularly the 
guarhnteed price procedure. 
Although Imr;,ort and Exchange Control was aimed primarily 
at salvaging London funds, .t'ull adVG.nthge was taken of this 
opport'll:ni ty to exp;c,nd SBOondal'Y industries in an endevvour to 
produce locally the goods which could not be il11portt:1d. This 
policy has not succeeded, mainly bec;;Juse New Zealand is not 
favourably endowed with the resoux•oes neces:::<ary f'or industriul 
development. The f&ct is of course that an expc.nsion of' ex-
isting SI~all scalu industries is pos;;.;ible only at higher rectl 
costs than those at which imports could be purohas(!d. 1 and there ... 
fore a fall 1n the stand(,trd of living must follow. 
It should now be quite clear that real il\Come ceru10t 
be maintained, let ulone increased, by a mer·e increnst:.e in money 
income, and that the trend ot' events in the outside world re .... 
duces New Zealand t s real income, no amount of rnonet1 .. 'rY IIH.mipu-
lation can prevent the sta.ndk:lrd of' living from !'idling. This 
means th<:Jt, whatever the monut;.,ry :po11cy followed New Za~land 
must necessarily live within its I'S£tl income, hlld limit its 
consumption to the value of its protluetj.on, 
!n the sphere of price fixation the Gove.t'll!Jlt:mt bus ex-
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pur1enoed considerable difficulty .. T.t1e history of the gut:.rr..nteed 
price scheme for dairy prodcue snows thut the trend of prices 
so far hc.s been in ont.J direction only, namely upwnrus. This 
is of course inevito.ble, $0 lor1g as the Government continues 
w:L th its ini'la.tionary financiul policy which increo . .s>c;s the 
farmers' costs of production. Consequently the Govf~:c·nruent 
must either yield to the demands fox· higher prices and there ... 
fore increase the dangers arising from & series of deficits in 
the Dairy Industry Account, or else i·t must attempt to stabilise 
prices rmd run the risk of antt;.gonising the farming community. 
The first alternative, 11' continued over a number of yec=Jt's, 
WOUld wreck the guarantE:;~.:;d price procedure Hl togeth8l', while 
the second would be: an act of poli tiol',.l inso.ui ty, ~~specially 
for a Government which hus b to face an elHction every three 
years .. F'uture prospects are th€tr·efor@ not enoour·aging, 
It is im1lortant to notice to, that, because of the lack 
of well organiseti conswners t co ... ope!'c...i.tivcs in New zealt~nd, the 
vaz·ious price fixing schemes, including wheat control have 
bene.t'i ted the procluaers at the e.hpense of the corurwne:t·s. 
It was deJJtonstrated that the ach1t;}Vement of the Govern-
ment's policy for the ru.tio:uHlisatiun of 1nuu.stry, ·which effected 
some improvements in the hltll'keti;,g of f~cr, .. ,ing pl'Oduce left 
much to be desired in other branches of industl'Y. This WhS 
especially true of the t;rnnspQl't i:ndu0tr·y. There was no 
evidence to suggest that the Govormnent 11-i;d formulated a 
deliberate and considered policy, in fact it restored direct 
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political control of the r&ilways, despite the fact thLt the 
19.30 Committee of Investigation rnuintained th&t this political 
control 'Nas ntha root cause or meny of the ndlways t d1fJ1cul tie.s. 
R~gulation of' the trHWil~'ort 1ndw:Jtry hf;;S been largely concerned 
with the licensing oi' luotor tr<>nsport. In &dditiun this branch 
of the industry bus been subjected to heG~.vy t&.xation i'or pur-
poses other than road construction and msintenance. On trte 
other h,,nd, despite the fact th~;t the :railway retuz·ns during 
recent :r~tus have shown a. deficit of neal'lY £ N.Z. 2 rn. annually, 
the Government per~ists in constructing new r•ilw&y lines in-
volving a heavy expenditure of public money. When completed 
these lines will be less liKely to meut their :run.tdng costs, 
than those alrendy in operation. 
co-ordination oi' road and rail trt:1nsport, the Gov~;;;:rnmei1t ht-.lS 
merely descriminr.ted. heavily ageiiust .;otor traus;por·t and in 
favour of the railways w.h1cn ure State owned and oper·(·.ted. 
It will be recalll'ld that the paraiuount objective of the 
Laboux· Government was the reduction 01· unemployment~ VIi th 
this end in view a vigorous progrw.uir:e of public works was under ... 
taken, a forty .... hour week introduced, and the rutes of pay in-
creased, with the r0sult tbat ~public employruont expendod_ ao.n ... 
siderttbly. It was hoped that with the expanding wave of business 
p:rospsr1 ty, there would be a progressive tran~.:t"er from public 
to priv[J;te el:.Iploym~nt., But this was not the cc:Aso. In. the 
field of agriculture, for instance, employment r·eg1stered a 
slight but persistent contr~:!C Lii'..ln. The .fa.ilu:t·a of p;rivw.te 
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industry to ubsorb an r .. ppreei~;;ble nu.mber of the un~mploy;z;d 
may be attributed to the fact that the Government had super-· 
imposed a vigorous progr'HJJlJ;;e of public wor,ks on a boom period 
in the trude cycle .::.nd therefo:re px·ivate industry found 1 t in ... 
ere;:;( singly di.fficul t to compete with tt1tJ .higher wage ra t~lS and 
the improved working condi ti(Jns of public erJploymant. More-
over, because these intproved working conditions ~::md t,vage rates 
meat~ a narrower w~rgin of profits accruing to private industry, 
this field of' investment pl'oved los~ attr<-~-ctive, with the result 
that privBte industl'Y did not expc.~r1d as 'nould otherwise have 
been the case,. In this way Governtnent policy, hin.derea rather 
than helped th{; transfer frvm public to private etli~ploywent. 
On the other hf.:ind, as might be expBcted., morkad increases 
wer·e registered in 1ndustrihl a.nd ft~Ctor·y eL;ployment .:md i:ilso 
in the construction.srl ind.usttries. 
It is significant th~i t the u:e&sures adopted to combat 
unemployment wm·e palliatives only; they do not Lctteiiipt to re-
move un0;;nploy.ment by removing the economic: disloc.:;.tions which 
caused it • 
.An.other impol'tc.'.nt objective of the Government was the 
redistribution o:f' imcowe. Accordingly expenditure on soci[ll 
services, a specially in cormcction with the Sooi&l $ecuri ty 
Scherne, was greatly increased and extended. While it cormot 
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be denied that the lower income grou~s have benefitea to a 
aonsider&bla exte1:1t by tbia redistribution, the .fact remains 
that the unproductive expenditw·e o:t.· the StfSI,te has been in-
creased tremendously .. · Expenai ture. on social services z.;.lone 
has increased f:t•oru £ N.Z, 7 rnil.lion in 19.36 to .£ N,Z. 19 Million 
in 1940. 
The achievement of' the Labour Government's econumic policy 
must not be Judged by any one particular aspect &lont;:~J the 
policy must be considered us a whole. On the orw hand it may 
be concluded that New Zeb.land ia tlow better eyuipped to w.e0t 
another depres-sion anc;l to c.ope with the p:r·oblems of post-war 
reconstruction. It nas now such t.!Conoruic controls as a State 
central bank, an import selection policy, the control of 
.:f'ore1gn exchange, a measure of price control.J State marketing 
machinery and a. Social Secur1 ty Scheme. On the otrwr h.cJ.nd 1 t 
would <:ppeur th<:,t in its enthusi&5m to give eff~act to its 
rud1Chl prograniue, the Goverlru.aent hus ~ndHngei·eu. the ver·y 
foundr, tions upon which 1 ts succl'.:lss depencts. In other words 
it has }1lacect acted tion&.l burdens upon ~n ~J,ll'tHH.ly overbura.enoa 
system of' State .finance, without g1 viug aueq_Ubte conside1·a ti0n 
to the factor$ which gover·n the sources of public l'ClVenue. 
In particular the Government upp· ... ars to h&Ve almost completely 
overlooked the vital role which e.Aport t.'r1ces and overseas 
markets play in the p1·osperi ty o.f the Dominion. Moreover, 
not on.Ly did the confusion of woney income with l'eal income· 
prove a source of· diffieulty1 but it actually onticea the 
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Government to eubark upon a too liberal fiw:~uc1<:d policy v~i th 
disasterous effects upon New Zealand's net overseas ~ssets. 
li'rom the foregoing discus;" ion 1 t shuu.l(l nov;' bo po.Jdible 
to establish the fo-Llowing fu.nd~iiuental pr1nc1pl>:JS upon whioh 
any progranDile of economic refor·u1 in New ZealtJnd must be buiied. 
F'1rst the :real 1ncomo of ~ew z~aland is largely governed by 
export receipts, and the succe::Js of any BUCh prog:ttHH e depends 
upon their bouyancy. Stwond, tho fi~Ct that overseas pric4;;13 
ee.n deter·n:ine the fa t.e of the D(1minion' s 1-:rosperi ty, dt:%Onstr<:i tes 
clearly thB econo;r1ic inter-dtrpendence of the modern world and 
the urgent necess1 ty for creating t!w JH~H.;hinory noce.::;bary · to 
establish closl13r economic 1nte:rna ti()Jv.l co-L!peration. 
Thirdly i the trend to events during J.,ecant ye~jr~ in New Zeah;nd 
shows only too cloe;.rly that althuugh eco:nomic nntion.s.lis'"' way 
control the natione;l ecorHw.ty, it Chn go no farthe;t'; 1 t c.:H'lilOt 
r!:llstore reril prosperity"' Th•;;t depto::nds uron the restorntil)H of 
tl'ude, 
Finally econowic welfare tenus to b8 greatest 1•iith full 
production e;nd exchanee, for all consuijl.ption ner:e~'lsD.rily de .... 
pends on prouuction and exch2L;.ge. The policy followed in recent 
years h~£<S succeedod in tri:.tnsfering both men e>.na rcsott.rc .;,s which 
were norma.lly productively ej4•loy1:c:d into W'lprod.uctive cht:mnels, 
such as unproductive public ·works und unessuntia1 tc~dr:1inistrative 
services. This policy has fll.so lost sight of the necessity 
normt1l bvlcnce und seridusl:,, r,·Jt;;,;l'JJ~ the up.H't, t:i-:1n {)I' th~~;;e 
pric€ls by whlch,; 1t1 L i'l'li!Cl' t.;CvUvi~;i oi!:<tur·bHnCli:lb irL l.n:ol,~.nce 
problew of Sti.Cur1ug a b~lw:CO(~ Y~<OJ.'k.Ang ocork;:i;rt in WJ~iCf1 thB 
fullest rroducti•.,,:JJ ~.nu the L~ost <i::·<uit~.bl0! di!iitx·ibuti,_)n of t.bti 
~'l:inds oi ·'.;:.:; ;nw sut·vit:es must neodect by thB CVl!it.unity ••ill 
be .:,cbi~Pved. 
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